










Title of Document: IN THE COURT OF WORLD OPINION: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF 
FORCE AND CRISIS ESCALATION 
  
 Benjamin Jay Appel, Doctor of Philosophy, 2012  
  
  




In this dissertation, I examine how international law on the use of force influences the 
behavior of leaders in international crises. I argue that leaders are less likely to 
escalate militarily in international crises when the Charter of the United Nations and 
related legal principles prohibit the use of force compared to when international law 
allows for the right of self-defense. I argue that international law can constrain crisis 
actors from employing the large-scale use of force by facilitating the dynamics of 
reciprocity in crisis-bargaining. Crisis actors who act in accordance with international 
law can expect to receive greater international support, while actors that violate the 
law can expect to obtain less support. International law therefore promotes the 
peaceful resolution of international crises because actors with the support of third 
parties can credibly signal their intent to employ the use of force in self-defense and 
deter their adversaries from engaging in the aggressive and illegal use of force in the 
first place. I find strong support for my theoretical argument using both quantitative 
  
and qualitative methods. Using an original dataset on international law on the use of 
force in international crises from 1946-2005, I find that leaders are less likely to 
escalate militarily when international law prohibits the use of force than when they 
have a right to use force.  I also find that intergovernmental organizations are more 
likely to support leaders who have the right to use force, providing support for the 
underlying causal mechanism in my argument. Finally, I present a case study of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and find that international law contributed to President 
Kennedy’s decision to implement the blockade, instead of employing air strikes 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The US believes that international law plays an indispensable role  
in the world on countless issues, including the use of force.  
-Abraham Sofaer 






On June 25, 1945, representatives from 50 countries met at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization in San Francisco to vote on the final draft 
of the Charter of the United Nations. The significance of the day was not lost on the 
attendees.  As Lord Halifax, the United Kingdom’s delegate to the San Francisco 
Conference, said, “This issue upon which we are about to vote is as important as any 
we shall ever vote in our lifetime.”
1
 The diplomats approved the Charter in a 
unanimous vote the following day; it officially entered into force on October 24, 1945 
after the five leading powers - the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States - and a majority of 
the other signatories had ratified it.  Today, 193 countries have ratified the Charter 
and are bound by its legal obligations.  
The establishment of the Charter is widely recognized as a pivotal moment in 
the modern history of the international system. For the first time in history, leaders 






and other international actors agreed to a general prohibition on the use of force in 
their international relations, with only two exceptions: the right to self-defense and 
authorization by the newly created United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Indeed, 
the Charter and related legal principles on the use of force continue to make up the 
normative foundation of the post-World War II era. As the eminent legal scholar 
Louis Henkin (1989, 38) argues, “The Charter remains the authoritative statement on 
the law on the use of force: It is the principal norm of international law of this 
century.” 
Despite the significance attributed to the Charter and related legal principles 
by many policymakers and international lawyers, there exists very little systematic 
knowledge on the effectiveness of this body of law.  Legal scholars, for instance, 
have produced a substantial literature on the legality of using force, but have failed to 
adequately address why leaders comply with it. At the same time, political scientists 
with few exceptions overlook and often dismiss the constraints imposed by the legal 
principles related to the use of force, despite the increased focus in the literature on 
the role of international law in security-related disputes.   
  In my dissertation, I address this lacuna and investigate whether this body of 
law can influence the behavior of leaders in international crises. I conduct a 
systematic study on the effectiveness of international law by examining how it alters 
the decision of leaders to escalate international crises with the large-scale use of force 
from 1946-2005.
2
 I develop a theory that I call institutional reciprocity to explain how 
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 I use the terms UN Charter, international law on the use force, and international law 
interchangeably in this dissertation. While I recognize that the other sources of international 
law, such as customary international law and international courts have modified the Charter, I 




the legal principles related to the use of force can promote the peaceful resolution of 
international crises.  Using an original dataset on international law on the use of force 
and case studies, I find strong statistical and substantive support for my theoretical 




Compliance with international law including the legal principles related to the use of 
force has long puzzled legal scholars and political scientists. The international legal 
system lacks overt enforcement mechanisms, such as those that exist in the domestic 
arena, and actors often have short-term incentives to renege on agreements even if 
compliance was initially in their interests.  As Keohane (1984:99) puts it, “The puzzle 
of compliance is why governments, seeking to promote their own interests, ever 
comply with rules.” 
 Many researchers simply reject the effectiveness of international law, given 
that it is a primitive system of laws that lacks centralized enforcement mechanisms. 
Some of these scholars argue that international law has little impact on state behavior, 
especially in the security realm (e.g., Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Mearsheimer 1994; 
Waltz 1979).  Other skeptics argue that the law often reflects the interests of the most 
powerful states, and therefore it has no independent effect on state behavior. As 
Morgenthau (1967:3) states, “the actions of states are determined not by moral 
principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power. Moral 




other grounds, but they do not determine the choice among different courses of 
action.” 
 Many legal scholars and in recent years an increasing number of political 
scientists have called into question realist claims about the futility of international 
law. While proponents of the law have put forward a diverse set of arguments, the 
one common theme among them is that international law can influence the behavior 
of governments. Several notable legal scholars and political scientists working in the 
normative tradition and relying largely on the logic of appropriateness argue that 
leaders and other actors comply with international law because of the legitimacy 
associated with it.  They argue that the legitimacy of the law engenders a sense of 
legal obligation that induces states to comply with it.   
 Other researchers working in the rationalist tradition agree with normative 
scholars that the law matters, but they disagree on the reasons why. Similar to the 
skeptics, they accept that actors are self-interested, yet they argue that compliance 
with the law can be in the interests of states. Drawing on insights of international 
relations scholars working in the cooperation literature, these researchers argue that 
enforcement mechanisms, such as reciprocity, reputation, and coercion can help 
enforce compliance with international law (e.g., Abbott and Snidal 2000; Keohane 
1984; Huth et al. 2011, 2012; Morrow 2007; Simmons 1998, 2010).  
 A growing body of empirical evidence supports the position taken by the 
proponents of international law. Several scholars have found that states comply with 
legal principles related to economic and environmental issues (e.g., Busch & 




scholars have found that international law can constrain governments even in the 
security sphere. Huth et al. (2011, 2012) find in a series of articles that when the legal 
principles related to title to territory serve as a focal point, the law both promotes the 
peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and reduces the resort to force.   Legro 
(1995, 1996) and Morrow (2007) find that states often comply with the legal rules 
related to the conduct of hostilities during war. Likewise, Leeds and Savun (2007) 
find that governments generally comply with alliance agreements during war. Finally, 
Simmons (2009) has recently found that the law has led to better human rights 
practices domestically.  
 While scholars studying international law compliance have made important 
progress in recent years, the literature still suffers from three major problems 
regarding international law on the use of force. First, despite the burgeoning literature 
on the role of the law in security-related disputes, political scientists, as noted, 
continue to overlook and for the most part dismiss the constraints imposed by the 
Charter and related legal principles.  This is a consequential omission, given the 
widespread importance of this body of law among many policymakers and legal 
scholars.  
 Second, while legal scholars have produced a few studies on compliance with 
this body of law, they all suffer from important research design problems. Most 
importantly, legal scholars restrict their empirical studies to use of force cases only. 
This is problematic as it produces a biased sample that limits the inferences that can 
be made about how international law alters the decision to use force. Focusing only 




influences the decision to employ force in the first place. The effectiveness of 
international law therefore should be assessed by how it alters the decision-making of 
leaders in crises that include both use of force and non-use of force cases.  
 Third, existing research suffers from important theoretical problems. 
Rationalists criticize the normative scholars for assuming that leaders largely comply 
with international law, arguing that the legitimacy of the law as a constant cannot 
explain the variable nature of compliance.  At the same time, normative scholars 
argue that leaders often comply with international law even in the absence of 
rationalist enforcement mechanisms.  The extant literature, therefore, is unable to 
fully explain why states comply with the law.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
In my dissertation, I overcome the limitations in the extant literature by integrating 
and ultimately extending recent theoretical and empirical advances made in both the 
rationalist and normative frameworks to develop a theoretical framework that 
explains why governments comply with international law on the use of force in the 
absence of overt enforcement mechanisms. The theory that I develop, institutional 
reciprocity, explains how international law on the use of force promotes the peaceful 
resolution of international crises by altering the dynamics of reciprocity in crisis-
bargaining.   
 I argue that international law facilitates the reciprocal use of force in 
international crises by influencing the support of third parties (i.e. states and 




law serves as a “bright-line” that establishes what type of behavior is appropriate in 
world politics (Morrow 2007). International law on the use of force in particular 
legalizes and in large part institutionalizes the reciprocal use of force in self-defense. 
It informs international actors that the aggressive use of force is unacceptable and the 
right to use force in self-defense is acceptable. As a result, third parties are more 
likely to support crisis actors with the right to self-defense and withhold support from 
leaders who violate international law on the use of force.  
 Third parties can then alter the dynamics of reciprocity in international crises. 
Greater third party support for the use of force in self-defense and the corresponding 
lower third party support for the aggressive use of force helps crisis actors commit to 
the reciprocal use of force in self-defense and deter states from violating international 
law on the use of force. Consequently, crisis actors can enforce cooperation with 
international law by employing the reciprocal use of force in self-defense and 
reducing the payoffs for states that engage in the aggressive and illegal use of force. 
Based on this logic, I hypothesize that leaders are less likely to escalate militarily 
when the law prohibits it compared to when they have a right of self-defense. 
 
Empirical Findings 
I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to assess my theoretical 
expectations on the effectiveness of international law on the use of force.  First, I test 
my theoretical argument on an original dataset on international law on the use of 
force from 1946-2005.  I assess how the legal prohibition on the use of force 




international crises. I find strong statistical and substantive support for my hypothesis 
across a multitude of statistical estimators and alternative research designs.  Simply, 
leaders are less likely to escalate militarily when the law prohibits the use of force 
compared to when the law permits the right to use force.   
 Second, I use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to test the underlying 
causal mechanism in my argument on the behavior of third parties. Statistical tests on 
international crises from 1945-2006 indicate that intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) as proxies of third parties respond in a manner consistent with my argument.  
IGOs are more likely to support crisis actors that have the right of self-defense 
compared to actors that are without the right to use force legally. Additional statistical 
tests using the related legal concept of aggression produce similar results; IGOs are 
less likely to support actors that commit aggression than states that have refrained 
from doing so.  
 Anecdotal evidence on the behavior of third parties in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq 
Wars provides additional support for my argument on third parties. While security 
concerns, of course, played a role in the first Gulf War, primary and secondary 
sources also indicate that the legality of using force against Iraq contributed to the 
decision of many states in the international community to support the US-led 
operation to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. In contrast, the historical record also shows 
that although many states had reservations about the security implications of invading 
Iraq, they also withheld support in 2003 in part because the United States and her 




 Finally, I present a case study of how international law on the use of force 
contributed to President Kennedy’s decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The case study focuses on how the law influenced the two primary policy options in 
this crisis, air strikes against the missile sites in Cuba and the naval blockade.  Case 
evidence including several quotes from President Kennedy and his top advisers 
indicate that international law influenced their thinking during this crisis. US officials 
believed that the illegal use of force against Cuba would result in lower international 
support, while the OAS-approved blockade would engender greater support from 
friends and allies. The greater support for the blockade led in part to Washington’s 
decision to implement it instead of employing airstrikes.  
 
Contributions   
In this dissertation, I make at least four important contributions to the legal and 
international relations literatures. Most importantly, I find that international law on 
the use of force can serve as an effective constraint on the behavior of leaders in 
international crises. This finding overturns the conventional wisdom among many 
international relations scholars that reject the effectiveness of this body of law, 
advancing the literatures on both crisis escalation and international law compliance.
3
 
The results also provide support for legal scholars who espouse the importance of this 
body of law, yet lack systematic empirical evidence to support their claims.  
                                                 
3
 To be clear, I am not arguing that the law is more important than traditional explanations of 
conflict escalation, such as military power and domestic politics, but rather that the legal 
principles related to the use of force can also contribute to our understanding of conflict 





Second, I identify the foundation for international law’s authority in world 
politics.  In particular, I explain how the process of law-making establishes 
international law as a legitimate source of information in world politics. Doing so 
represents an important contribution since this insight can be applied to other areas of 
world politics, including other security concerns and even economic relations.  
Third, I overcome the limitations of existing theories on international law that 
restrict their focus to either rationalist or normative arguments by developing a theory 
on the effectiveness of international law that integrates both approaches. I 
demonstrate, consistent with the normative framework, that the UN Charter and 
related legal principles establish standards of appropriate behavior for using force in 
world politics and how this shapes the incentives of leaders in international crises.  In 
so doing, I contribute to recent trends in the compliance literature that also integrates 
normative and rationalist approaches (e.g., Kelley 2007; Morrow 2007; Simmons 
2009).   
Fourth, I develop an innovative research design that avoids many of the 
limitations in existing empirical research on international law compliance.  First, by 
studying crisis escalation, I focus on the effectiveness of international law instead of 
compliance with it. 4 Importantly, this allows me to incorporate my work into the 
conflict literature and address more directly how the influence of international law on 
crisis-behavior compares to the other explanations for crisis escalation.  Second, since 
all UN member states are obligated to comply with the Charter, my study avoids the 
problems of selection effects that can create inference problems for analysts (e.g., 
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Downs et al. 1996, von Stein 2005, Simmons and Hopkins 2005). We can therefore 
have greater confidence that complying with international law is about cooperation 
instead of states selecting into low-levels of compliance.
5
  Finally, my research on the 
Charter and related sources of legal principles (i.e., customary international law, 
courts, etc) expands upon the almost singular focus of political scientists on treaty 
law. 
 
Plan of Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, I briefly review the 
Charter and the related legal principles that make up this body of law.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide readers with a basic knowledge of this body of law to ensure 
that readers fully understand the context for my theoretical framework and empirical 
analyses. In Chapter 3, I review both the political science and legal literatures on 
international law compliance.  In so doing, I focus on the normative and rationalist 
divide that exists in the literature. Consistent with recent efforts, I find that the 
leading arguments are problematic and that it is necessary to integrate them in order 
to overcome their limitations.  Finally, I present my theoretical argument on the 
effectiveness of international law on the use of force. 
 In Chapters 4-6, I present my empirical evidence with two chapters using 
quantitative evidence and one chapter with qualitative evidence.  In Chapter 4, I test 
my theoretical expectations on an original dataset on international law on the use of 
                                                 
5
 I recognize that selection effects may impact my analysis in other ways. For instance, it is 
likely that the decision to initiate a crisis is related to the escalatory behavior of a leader once 
in the crisis, the focus of my analysis. I address this in more detail in my research design 
section below, and conclude that selection bias does not weaken my central finding that law 




force, in which I code the legality of using force for over 900 crisis actors. In 
particular, I examine the relationship between the prohibition on the use of force and 
patterns of escalation in international crises from 1945-2006.  In a series of statistical 
analyses, I find strong support for my theoretical expectations: leaders are at least 
45% less likely to escalate militarily in a crisis when international law prohibits the 
use of force than when leaders have a legal right to use force. In Chapter 5, I assess 
whether the United Nations and regional multilateral security organizations are more 
likely to support states that have the right of self-defense and less likely to support 
states that have committed aggression.  I find that IGOs are at least 38% more likely 
to support states that have the right to use force.  
 In Chapter 6, I present a case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis; the historical 
record indicates that international law contributed to President Kennedy’s decision to 
impose the blockade instead of employing air strikes against the missile sites in Cuba. 
Finally, I conclude with the implications of this dissertation, policy recommendations, 







Chapter 2: The Charter System 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I briefly review international law on the use of force. I first introduce 
the sources of international law, review the Charter of the United Nations, and then 
discuss the other legal principles that regulate the use of force. In so doing, I put 
forward my interpretation and understanding of this body of law based on my 
extensive reading of the legal literature.  My purpose is simply to introduce 
international law on the use of force to help readers better understand the legal 




Sources of International Law 
According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)  statute 38 (1), there are four 
primary sources of international law: 1) International conventions and treaties, 2) 
Customary international law, 3) General principles of international law 4) 
International judicial decisions, and the legal writings of highly qualified scholars.  
The first three sources are the primary sources of international law and follow a 
hierarchy in terms of their importance, while the fourth is considered a subsidiary 
source (Brownlie 1999).  Primary sources of international law create and contribute to 
the development of international law, while subsidiary laws are designed to help 
                                                 
6 
My intent it not too put forward a comprehensive review of the literature on international 
law on the use of force. There is an extensive and at times contentious legal literature on this 
area of law that is beyond the scope of this chapter.  For a more comprehensive review of this 




interpret the law.  The legal principles related to the use of force draw heavily upon 
all four sources of international law.  I briefly describe each source below.  
First, international conventions and treaties make up one of the leading 
sources on international law, and are widely recognized as the primary source of law 
today (e.g., Akehurst 1987; Brownlie 2008; Murphy 2006; Scott 2010; Shaw 2008). 
According to the Article 2.1 (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, a treaty is defined as, “an international agreement concluded between states 
in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments.”  Signatories (and in many cases 
ratifiers) are bound by the obligations contained in the respective treaty. Examples of 
treaties include Peace Treaties, Border Treaties, Extradition Treaties, and Treaties of 
Friendship.  
Second, customary international law makes up the second most important 
source of international law (e.g., Akehurst 1987; Brownlie 2008; Murphy 2006; Scott 
2010; Shaw 2008).  This is source of law develops through the widespread practice of 
states. Legal principles must satisfy two criteria to be considered customary 
international law: 1) state practice must be consistent and uniform in usage and 2) 
state practice must be based on a sense of legal obligation (opino juris).  All states are 
bound by the rules and regulations that are considered to be customary international 
law. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights is widely recognized as 
customary international law.  
Third, general principles of law make up the third source of international law 




source consists of principles that are common to almost all domestic legal systems or 
at least types of legal systems (i.e. Civil, Common, and Islamic) in the world.  
Examples include principles such as the binding nature of agreements, or principles 
of procedural fairness before a court of law. 
Fourth, the decisions of courts and tribunals and legal scholars make up the 
final source of international law (e.g., Akehurst 1987; Brownlie 2008; Murphy 2006; 
Scott 2010; Shaw 2008. As noted above, these two sources are secondary sources that 
clarify existing laws through their decisions and writings, rather than create new laws.  
The decisions made by the ICJ have had a major impact on the development of 
international law on the use of force.  
 
Charter of the United Nations 
The Charter consists of a preamble and 19 chapters on the maintenance of peace and 
security in the post-World War II era.  In particular, it includes chapters on United 
Nations Purposes and Principles, Membership, Organs, Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and 
Acts of Aggression, International Economic Cooperation, and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories.  The Charter’s legal obligations are paramount and supersede the 
obligations contained in all other treaties.   
 Most importantly, the Charter of the United Nations also serves as the primary 
source of law regulating the use of force in world politics. Specifically, it consists of a 
legal prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4)) along with two exceptions (Article 





The prohibition on the use of force is: 
Article 2(4):  
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
 
The first exception is: 
Article 51:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of collective or 
individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.  
 
The second exception is: 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members 
of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
 
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat of or use of force, while Article 51 and Articles 39, 
41, and 42 allow for the right to individual and collective self-defense in response to 




respectively. Taken together, the Charter attempts to completely outlaw the 
aggressive use of force in world politics.
7
 As one US delegate to the 1945 San 
Francisco Conference claimed, “the intention of the authors of the original text was to 
state in the broadest terms an absolute all inclusive prohibition; … there should be no 
loopholes” (Brownlie 1991, 268).   
  While the Charter is the primary source of law in this area, there are several 
additional principles from the other sources of international law that help interpret the 
Charter and in many cases expand upon its general prohibition on the use of force. 
The ICJ, for instance, in the well-known Nicaragua case that I describe below made 
clear that customary international law exists alongside the Charter (Nicaragua v. 
United States 1986, ICJ Report 14). In addition, the ICJ in the same case also ruled 
that the Charter provisions are dynamic rather than fixed and thus capable of change 
over time through state practice. As a result, international law on the use of force is 
far more complex and varied than the simple right to self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs.  Given this, I believe that it would be helpful to review some of the key legal 
principles in this area of law.   
 
Additional Legal Principles 
Scholars, leaders, and other international and domestic actors have all turned to the 
other sources of international law to help clarify the legal rules related to the use of 
force. Based on my extensive reading of the legal scholarship (e.g., Alexandrov 1996; 
Arend and Beck 1993; Dinstein 2005; Franck 1990, 2002; Gray 2008; O’Connell 
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2001; Ruys 2010). I believe that nine principles represent the core of international law 
on the use of force:  1) scale and effects, 2) necessity and proportionality, 3) location 
of the attack, 4) anticipatory self-defense, 5) protection of nationals, 6) non-state 
actors and the extra-territorial use of force, 7) interventions, 8) collective security, 
and 9) collective self-defense.  The first three principles (scale and effects, necessity, 
proportionality, and immediacy, and location) help interpret the Charter, the next four 
principles (anticipatory self-defense, protection of nationals, non-state actors, and 
interventions) exist alongside the Charter, while the latter two help to clarify the 
collective security system and the right of collective self-defense.  
 
Scale and Effects 
The first principle concerns the magnitude of the initial attack that is necessary to 
trigger the right of self-defense. The Charter’s prohibition on the use of force as 
stated in Article 2 (4) amounts to a comprehensive ban on the use of force. The 
Charter, however, only permits the collective or individual right of self-defense in 
response to an armed attack (Article 51).  Thus, the framers used different language 
when describing the prohibition on the use of force and the right of self-defense. The 
decision to use  the language “armed attack” instead of more general words, such as 
the use of force or even aggression suggests that there is a gap between what the 
Charter prohibits (use of force) and when the Charter permits the right of self-defense 
(armed attack).  
 Scholars debate about whether this gap is consequential. The central 




threshold to trigger the right of self-defense. Some argue that states always have the 
right of self-defense in response to the use of force, regardless of the magnitude of the 
level of force used in the initial attack (Wilmshurst 2006).  In other words, they argue 
that a threshold does not exist. In contrast, others argue that the gap is meaningful. 
These scholars maintain that the gap implies that governments only have the right of 
self-defense when the initial attack is above some minimal threshold.
8
   
 In this dissertation, I side with the majority of legal scholars that argue that the 
gap is meaningful. As such, I move forward with the interpretation that the attack 
must be of sufficient gravity to qualify as an armed attack and trigger the right of self-
defense. Specifically, the use of force must result in or have the intention to cause 
casualties or significant property damage.  Thus, minor border incidents that do not 
cause casualties or property damage do not permit the right of self-defense. Scholars 
who hold the majority opinion cite two primary sources of international law that 
provide evidence to support their position: 1) the Definition of Aggression and its 
travaux (preparatory works) 2) the ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua vs. the United States 
that was later confirmed by the ICJ in several of its other decisions.  
 First, in 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Definition of 
Aggression.  The purpose of the resolution was to help the international community 
identify what acts could be understood as either aggression, an armed attack, and so 
forth. While the international community struggled with precise definitions, the 
travaux and the resolution itself provide some guidance on this matter.  As Ruys 
(2011) argues, the drafting of the resolution indicates that governments generally 
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believe that the use of force can fit into three distinct categories based on the 
magnitude of force used:  1) the use of force, 2) aggression, and 3) armed attack.  The 
implication of this is that while all three types of force are illegal and aggression 
constitutes an international crime, only the third category allows for the right of self-
defense.    
 Furthermore, Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression specifically states that 
some use of force may not be of sufficient gravity. Other articles also distinguish 
between different levels of force.  Article 3, for instance, specifically refers to 
conduct of particular gravity, such as an invasion by armed forces. The Definition of 
Aggression, therefore, suggests that there is a distinction between frontier or other 
minor incidents and armed attacks.  
 Second, the International Court of Justice’s decision in the case brought by 
Nicaragua against the United States in 1984 provides strong evidence in favor of the 
threshold argument. The well-known Nicaragua case is one of the most important 
cases on the use of force. In short, the case concerned the legality of the US’s 
decision to support the contras and use force to help destabilize the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua. The US argued that it had the right to use force against 
Nicaragua based on the principle of collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador. 
They claimed that Nicaragua engaged in an armed attack against El Salvador by 
supporting rebels that were trying to overthrow the El Salvadorian regime.  
 The ICJ decided in favor of Nicaragua for four primary reasons 1) no 
evidence of an armed attack by Nicaragua, 2) El Salvador did not request the help of 




fight in El Salvador, and 4) US was permitted to assist El Salvador domestically 
based on collective self-defense, but she could not use force in collective self-defense 
outside of El Salvador’s borders.  In other words, the ICJ rejected the US position that 
Nicaragua’s support for the rebels fighting the El Salvadorian government amounted 
to an armed attack that provided the US with the right of collective self-defense.   
 More specifically, based on both the Definition of Aggression and customary 
international law, the ICJ ruled that the supply of arms and other forms of assistance 
to armed bands could not be considered an armed attack.  At the same time, the Court 
acknowledged that a state could be culpable for an armed attack if they directly sent 
the armed groups on their behalf.
9
 As the Court declared, “the court sees no reason to 
deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the 
sending by a state of armed bands to the territory of another state, if such an 
operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed 
attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed 
forces” (Nicaragua Case, ICJ Reports 1986, 103-104).  Thus, the ICJ distinguished 
between less grave forms of force (e.g. frontier incidents) and grave forms of force 
(armed attack), and it explicitly acknowledged that a gap exists and consequently 
appeared to confirm that there is a difference between aggression and an armed 
attack.  Most legal scholars now accept that the Nicaragua case established that there 
is a minimal threshold for an attack to be considered an armed attack.
10
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 I discuss in greater detail below the specific legal principles related to state support for non-
state actors.  
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 The ICJ affirmed the threshold criteria in several cases, such as the Oil Platforms Case (US 




 While the ICJ decision has been widely criticized on the distinction between 
large- and small-scale attacks, it is consistent with customary international law that 
the use of force must cross a certain threshold to be considered an armed attack (Gray 
2008). Even the eminent legal scholar Yoram Dinstein (2005, 174), one of the leading 
critics of the Nicaragua decision, accepts that “an armed attack postulates a use of 
force causing human casualties and/or serious destruction of property...when recourse 
to force does not engender such results, Article 51 does not apply.”
11
   
 The ruling made by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission as part of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration provides a useful example of the threshold 
requirement (Gray 2008). In this case, both parties disagreed on who started the 1998-
2000 war, and consequently disagreed on what party should be held responsible for 
the damage inflicted during the conflict.  Eritrea justified its use major use of force by 
claiming the right of self-defense in response to Ethiopia’s illegal occupation of its 
territory, and that they were only responding to Ethiopia’s prior use of force. Ethiopia 
claimed, in contrast, that the several border incidents that took place between the 
combatants did not constitute an armed attack, and therefore did not provide Eritrea 
with the right to employ the large-scale use of force in self-defense. The Arbitration 
panel rejected the claims made by Eritrea by deciding that the minor incidents 
initiated by Ethiopia were geographically limited clashes between the adversaries that 
did not reach the magnitude of an armed attack. Gray (2008) argues that the Court’s 
decision affirms the gravity condition.  
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 In sum, several sources of international law (i.e. customary international law, 
ICJ decisions in several cases, the Definition of Aggression, etc) all indicate that an 
attack must be above a certain threshold to amount to an armed attack and trigger the 
right of self-defense.  It is, however, also important to note that this gravity threshold 
should be set relatively low, as several scholars argue that customary international 
law also indicates that the minimum threshold required for an armed attack should be 
interpreted flexibly and it should not be set too high. Thus, we can conclude that 
while there is a gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51, the difference between the 
two is relatively narrow and for the most part it only precludes minor border incidents 
that fail to result in casualties and significant property damage from triggering the 
right of self-defense.  
 
Accumulation of Events 
The above section established that small scale attacks do not permit the right of self-
defense.  Several commentators argue, however, that there exists a partial exception 
to this rule, the accumulation of events doctrine (e.g., Blum 1976; Bowett 1972; 
Dinstein 2005, 202, 230-231; Ruys 2010, 168-169).
12
  This principle involves the 
right to use force in self-defense in response to repeated attacks that are linked in 
time, source, and cause. In particular, scholars argue that it is widely accepted in 
customary international law that states may have the right of self-defense in response 
to a series of repeated minor attacks and/or incidents, even if each individual attack is 
below the required threshold. In this way, a state can legally use force when it is the 
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victim of a series of repeated patterns that in totality amount to an armed attack. 
Several states have justified the use of force based on this principle; for example, 
Israel has claimed this right on a regular basis in response to terrorist attacks (i.e., UN 
Doc. S/2003/976), Lebanon in response to Israeli violations (UN Doc. S/2003/148), 
Iraq in response to US/UK air strikes (UN Doc. 2/2001370), and Russia in response 
to sorties from Georgia (UN Doc. S/2002/1012).  
 The ICJ case Cameroon vs. Nigeria provides a useful example of the 
accumulation of events doctrine (Cameroon vs. Nigeria, ICJ Reports 2002).  For 
years, Cameroon and Nigeria were involved in a territorial dispute over their mutual 
claims of sovereignty to the Bakassi Islands and other nearby islands. As part of the 
ICJ case, Cameroon blamed Nigeria for several border incidents that took place 
between the adversaries and requested that the ICJ make a ruling on the attacks.  
Cameroon also requested that the court consider the incidents collectively, as opposed 
to rule on each individual attack. Cameroon claimed that they had the right of self-
defense because the repeated nature of the small scale attacks amounted to an armed 
attack, even if each individual attack failed to cross the armed attack threshold. Gray 
(2008) argues that Cameroon’s behavior clearly indicates evidence of the 
accumulation of events doctrine in customary international law.
13
   
 In sum, several scholars note that this doctrine holds widespread support in 
customary international law and that the accumulation of events allows for the right 
of self-defense in response to a series of attacks.
 14
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 The ICJ ruled that the disputed territory belonged to Cameroon.  
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A related legal principle concerns the intent of the state using force. Several sources 
of law indicate a government can only use force in self-defense when they are the 
victim of a hostile act or the deliberate use of force. In other words, states do not have 
the right to use force when the initial attack was an accident or if they were not 
otherwise intentionally targeted.  
 In the Oil Platforms case (Iran vs. US), the ICJ affirmed the necessity of intent 
for determining whether a states has the right to self-defense (e.g., Dinstein 2005, 
209-210; Gray 2008, 151-154; Gazzini 2005). In this case, the US used force against 
Iran in response to two previous militarized incidents. First, an Iranian missile hit the 
Kuwait tanker, the Sea Isle City, which had been re-flagged as a U.S. vessel. Second, 
the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine in international waters near Bahrain.  
The US claimed that the attacks amounted to an armed attack by Iran and, therefore, 
they had a right to self-defense against Iran.  The ICJ rejected the US claims and 
ruled that the Iranian attacks on US vessels in the Persian Gulf did not constitute an 
armed attack on the US, because Iran was not directly targeting US property, at least 
based on evidence provided by the US.  As Gray (2008) argues, the ICJ decision 
suggests that an attack should be considered a frontier incident or something similar 
and not an armed attack when there is no intent to carry out an armed attack, 
including accidental incursions or incidents where soldiers and/or officials contravene 
orders from the government.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
condemned by the international community.  The criticism, however, was largely due to the 




Necessity, Proportionality, and Immediacy  
The principles of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy largely provide the 
foundation for this body of law and thus play a primary role in helping states and 
other actors identify when an armed attack has taken place and when a state has the 
right of self-defense.  Together, they maintain that the use of force in self-defense 
must not be retaliatory or punitive and its aim should be to halt and repel an ongoing 
attack by employing the use of force that is similar in magnitude to the initial attack.  
The ICJ has affirmed the primacy of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy in 
several cases, such as the Nicaragua case, the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Force of Nuclear Weapons, the Oil Platforms case, and the DRC v 
Uganda (Gray 2008). 
 The well-established legal principles are based on customary international 
law, dating back to an incident known as the Caroline Affair in 1837. In brief, 
Canadian and British troops attacked The Caroline, a ship owned by US nationals, in 
US waters that they believed was providing aid to Canadian rebels. The troops 
boarded the ship, killed several Americans, and sent it over Niagara Falls.  Following 
the incident, the US complained to the British about the nature of attack, and that the 
UK had no right to attack the US ship. In the course of diplomatic correspondence 
between the two states, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster claimed that a state 
engaging in anticipatory self-defense, the relevant legal principle, was required to, 
“show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation. The action must involve nothing unreasonable or 




that necessity, and kept clearly within it”   (Jennings 1938, 66). Both the US and 
British acknowledged the merits of the Secretary’s logic, and the so-called Webster's 
formula was born. In fact, Webster’s formula and the ensuing principles of necessity, 
proportionality, and immediacy are largely considered a cornerstone of international 
law and applicable to all areas of self-defense (and other areas of law), even beyond 
anticipatory self-defense.  
Necessity  
There are three primary rules that clarify when the use of force in self-defense can be 
necessary (e.g., Brownlie 1991; Gardam 2004, Cassese 2001). First, the purpose of 
the use of force in self-defense should be to halt or repel an ongoing attack. Second, 
necessity is based on the principle of last-resort; the use of force is only permitted 
when all other peaceful means have been exhausted.  Third, in situations when the 
attacker has terminated the armed attack, self-defense is permitted only if there is 
compelling evidence that more attacks will imminently follow.
15
 In this way, the use 
of force must be preventive in nature and not be punitive or motivated by punishment 
(i.e. deterrence alone is not sufficient to allow for right of self-defense).
16
  Finally, 
reprisals are generally agreed to be unlawful. 
 Israel’s use of force against Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981 is a good example 
of a state violating the necessity principle. In response to the Israeli air attack that 
destroyed Iraq’s suspected nuclear facilities, the United Nations Security Council 
passed a resolution condemning the use of force as a violation of the Charter (1981 
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 The accumulation of events principle discussed above is also relevant here.  
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UNYB, 275; UN Doc S/14510).  Even the United States, a frequent supporter of 
Israel, criticized her for failing to exhaust all peaceful means.  
 
Proportionality  
Proportionality implies that the use of force in self-defense must not exceed in 
magnitude or in scale the initial attack triggering the right of self-defense (e.g., 
Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996; Gray 2008; Simma 
2002).
17
   There are two principles that help clarify the proportionality principle: the 
target and location of the response.  
 First, the use of force in self-defense must generally be directed at the source 
of the armed attack.
18
  The US abided by this principle when it used force against Iraq 
in 1993. In April 1993, there was a failed assassination attempt against the former US 
President George Bush in Kuwait. Within two months, the United States traced the 
explosives to the Iraqi government and concluded that Saddam Hussein was 
responsible for the attack.  On June 26, 1993, the US employed air strikes against 
Iraqi Intelligence headquarters in response to the attack. When the US justified the 
use of force to international community, they emphasized that its military raid was 
solely aimed at the target directly linked to the operation against President Bush (e.g., 
Gray 1995; Kritsiotis 1996; Reisman 1994).  
 Second, the location of the response is also an important consideration. When 
the attack is an isolated incident, it is generally recognized that the victim state has to 
limit itself to what is commonly referred to as an “on the spot” reaction. In other 
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States, however, are not restricted to employing the same weapons or approximately the 
same number of troops as used in the initial attack.   
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words, they are only allowed to use force against its adversaries in the exact location 
of the attack. In contrast, customary international law has established that victim 
states have greater flexibility in responding with force when they are targeted by 
consecutive and/or large scale attacks.  Put differently, when a state is the victim of a 
series of repeated attacks, it may use force that would otherwise be considered to be 
disproportionate. A victim state, therefore, is not obligated to restrict itself to an on 
the spot reaction following several attacks, but rather it may use force beyond the 
location of the attack.  
 Several states have used this rule to justify large-scale attacks following a 
series of repeated, but small-scale attacks, especially against non-state actors. In 
2006, Israel used this rule to justify its response to Hezbollah’s attack that resulted in 
several fatalities and the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. Israel claimed that it was 
targeting Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, even beyond the exact location of attack in 
Southern Lebanon, due in part to the fact that Hezbollah had engaged in several 






Immediacy makes up the final principle stemming from the Caroline Incident and 
Webster’s Formula (Ruys 2010, 99-103).   It is generally regarded that a state acting 
in self-defense should only use force when the armed attack is in process (i.e. repel or 
halt an attack).   Scholars argue that according to customary international law that the 
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exact time between the beginning of the armed attack and the initiation of self-
defense should be interpreted somewhat flexibly (Ruys 2010).  This is for two 
primary reasons.  
 First, the bureaucracy of government often requires that states have additional 
time to make a final decision about employing the use of force. For instance, the 
different branches of government often have to negotiate and agree to the exact nature 
of the response, as well as prepare appropriate military plans for the response.  The 
US raid on Iraqi intelligence discussed above is a useful example of flexible nature of 
the immediacy principle. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that 
the US required a time lag to properly investigate the assassination attempt and 
identify those responsible for it (Murphy 2001). 
 Second, the accumulation of events doctrine is once again relevant here, and 
allows for a time lapse between the initial attack and the use of force in self-defense. 
If there is compelling evidence that further attacks will follow, states can use force 
even after the attack has ended in order to prevent and impede future attacks.  
The crisis between the UK-Yemen in 1964 is another useful example of the 
immediacy principle.  In 1964, Yemen attacked Saudi Arabia – a UK colonial 
possession. A day later, the UK responded with air raids against a police station in 
Harib, Yemen. When the UK justified its response, they claimed that, “defensive 
measure undertaken by a responsible Government requires preparation and the proper 
approval just as any other measures. In the present case, such planning and approval 
was necessary to ensure that those responsible… were involved in the attack and the 




there is widespread agreement that the use of force in self-defense can under certain 
conditions be carried out after the initial armed attack has ended.  
 
Location  
Article 51 states that the use of force is prohibited “against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.” This leaves open the question about how to 
classify attacks against state property outside of the territory in question, such as 
embassies and military bases. While there is some debate, commentators largely 
agree that a state can be the victim of an armed attack, regardless of geographic 
location, as long as the attack is on official emanations of the state in question, such 
as embassies, armed forces, or other official state property. In this way, an attack does 
not have to take place on the territory of the targeted state in order to be considered an 
armed attack.  
 The ICJ affirmed this principle in the case brought forward by the United 
States against Iran (Ruys 2010, 201; Schachter 1985; United States v Islamic 
Republic of Iran, ICJ Reports 1980). In November 1979, Iranian militants attacked 
and seized control of the US Embassy in Tehran, seizing control and holding 52 
members of the US diplomatic staff hostage. In May 1980, as the hostage crisis was 
still ongoing, the ICJ ruled that Iran had violated the most fundamental principle of 
relations between states and it violated its legal obligations to the United States.  The 
ICJ furthermore called for the immediate release of the hostages, among other 
considerations. Several legal scholars maintain that ICJ decision suggested that the 






Anticipatory self-defense is one of the more controversial legal principles. The debate 
concerns whether states still have this legal right to use the preemptive use of force, 
since the UN Charter specifically states that there is only a right to self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs.   Despite the precise wording of the Charter, Arend and Beck 
(1992, 79) argue  “it is also clear that there a great many states that… support the 
proposition that in certain circumstances it may be lawful to use force in advance of 
an actual armed attack.”  
 Consistent with the widespread practice if not belief of states, I believe that 
there is a limited right to anticipatory or interceptive self-defense.
20
 Specifically, I 
concur with Dinstein (2005) who argues that states have a right to interceptive self-
defense in that the beginning of an armed attack does not have to be synonymous 
with the first shot fired. Rather, it is more about whether the attacking state has 
passed some sort of threshold, irrespective of the actual use of force. In other words, a 
state does not have to absorb the first hit in order to have the right to self-defense. The 
right to anticipatory self-defense, however, is a very limited right; a state can only use 
force if there is clear and compelling evidence that an attack is imminent.   
 The 1967 Israel-Arab War is largely considered one of the few genuine cases 
of the anticipatory use of force since 1945 (Oren 2002; Shapira 1971; UNYB 1967, 
195-196).  In June 1967, Israel preemptively used force by launching surprise air 
strikes against Egypt. Israel claimed that it had the right to preemptive self-defense 
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for five primary reasons: 1) Egypt began massing its troops in the Sinai Peninsula, 2) 
Egypt expelled the UN forces from this area, 3) Egypt declared that the Straits of 
Tiran were closed to Israel, 4) Egypt and Jordan signed a defense pact, and 5) Iraqi 
troops began deploying in Jordan. Israel claimed the Egyptian actions in combination 
indicated to them that there was clear and compelling evidence that an attack was 
imminent, and that therefore they had the right to interceptive or anticipatory self-
defense. While there was some criticism of Israel, mostly by Arab nations, the 
international community largely accepted that Israel had the right of self-defense in 
response to the aggressive actions taken by Egypt.  
 
Protection of Nationals 
Another controversial principle is whether attacks on private citizens or other non-
governmental actors abroad permit governments to use force in self-defense.  Several 
scholars argue that there is a doctrine, the so-called protection of nationals principle, 
that allows states to use force to protect nationals abroad. Researchers have posited 
several reasons to justify why there is a legal right for states to protect nationals. First, 
it was legal under customary international law long before the creation of the Charter 
(e.g., Bowett 1958). Second, scholars argue that an attack on a state’s citizens is 
tantamount to an attack on the state’s homeland (Arend and Beck 1992). Third, some 
lawyers have suggested the right to protect nationals is a use of force that falls below 
the threshold of Article 2(4). In other words, it is a “de minimis” use of force that 




reject the right to protect nationals since there was not an attack on the territory or an 
official body of the state (e.g., Akehurst 1987; Henkin 1979; Ronzitti 1985).   
 Regarding state practice, Frank (2002) argues that when the facts are widely 
seen to warrant a preemptive intervention on behalf of endangered citizens abroad, 
and if the UN is unable to act, there is a legal right to use force to protect nationals.   
He argues that the international community is most likely to condone the use of force 
as long as the motive of the state is genuinely to protect its citizens, the use of force is 
proportionate, and it results in minimal collateral damage.  As such, he concludes 
based on customary international law that there is a right to protect nationals when 
there is clear evidence of extreme necessity.  
 Following Franck and several other leading scholars, I accept that states have 
a very limited right of self-defense to protect nationals in foreign states, as long as 
several conditions are satisfied. First, nationals must face imminent threat of injury or 
they must be in grave danger. Second, the state they are residing in must be unwilling 
or unable to protect the foreign nationals. Third, the use of force must only be used to 
protect the nationals. In short, the protection of nationals exists, but it is a very limited 
right.  
 The Israeli rescue operation in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 is widely recognized 
as the quintessential case of the protection of nationals doctrine (Ruys 2010; 96-98; 
UN Doc. S/PV.1939). In June 1976, Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Air France 
plane with 248 passengers and flew it to Entebbe, Uganda.  The hostage-takers 
released all non-Israeli passengers. On July 4 Israeli Special Forces without the 




three of the hostages who died during the course of the operation or shortly thereafter. 
At the United Nations, Israeli defended its action as legal and even cited legal 
scholars, such as Derek Bowett during the debate held at the UN. While there was 
some criticism of Israel, the Council and the General Assembly refrained from 
criticizing her.  
 The international reaction to another rescue attempt provides further support 
for a limited right to protect nationals that are threatened abroad (Ruys 2010, 229). In 
1978, Egypt claimed the right to protect nationals after Arab gunman seized and held 
several Egyptian hostages in Cyprus.  Without permission, Egypt entered Cyprus to 
free the hostages and even engaged the Cypriot soldiers in a battle that resulted in a 
number of casualties for both sides. Despite this, Egypt was not censured, and no 
discussion was held at the UN (Ruys 2010). 
 Finally, the international community has also not hesitated to condemn states 
when the use of force goes beyond the strict right to protect nationals (Gray 2008, 
156-160). For example, the US relied in part on the protection of nationals doctrine to 
justify its interventions in Panama (1989), Grenada (1983), and the Dominican 
Republic (1965). Many states, however, doubted that the US intentions were limited 
to the protection of its nationals.  Instead, they claimed that it appeared that the US’s 
real intentions were to overthrow or at least weaken the ruling governments in all 
three cases.  As such, the US found itself heavily criticized; the General Assembly 
condemned all three interventions and the OAS condemned the Panama invasion, 
while the US was only saved from condemnation by the Security Council by the 




Non-state Actors and Extra-Territorial Use of Force
21
 
In recent years, the use of force against non-state actors, such as terrorist and rebel 
groups, and in some cases their state supporters have become two of the most 
important principles regulating the use of force.  This is in response to the changing 
nature of political violence, whereby non-state actors have become increasingly 
responsible for acts of violence against both states and citizens across the globe. In 
particular, there are two primary questions relating to the use of force by non-state 
actors: 1) can non-state actors commit armed attacks and trigger the right of self-
defense and 2) can a victim state use force against states that support non-state actors.  
I begin with the first principle.  
First, traditionally, only a state could be responsible for an armed attack and a 
non-state actor could be culpable for an armed attack if the attack could be attributed 
to a state. More recently, however, international law has responded to the growing 
relevance of non-state actors and the changed nature of political violence (e.g., 
Cassese 2001; Franck 2001, 20022; Greenwood 2003; Lubell 2001; Schachter 1989; 
Tams 2009; Wilmshurst 2008). As such, since 1993, it can be accepted that a state 
can respond in self-defense to the use of force against non-state actors, even when the 
non-state actor resides in another country and the attack cannot be attributed to the 
host state.
22
  As Franck (2002, 67) argues, “It is becoming clear that victim-states 
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assessing the right self-defense in response to attacks by non-state actors. I understand that 
there are some differences between the two, but the major restrictions and criteria for 
responding with force are similar across the two actors.  
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 I rely on 1993 as the year when this body of law changed due in large part to the 
widespread support for the US following its use of force against Iraq in 1993 after the 
assassination attempt against President Bush.   While the armed attack was committed by a 




may invoke Article 51 to take armed countermeasures against any territory harboring, 
supporting or otherwise tolerating activities that culminate in or give rise to insurgent 
infiltrations or terrorist attacks.” 
There are some important restrictions, however.  First, the attack must be 
large; the required threshold is larger than it is for attacks by states. Second, the acts 
must form part of a consistent pattern of attacks and not merely be an isolated or a 
sporadic attack. Third, a target state can only enter the territory of another state to 
attack the non-state actor if the host state is either unwilling or unable to stop the non-
state actor. Fourth, it must be clear that law enforcement, as opposed to military 
actions, would be unsuccessful. In other words, the use of force must be a last resort. 
Fifth, forcible reprisals aimed at punishing non-state actors that are punitive in nature 
are unlawful; only protective actions that are necessary to prevent a major attack or 
imminent attack are allowed (e.g., Cassesse 2001; Wilmshurst 2008).  
Several recent events suggest that states are now permitted to use force against 
non-state actors or related acts of terrorism.  Most importantly, the United Nations 
Security Council settled any lingering uncertainty over this principle when it 
authorized the use of force against Al-Qaeda following the attacks on 9/11. Likewise, 
both the NATO and OAS invoked the right of collective self-defense, implying that 
the US was the victim of an armed attack.   
Second, the international community’s reaction to the US use of force after 
the Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Somalia in 1983 provides further support for 
this right (Lubell 2010; Dinstein 2005; Ruys 2010). Following the Embassy 




a series of attacks domestically and abroad by Al-Qaeda.  US officials also claimed 
that its use of force was aimed at preventing and deterring future attacks, and were 
only carried out after Sudan and Afghanistan refused to take actions against Al-
Qaeda.  The international community largely supported the US. With the exception of 
Libya and Iraq, Arab states did not condemn the US, while Pakistan provided the US 
with use of its airspace. Russia did condemn the attack, although it nonetheless 
claimed that states have the right to use force against terrorists.  
The second principle concerns whether states can be held to account for the 
action of a non-state actor. That is, can a victim state use force against states that 
support non-state actors. The ICJ’s ruling in the Nicaragua Case helped to clarify 
when a state has the right to use force against state supporters of non-state actors. The 
fundamental issue is the relationship that exists between the state and the relevant 
non-state actor. Lubell (2010) argues that the relationship between a host state and 
non-state actor can fit into five categories: 1) the non-state actor is a state organ or de 
facto organ of the state, 2) the non-state actor receives some form of aid, support, or 
instruction from the state, 3) the non-state actor is independent, but host state gives it 
permission to operate from its territory, 4) the state claims to have no ties to non-state 
actor, but is unwilling to interfere with the actions of the group, and 5) the state is 
unable to act against the non-state actor even if it disapproves of it on its territory.  
Across the five possibilities, there are three categories of attribution (Lubell 
2010). First, attacks by the non-state actor can be attributed to the state, second, the 




responsibility for the actions of the non-state actor, and finally the state has done 
nothing wrong, but the non-state actor is still operating from its territory.  
While the second and third conditions of attribution are illegal under 
international law, they do not allow the victim state to use force in self-defense 
against the host state. A target state only has the right to self-defense against the host 
state if the non-state actor can be considered an organ of the host state. More 
substantively, the relationship must meet at least one of the following three 
conditions: 1) the non-state actor is a de jure or de facto organ of the state (i.e. state 
has effective control of the group), 2) the non-state actor performs governmental 
functions on behalf of the state, or 3) if it is de facto directed by official authorities of 
the state.  In other words, the actions must be fully attributed to the state to allow for 
the right to self-defense against the state in question. All other types of support, such 
as training, logistical, intelligence, weapons, or any other type of assistance do not 
allow for the right to self-defense against the host state.  
The recent conflict between Israel-Lebanon provides a useful illustration of 
this principle (e.g., Redsell 2007; Ronen 2006; Zimmerman 2009). 
23
 First, in the 
summer of 2006, Hezbollah engaged in a two-prong attack against Israel that resulted 
in both casualties and property damage.  Following the attack, the Israeli Prime 
Minister declared that Israel had the right to self-defense against both Hezbollah and 
Lebanon. He said that Israel could use force against Lebanon because the attacks 
emanated from Lebanese territory and because Lebanon had two of its members in 
the Lebanese parliament at the time. According to international law, while Israel had 
the right to use force against Hezbollah, they had no right to use force against 
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Lebanon.  Lebanon did not have effective control over Hezbollah, and they did not 
give Hezbollah the political or legal authority to strike Israel.  In fact, while Israel 
claimed they had the right of self-defense against Lebanon, they also claimed that its 
use of force was solely directed at Hezbollah.  
Finally, in the ICJ case, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Uganda, the 
World Court affirmed and clarified the legal principles relating to the right of self-
defense against state supporters of non-state actors (DRC v Uganda ICJ Reports 
2005).  In this case, the DRC accused Uganda of aggression and interference in its 
domestic affairs. Uganda claimed it had a right to self-defense because the DRC 
supported anti-Ugandan rebel groups.
24
  In particular, Uganda claimed that the DRC 
had a “duty of vigilance” to prevent attacks from its territory against them.  The ICJ 
ruled against Uganda and in favor of the DRC. The Court said that while DRC has a 
duty of vigilance, Uganda was unable to provide sufficient enough of a relationship 
between the rebel groups and the DRC.  As such, the ICJ declared that Uganda had no 
right to self-defense against the DRC; furthermore, the court claimed that Uganda’s 
use of force against the DRC violated the Charter.  
 
Interventions 
In the international system, there is a general prohibition on military interventions and 
general principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states. The international 
community, and in particular the United Nations General Assembly has affirmed this 
principle numerous times since 1945.  For example, the General Assembly 
Resolution, the Rights and Duties of States, calls on all states to refrain from 
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intervening in the affairs of another country. Likewise, in GA Resolutions, the 
Inadmissibility of Interventions and the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the 
international community reaffirmed the prohibition against foreign interventions. 
Indeed, several scholars argue that rules and regulations relating to interventions are 
uncontroversial with disagreements only occurring over the application of these rules. 
 While there is a general prohibition on military interventions, there are a few 
situations when states are permitted to intervene in other states.  Three factors in 
combination generally determine when states can intervene in other states: 1) the 
level of domestic conflict, 2) the distinction between governments and the 
opposition/rebel groups, and 3) whether the actor requested the intervention or not.  
According to Arend and Beck (1992), there are three distinct categories of 
civil unrest: 1) low-intensity conflict, 2) civil war, and 3) mixed conflict or 
internationalized civil wars. First, when the level of domestic unrest is considered 
low-intensity and/or below the level of civil war, a state can intervene on behalf of a 
legitimate government when the government invited the state to intervene. Forcible 
interventions on behalf of governments are unlawful. Likewise, it is illegal to 
intervene on behalf of opposition groups or other domestic groups that are not 
affiliated with the government, whether or not they requested the intervention.   
There are several examples to show that the international community largely 
supports interventions on behalf of governments when the level of conflict is below 
the threshold of civil wars. For example, the UN Security Council supported France 
when, on numerous occasions, they sent troops to support the Ivory Coast 




S/2004/3; UN Press Release SC/7588).   Similarly, the United Kingdom sent troops to 
support governments in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya, while Senegal also 
dispatched it troops to protect the Guinea Bissau leadership. In all of these cases, the 
international community refrained from criticizing the intervening states that were 
invited by host governments (Gray 2008, 80-85).  
On the other hand, there have been several notable occasions when the 
international community criticized states that forcibly intervened without permission 
from the host state. For example, the United Nations General Assembly passed 
several resolutions condemning the USSR for its illegal interventions in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan (Gray 2008). 
Regarding support for the opposition, it is largely recognized that states rarely 
if ever provide them with military troops. Instead, third parties generally provide the 
opposition or other domestic actors with either covert support, or other forms of non-
military support. The Reagan doctrine is a useful example of this in that the US 
provided aid, but it was almost always below the level of overt military support 
(Franck and Weisband 1971; Reisman 1988; Vertzberger 1998).  
Second, the legal rules relating to foreign intervention are different in the 
context of civil war.  In civil conflict, the deciding factor is the level of control or 
authority the government is able to demonstrate. When the control of the government 
is contested and non-state actors control at least some of territory of the state, it is 
illegal for foreign states to intervene, even if the government requests assistance 
(Arend and Beck 1993; Moore 1983; Schachter 1990). It is also unlawful to intervene 




 Third, there is an important exception to this general prohibition on 
interventions in civil war.  Based on the so-called proportionate counter-intervention 
rule, in mixed or internationalized conflict, states can intervene on behalf of the 
recognized government when there was a prior intervention on behalf of the rebel 
groups against the government.
25
  
 Three illustrations can serve to demonstrate the proportionate counter-
intervention rule in practice. First, towards the end of the 1998 Civil War in the 
Domestic Republic of Congo/Zaire, the United Nations distinguished between 
external forces invited by the government and those of Rwanda and Uganda who 
forcibly invaded (Gray 2008, 80-82). Likewise, the Security Council condemned 
Angola for its intervention on behalf of the opposition in the 1997 Congo 
(Brazzaville) Civil War (Gray 2008, 92).  Gray (2008) argues that these two examples 
support the legal rules on interventions and are generally representative of the 
behavior of the Security Council, especially since the end of the Cold War.  
Second, when states intervene in civil conflict, they almost always try to claim 
that their intervention is in response to a prior intervention.  The international 
community has also not hesitated to condemn states that claimed that a prior 
intervention took place when it is clear that there was no prior intervention. For 
example, the General Assembly condemned the USSR for its unlawful interventions 
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 The counter-intervention should generally be limited to the territory of the state 
experiencing mixed conflict and not spread to the prior intervening state, although if the aid 
to the rebels reaches the level of an armed attack, the state supporting the government can 





in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan (Reisman 1987; UNYB 1968, 1980).
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 Likewise, 
the Council criticized Turkey for its invasion of Cyprus in 1974, even though Ankara 
claimed that their intervention was in response to a prior intervention (Gray 2008, 94; 
UNYB 1974).  
 Third, similar to situations of domestic unrest, states rarely if ever openly 
provide military troops to the opposition in civil conflict. For example, the United 
States provided covert support to non-state actors in Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, 
and Nicaragua, instead of their own troops (Gray 2008, 106-107).  US behavior in 
Laos between1958-1960 is a useful example of how support varies for government 
and opposition forces (Gray 2008, 105).  When an unfriendly government ruled Laos, 
the US only provided covert support to opposition forces, while in contrast, when a 
friendly group came to power in Laos, the US supported the government with the 
overt use of military force. The US even permitted Laos to claim that it provided 
military support for its bombing raids against rebel forces.   
Finally, humanitarian interventions, pro-democratic interventions, and other 
types of regime-change are all illegal.  
 
Collective Security  
The framers of the Charter envisioned a three step process for the use of force in self-
defense. First, a state could act in self-defense when it was necessary to respond to 
aggressive actions (i.e. repel or halt an ongoing attack). Second, the victim state 
should report the aggressive act to the United Nations Security and cease using force 
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(even if the use of force is legally permitted by the right of individual self-defense), 
and third, the Council would then take the lead in dealing with the attacker. The 
Council, therefore, was supposed to play a central role in the regulation of armed 
conflict, including the right of self-defense. 
 Chapter VII contains the key provisions for the Council’s duties and 
obligations. According to Article 39, the Council has jurisdictional basis over the 
right to use of force when a state was the victim of an armed attack.  In other words, 
the Council has responsibility for determining whether a threat to peace, breach of 
peace, or act of aggression has taken place, and consequently make a 
recommendation for further action as set forth in Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 
permits the council with employing sanctions against the illegal use of force, while 




 Based on this institutional set-up, the Charter was supposed to create a robust 
collective security apparatus. The international community, however, has failed to 
implement the collective security system envisioned by the Charter. As such, 
individual self-defense and more recently member states acting under the auspices of 
United Nations Security Council make up the primary exceptions to the legal 
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Article 43 called for member states to make troops available to the Council for the purpose 
of establishing a standing army in order to carry out its obligations under Article 42. Member 





Although rare in practice, customary international law and Article 51 provide for the 
right to collective self-defense in response to an armed attack. The ICJ in the 
Nicaragua decision also affirmed and clarified the criteria that permit the right of 
collective self-defense. First, the victim state must request assistance from another 
state; that is, a third party cannot use force in support of the victim state unless its 
help was formally requested. Second, the victim state must have been the victim of an 
armed attack.  Lower levels of force or other types of force, such as protection of 
nationals, anticipatory self-defense, and the extra-territorial self-defense do not allow 
for the right to collective self-defense.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the legal principles related to the use of force. To that 
end, I first introduced the sources of international law, reviewed the Charter’s 
prohibitions on the use of force along with the two primary exceptions, and finally I 
put forward the additional legal principles that make up this body of law.  In the next 
chapter, I put forward my theoretical framework and in the following chapters I 
present my empirical analyses that are based on the review of international law on the 





Chapter 3: Institutional Reciprocity 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I put forward my theory, institutional reciprocity, to explain how the 
legal principles related to the use of force can constrain leaders from employing the 
aggressive and illegal use of force in international crises.   I argue that international 
law on the use of force contributes to the peaceful resolution of international crises by 
facilitating the reciprocal use of force in international crises. In particular, the law 
helps leaders credibly signal their commitment to using force in self-defense and 
deter the aggressive use of force from taking place. This argument consists of two-
parts.     
First, the law serves in an informational capacity and clarifies when it is 
appropriate to use force in world politics. Specifically, it establishes that the 
aggressive use of force is inappropriate and the right of self-defense is appropriate.  
As such, the law essentially institutionalizes the reciprocal use of force in self-
defense.  Second, by serving in this capacity, the law alters the support of third parties 
and increases the costs for the unlawful use of force. Crisis actors can expect 
international and domestic actors to withhold support when they employ the 
aggressive use of force and provide greater support when they have the right of self-
defense. Actors with a higher expectation of third party support can therefore credibly 
signal that they will use force in self-defense and consequently they can deter the 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I briefly identify 
the problems in the current international law compliance literature. Second, I briefly 
discuss how reciprocity operates in the context of international crises. Third, I argue 
that the law-making process allows international law to be considered a legitimate 
source of information in world politics.  Fourth, I discuss how international law 
influences the support of international actors. Fifth, I present my theoretical argument 
and explain how international law on the use of force can serve as an effective 
constraint on leaders in international crises. 
 
Problems in the International Law Compliance Literature  
In the international law compliance literature, the fundamental issue is why states 
ever uphold their legal obligations. This is largely because the international system 
lacks overt enforcement mechanisms, such as those that exist in the domestic arena 
and states and other actors often have short-term reasons to violate their obligations, 
even if compliance was initially in their interests. As Thomas Franck (1988; 705) puts 
it, “The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its strictures 
or carry out its mandate.”  
Legal scholars and political scientists have largely coalesced into two major 
theoretical camps - normative and rationalist - to address the compliance puzzle. 
Proponents of the normative approach emphasize the legitimacy of international law 
and the importance of legal obligations to explain why states abide by international 
law.  They often assume that states comply with international law because of its 




obligation to comply with international law, and instead argue that the law must be 
self-enforcing in order for states to comply with it. In other words, actors will only 
comply with international law when it is in their interests to comply with it.  I begin 
with the normative framework.  
 
Normative Framework  
Based on a logic of appropriateness, the normative framework largely assumes opino 
juris (the sense of “legal obligation”), in which “a state is drawn toward compliance 
with international law because compliance is considered the morally right or 
legitimate thing to do” (Franck 1990).  International legal scholars point to the “pull 
toward compliance” (Franck 1990) or “obligation of obedience” (Chayes and Chayes 
1995), or even that international law develops into a part of a state’s “internal value 
set” (Koh 1997) to explain why states comply with international law.   
 Normative scholars also argue that sanctions or enforcement mechanisms are 
unnecessary to induce compliance with the law.  Henkin (1979) argues, for instance, 
that law is obeyed because it is accepted as authoritative by the community it 
governs, while Chayes and Chayes (1995) argue that sanctions are unnecessary and 
often counter-productive. Finally, Hart (1963) posits that sanctions are a secondary 
determinant of state behavior, and argues instead that actors comply with the law 
when they internalize it and accept it as an authoritative source of rules governing 
their behavior.  
Normative scholars have put forward three major theoretical frameworks to 




based framework, and 3) transnational legal processes.  First, Chayes and Chayes’s 
managerial framework (1993, 1998) is largely recognized as the most comprehensive 
theoretical framework in the normative school.  They argue that actors have a general 
propensity to comply with international law, and point to three factors to explain why 
governments feel this way; first, international law saves on transactions costs by 
identifying appropriate conduct, second, treaties are consent-based in that states that 
have signed/ratified them have consented to being bound their legal obligations, and 
finally, there is a general norm of compliance that permeates the international 
system.
28
  The important implication of their argument is that uncertainty about the 
nature of the legal obligation itself or a limited capacity to comply with the law 
explains why actors violate the law, as opposed to weak or nonexistent enforcement 
mechanisms. As such, they argue that compliance can be increased or “managed” by 
creating more transparent agreements, robust dispute resolution mechanisms, or other 
forms of military/financial assistance to reduce the uncertainty or capability shortfalls 
that largely explain noncompliance.  
Second, Thomas Franck’s legitimacy theory is also one of the leading 
arguments in this field (Franck 1995). In an effort to explain why states feel a sense 
of obligation towards the law, he argues that states obey the rules that they perceive to 
have “come into being in accordance with the right process” (Franck 1995, 706). In 
other words, Franck’s focus is on the process of law-making; when the process is 
legitimate, states will comply with international law, while he argues that 
noncompliance is usually the result of illegitimate processes. Franck argues that four 
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factors determine whether a process is considered legitimate: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence, and adherence. In short, determinacy is about the clarity of the 
rule or norm, symbolic validation refers to the presence of procedural practices that 
provide a rule with legitimacy, coherence refers to the connection between rational 
principles and the rule, and adherence refers to the connection between the rule and 
other rules that help interpret the new law. He concludes that when these four factors 
are present, the law is considered legitimate and states and other actors feel a sense of 
legal obligation to comply with it.   
Third, Harold Koh has recently developed a theory of transnational legal 
processes to explain compliance with international law. Koh emphasizes the 
interaction between international and domestic actors and norm internalization. He 
argues that when transnational actors – state and non-state actors – interact, norms of 
compliance emerge that are then internalized by domestic actors.  The internalization 
of norms by these actors leads them to being incorporated into domestic legal 
institutions. States are then more likely to comply with international law as they 
become ensconced with them at the domestic level.  
In a similar vein, several scholars have put forward arguments about how 
norm diffusion and socialization processes can induce states to comply with 
international law. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that social pressures from 
other states can lead governments to adopt norms, including legal rules.  Put 
differently, reputational concerns based on normative considerations instead of 
rationalist ones can contribute to compliance with the law. Likewise, Thomas (2001) 




government’s identity to valuing legal rules and obligations. Finally, Kelley (2007) in 
her work on the International Criminal Court (ICC) finds that many states act in 
accordance with the Rome Statute because of an affinity towards the court or pacta 
sunt servanda (nations have an obligation to abide by treaty commitments), instead of 
rational calculations.  
 
Problems with Normative Framework 
Despite the contributions made by scholars working in the normative school, several 
rationalist-scholars argue that the normative school has serious limitations. As 
Guzman (2008, 8) argues, norms-based theories have failed to provide a “satisfying 
theory of how or when states comply with international law or when international law 
is more or less likely to work.” Put differently, they have failed to explain the 
variation in compliance across issues areas and within and between states.  With 
respect to the managerial school, Guzman argues that the managerial school may be 
useful at explaining coordination problems, but it fails to provide a theory for all 
types of problems in political science. 
Likewise, Hathaway argues that norms-based theories fail to provide guidance 
with respect to why some laws succeed at bringing about compliance and others do 
not. Her basic point, like Guzman, is that it fails to explain the variance in 
compliance. Goldsmith and Posner (2008) reject norms-based theories outright 
because they believe models of compliance should be based on rationalist 
assumptions.  Finally, Keohane (1997) also argues that much of the legitimacy-based 




compliance'', yet the ''compliance pull'' brings about the legitimacy of the law. In 
other words the compliance pull is both a cause and effect of legitimacy.  
 
Rationalist Framework 
In response to the problems with the normative approaches, both political scientists 
and legal scholars have in recent years adopted a rational choice framework for 
analyzing international law compliance. As Guzman puts it, “(T)o generate a model 
in which international law matters, then, it is necessary to identify a mechanism 
through which violations are sanctioned in some fashion… a model of international 
law must turn on the impact of sanctions on states.”  In other words, international law 
can only be influential in world politics when it inflicts costs on states that violate it.  
To that end, scholars working in this literature have largely drawn on insights from 
the international cooperation literature to provide a foundation for theorizing about 
the effectiveness of international law (e.g., Abbott and Snidal 1998, 2000; Keohane 
1984; Martin 1992; Martin and Simmons 1998).   
Within this approach, scholars argue that legal obligations must be self-
enforcing in order for governments to comply with them.  In other words, in the 
absence of centralized enforcement in an anarchic international system, compliance 
must be in the narrow self-interests of the relevant actors.  As such, the majority of 
scholars focus on how enforcement mechanisms, such as reputation, reciprocity, 
sanctions, and domestic institutions can induce compliance with the law.   
First, reputation has recently become one of the leading enforcement 




Simmons 2000; Tomz 2007; Valentino et al 2006). The basic logic of reputation 
suggests that the expectation of future benefits from cooperation with third parties 
generates compliance today.  Simply, a state that complies with international law will 
be viewed as more reliable partner, and, in turn, will find a greater number of states to 
cooperate with and benefit from in the future. States therefore have strong incentives 
to develop and maintain a reputation for compliance with international law.   As 
Keohane puts it, reputation can be understood as “diffuse reciprocity”, in which 
future interactions with third parties over at time t+1 can bring about enough benefits 
to generate compliance with international law at time t.   
The few available empirical studies of reputation appear to support the 
importance of this mechanism. Gibler (2008) finds that states who comply with their 
alliance commitments are more likely to enter into alliance agreements in the future. 
Simmons (2000) argues that concern for a favorable reputation explains why 
governments abide by Article VIII of the  International Monetary Fund. Finally, 
Tomz (n.d.) uses embedded surveys and finds that domestic actors prefer that their 
leaders comply with international law because of reputational considerations.  
Second, scholars have long recognized that reciprocity can contribute to 
international law compliance and international cooperation, more generally.  Based 
on the logic of reciprocity, states can enforce cooperation by responding to or 
threatening to respond to violations with similar conduct. Mutual defection or the 
threat of it can therefore prevent actors from defecting or reneging on agreements in 
the first place. International law contributes to reciprocal enforcement by establishing 




ensure that governments avoid escalatory spirals that can follow defection (Morrow 
2007; Von Stein 2010).  
In the legal literature, Morrow has thus far been one of the few scholars to 
explicitly test this mechanism by applying it to compliance with international 
humanitarian law in interstate wars. He argues that ratification, especially joint 
ratification, “strengthens reciprocity and leads to compliance generally through 
effective deterrence” (Morrow 2007: 560). In addition, he finds that democracies are 
less likely to violate the laws of war because they are more capable of sending a 
credible signal about their intentions to comply with the treaties that they have 
ratified.  
Third, some scholars argue that coercion can explain compliance with the law. 
States engaging in coercive statecraft can enforce cooperation by employing both 
carrots (i.e., increased aid, trade agreements, etc) and sticks (i.e., sanctions, military 
intervention, etc). Scholars have found some support for the role of coercion in 
generating compliance with the law. Hafner-Burton (2005) finds that governments 
that value human rights practices can use the promise and benefits of preferential 
trade agreements to coerce states into compliance. Likewise, Lebovic and Voeen 
(2009) show that the World Bank has reduced aid to counties with questionable 
human rights practices. Indeed, Thompson (2010) argues that sanctions are actually 
more prevalent in the international system than most scholars recognize since it is 
often the threat of coercion that induces compliance with the law.  
Finally, other scholars working in the rationalist tradition have turned to 




called domestic legalism approach have put forward two primary reasons to explain 
why democracies are more compliant than non-democracies: 1) accountability and 2) 
transference.  First, drawing on insights from the institutional logic in the democratic 
peace literature, scholars argue elections make democratic leaders more accountable 
to domestic actors, most notably elites (e.g., Huth and Allee 2003; Russett and Oneal  
2001). As such, democratic leaders are more likely to be punished at home if they 
violate their international legal agreements, as the fear of being removed from office 
deters democratic leaders from violating the law in the first place.  
Several scholars find support for the role of democratic legalism in promoting 
compliance with the law. McGillvray and Smith (2002) find that citizens punish 
leaders for reneging on agreements and impairing the future benefits from 
cooperation. Likewise, Leeds (2003)  finds that democracies are more likely to honor 
their alliance agreements than nondemocratic leaders. Many scholars also find argue 
that democracies have better human rights practices (e.g., Hathaway 2001; Keith 
2002; Neumayer 2005).
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Second, several scholars argue that leaders from states with greater respect for 
legal institutions and the rule of law, such as in democracies will transfer this 
behavior over to the international arena and be more likely to pursue foreign policies 
that are consistent with international law (Doyle 1986, Huth and Allee 2003; Maoz 
and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Simmons 1998; Slaughter 1995).   In 
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less reliable allies in times of crises. Likewise, Simmons (2000) finds that democracies are 




contrast, leaders from nondemocratic states who have less experience with legal rules 
will be reluctant to incorporate the law into their decision-making.  
Democratic legalists have put forward three primary reasons to explain why 
democratic leaders are more likely to resort to international legal principles in their 
foreign affairs (Simmons 1998). First, democratic leaders are more likely to accept 
rules-based constraints in their international relations since they operate under 
constitutional traditions domestically that place limits on executive power. Second, 
democratic leaders become accustomed to working within institutionalized settings, 
such as regulated political competition that regulates and limits their behavior.  Third, 
democratic states with independent judiciaries are more likely to feel an affinity 
towards and trust international legal rules and institutions.  In sum, democratic leaders 
who become inculcated in legal institutions and traditions are more likely to turn to 
international law in the international arena compared to nondemocratic leaders.  
 
Problems with Rationalist Framework 
Despite the insights produced by rationalists, several norms-based scholars have 
criticized these approaches, most prominently Martha Finnemore, Stepehen Toope, 
Ian Hurd, and Christian Reus-Smit.  Finnemore and Toope (2003) argue that 
international law is more than formal, treaty-based law, and that such a narrow 
conception of law and legalization weakens rather than strengthens research on 
compliance. Rather, they argue that international law is a broad social phenomenon 




interaction among societies. Explanations for compliance, therefore, must go beyond 
rationalist enforcement mechanisms  
Similarly, Reus-Smit (2003) argues that rationalist approaches cannon explain 
high levels of compliance with international law. He claims, in contrast, that some 
states feel a sense of obligation to comply with international law, and thus all rational 
choice models require a foundation of legitimacy. Finally, Hurd (1999) argues that 
scholars should not simply accept that coercion and self-interest have a monopoly on 
explaining compliance in the international system, and that there are important 
reasons to believe that the legitimacy of norms, institutions, and international law can 
influence the behavior of states.  
Rationalist scholars have also identified the limitations in their own 
framework. Guzman, for instance, argues that reciprocity and sanctions are unable to 
serve as robust enforcement mechanisms, since it must be in the interests of states to 
either implement sanctions or withhold cooperation, two conditions, he argues, that 
are unlikely to exist in most cases, especially in security-related disputes. Likewise, 
von Stein (2010) argues that several factors must be present for reciprocity and 
sanctions to serve as credible enforcement mechanisms.  
Reputation also suffers from several problems, as many scholars have noted.  
Downes and Jones (2002) argue that reputation may not travel well across issue area, 
limiting the power of this mechanism. States also have to weigh various reputational 
concerns (i.e. resolve) beyond compliance with the law that may attenuate the 
constraining effects of this mechanism (Keohane 1997). Finally, Thompson (2010) 




that it may not be in the interests of third party states to refrain from cooperating with 
states that violate the law.  
We can therefore conclude that despite the important contributions made by 
both rationalist and normative scholars, the extant literature suffers from some 
important theoretical limitations. Rationalists criticize the normative scholars for 
assuming compliance, rather than specifying the precise conditions or factors that can 
generate compliance. In other words, rationalists argue that the constant of legitimacy 
cannot explain the variable nature of compliance.  At the same time, normative 
scholars argue that leaders often comply with international law when the leading 
rationalist explanations are absent from the political context. As such, enforcement 
mechanisms may only explain some of the variation in compliance, and that they 
actually may be unnecessary to constrain the behavior of states and other actors in the 
international system. 
In this dissertation, I seek to overcome the limitations in both approaches by 
developing a theoretical framework that integrates insights made by both normative 
and rationalists scholars. First, I argue consistent with the rationalist choice schoalrs 
that legal obligations must be self-enforcing in order for states to comply with them at 
high-levels. Second, I draw on insights made by normative scholars and argue that 
international law serves as a credible source of information that establishes 
appropriate standards of behavior regarding the use of force in world politics. In this 
way, the law as a normative standard shapes the incentives for using force. I now turn 







In this section, I put forward my theoretical framework on how international law on 
the use of force can constrain the behavior of leaders in international crises. I first 
discuss the conditions that are required for reciprocity to promote cooperation in 
world politics and international crises in particular. Second, I describe how 
international law can serve a credible source of information. Third, I discuss how the 
law shapes the behavior of third parties and ultimately alters the dynamics of 
reciprocity between crisis actors.   
 
Reciprocity and Crisis Bargaining 
Reciprocity plays a fundamental role in the international relations of states.   Keohane 
(1986, 6) defines reciprocity as, “exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the 
actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way 
that good is returned for good, and bad for bad.” In the other words, actors who 
engage in reciprocal actions respond to cooperation with cooperation and to defection 
with defection. As scholars have long recognized, reciprocity can help promote 
cooperation in the international system. Actors can induce cooperation by increasing 
the costs of defecting when they defect in kind, while they increase the benefits of 
cooperation by cooperating as well.  Indeed, Keohane (1984, 314) argues that 
reciprocity may be “the most effective strategy for maintaining cooperation among 
egoists.”  
 Reciprocity plays a similar role in crisis-bargaining by altering the incentives 




resolution of crises because it can increase the costs of employing the aggressive use 
of force (i.e. defecting).  In this way, crisis actors will be less likely to use force when 
they expect their adversaries to do the same, since this will increase the costs of using 
force. In contrast, they will be more likely to use force when they believe that their 
adversaries will refrain from using force (or employ low-levels of force), as this will 
result in relatively lower costs for them. Put differently, the costs for employing the 
aggressive use of force (i.e. defecting) will be greater when actors respond to the use 
of force with the reciprocal use of force (i.e. mutual defection), while the costs  for 
using force will be lower when states refrain from employing the use of force in 
retaliation. As such, crisis actors can deter their adversaries from using force by 
threatening to respond with the use of force in kind. 
While reciprocity can promote cooperation in crisis-bargaining, it must meet 
certain conditions to serve as an effective deterrent in international crises.  Most 
importantly, it can only be successful when the threat of the reciprocal use of force 
deters an actor from employing force in the first place.  This requires that actors have 
sufficient incentives to commit to mutual defection, since they will be only able to 
credibly signal their intention to use force in response when this is true.  In contrast, 
when actors lack the incentives to use force in kind, they will be unable to credibly 
threaten to respond to the aggressive use of force. Thus, actors can only deter the use 
of force when it is in their interests to use force.  In this way, reciprocity can only 
promote the peaceful resolution of crises when crisis actors have the incentives to 




 While scholars have identified several ways to promote reciprocity, 
international law can also facilitate reciprocity in international crises by providing 
actors with the incentives to employ the reciprocal use of force, and thus, it can help 
them deter states from initiating the use of force against them. First, the law serves as 
a “bright-line” that establishes what type of behavior is appropriate and what type is 
inappropriate (Morrow 2007). The legal principles related to the use force make clear 
that the aggressive use of force is unacceptable and the right to use of force in self-
defense is acceptable.  In this way, this body of law essentially institutionalizes the 
reciprocal use of force in self-defense. Second, by serving in this role, the law alters 
the payoffs for using force. The law influences the support of international actors, 
who are more likely to support the use of force in self-defense and withhold support 
for the aggressive and unlawful use of force.  Crisis actors therefore face greater 
payoffs for using force in self-defense and lower payoffs for initiating the use of 
force. As a result, leaders with the support of international actors can credibly signal 
their commitment to the reciprocal use of force in self-defense, and consequently they 
can deter their adversaries from engaging in the illegal use of force in the first place.  
In the remainder of this section, I develop this logic more thoroughly. First, I 
explain how international law can serve as credible source of standards regarding the 
appropriate use of force, and second I argue that the law in combination with third 
parties can alter the incentives for using force and consequently change the dynamics 






The Legitimacy of International Law 
In this section, I establish that international law can serve as an authoritative 
information transmission mechanism (i.e. bright-line) in world politics that can shape 
the dynamics of reciprocity in international crises. In so doing, I argue that 
international law on the use of force has two key features that allow it to serve as an 
authoritative source of information. First, the credibly of the law serves as a focal 
solution that establishes a common and specific set of standards that clarifies what is 
and what is not acceptable behavior regarding the use of force.   Second, by 
identifying when the use of force is appropriate it makes clear that aggressive use of 
force is wrong and that using force in self-defense is right. Taken together, 
international law serves as a credible source of information that influences the 
behavior of leaders and third parties in international crises.  
 In recent years, a handful of studies have begun to take seriously the 
informational role played by international law.  Huth et al. (2011), for instance, argue 
that when the legal principles related to the title to territory serve as a focal point, 
they can help lead to the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes.   Other scholars 
have argued that international courts, such as the International Court of Justice and 
International Criminal Court, can also serve as a focal point and facilitate cooperation 
between actors (Allee and Huth 2005;  Huth et al 2011, 2012; Mitchell and Powell 
2011; Powell and Mitchell 2007).  Finally, Morrow (2007) integrates information and 
enforcement problems and argues that the legitimacy of international humanitarian 
law increases the likelihood that reciprocity as an enforcement mechanism can lead to 




While these studies have advanced our understanding of international law, 
they have their own important limitations. Specifically, many scholars accept the 
authority of international law without establishing how it acquires this distinction; 
they simply assume that international law is legitimate by its very nature. The 
problem with this assumption is that scholars in other fields have already established 
that information must meet certain criteria in order for actors to rely on it to update 
their beliefs on the issue in question (e.g., Chapman2007; 2009; Gilligan and 
Krehbiel 1989, 1990; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Thompson 2006, 2009).  Scholars 
interested in international law, therefore, must identify the source of international 
law’s authority before accepting it as credible source of information in world politics. 
 
The Process of Law-Making 
In this section, I establish how international law can serve as a legitimate source of 
information regarding the use of force in world politics. In so doing, I first argue, 
drawing on insights from the IO literature, that laws must be diverse and 
representative to be considered credible. Second, I argue that the law-making process 
determines whether international law satisfies the diverse and representative 
conditions. Finally, I apply this logic to my specific interest in international law on 
the use force and show that it can serve as a credible source of information regulating 
the conduct of the states in their international relations.  
Scholars that focus on institutions have established that information can be 
considered credible when it is developed through both diverse and representative 




Representative institutions consist of members with a wide preference distribution, 
while diverse institutions produce information that is similar to the median 
preferences of its clients states (Thompson 2006).   Thompson (2006, 2009) argues, 
for instance, that the United Nations Security Council produces credible information 
because it satisfies both of these conditions. It is, according to Thompson, diverse 
because of the wide preference distribution of member states at the UNSC, and it is 
meets the representative criteria as the median preference is similar to that of the 
international community.  
Similar to the institutions literature, international law can also be considered a 
credible source of information when it is established through diverse and 
representative processes. In contrast to the institutions literature, however, the process 
of law-making (opposed to the member composition of the relevant body) can explain 
when the law satisfies both of these factors. Specifically, when states and other actors 
enact laws through fair and consent-based processes, they meet the representative and 
diversity conditions that are required for information to be considered legitimate.      
First, international law satisfies the representative condition when it is based 
on the wide-spread consent of states. The consent-based theory of international law 
claims that laws that are based on the approval of states are more likely to be accepted 
as authoritative by the international community. In contrast, legal principles that lack 
consent are unlikely to be viewed as illegitimate.  The implication of this is that legal 
principles that are based on the wide-spread consent of states (i.e. representative of 
states in the international system) have a greater sense of authority than laws that lack 




other hand, unilateral declarations and other laws that receive support from a smaller 
or limited number of states in the international community are unable to serve in an 
information role, since they are likely to be rejected by many states as illegitimate.  
Second, legal principles meet the diversity condition when they are enacted 
through fair processes.  In the context of international politics, this indicates that the 
information from diverse institutions resembles the median preferences of the 
international community.  Likewise, fair rules are those that have “come into being in 
accordance with the right process” (Franck 1990). Among other considerations, they 
are inclusive of the preferences of states in the international system.  Fairness assures, 
for instance, that the superpowers are unable to force their preferences on the 
international community. As such, legal principles that reflect the preferences of the 
international community are able to provide credible information. In contrast, rules 
that are enacted outside of such processes fail to serve in this role.  
 I now apply these criteria to international law on the use of force. In short, the 
historical record clearly indicates that international law on the use of force was 
established through both consent-based and fair processes, thereby allowing it to 
serve as a credible source of information. This is true for four primary reasons. 
First, both the US and the USSR - two leading powers in 1945 - were not 
alone in crafting the Charter. Scholars have long recognized that it was a political 
bargain between the great powers and weaker states (e.g., Ikenberry 2001).  The 
Charter, therefore, can be understood as both diverse and representative of the 
international system. Second, developing nations and other minor powers have also 




General Assembly Resolutions (diversity and consent). Customary international law 
is especially relevant since it only exists when all states accept it (consent). 
Anticipatory self-defense and the protection of nationals are two essential legal 
principles that are based on customary international law.   UNGA resolutions, while 
not legally binding, have proven critical in interpreting the Charter (e.g., Gray 2008) 
(fairness). The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, for instance, relied on the UNGA’s 
Definition of Aggression in its decision that favored Nicaragua over the United 
States. Third, international courts also play a role in this body of law. As a landmark 
case on the use of force, the ICJ’s ruling in the Nicaragua case has influenced how 
states interpret this law (fairness). ICJ decisions are also independent of powerful 
states; the US refused to participate with the ICJ in the Nicaragua case even 
withdrawing from the compulsory jurisdiction clause, but the court’s ruling has had a 
major impact on the development of international law despite US objections (Gray 
2008). Finally, the UNSC can authorize the use of force, and as Thompson and others 
argue, it is both representative and diverse and thus it can produce credible 
information.  
 
Appropriate Standards of Behavior   
When legal principles are established through diverse and representative processes, 
they can provide information to actors by establishing standards of appropriate 
behavior in world politics. The law serves as a regulative norm that orders and 
constrains the conduct of states.  The law informs domestic and international actors 




international politics. Given this, international law acts as a focal solution to promote 
orderly and consistent patterns of behavior among states and other actors in the 
international community (Keohane 1982).   
By establishing what is right and wrong, the law has the potential to alter the 
behavior of crisis actors and shape their expectations regarding the payoffs for using 
force. As Morrow (2007) puts it with respect to the international humanitarian law, 
“agreement on normative standards generally and treaties specifically can be thought 
of as being captured in the common conjecture [in equilibrium]. They matter when 
they induce a particular pattern of behavior that a different agreement would not. 
Compliance then is a property of the equilibrium behavior that institutions induce in 
actors.”  The same logic can be applied to international law on the use of force.  
Because the use of force, under certain conditions, clarifies what acts constitute 
violations and which do not, the law establishes standards of appropriate behavior 
regarding the use of force. By serving in this role, it shapes the expectations of 
members of the international community about when the use of force is appropriate. 
As such, deviations from the recognized standard are open to punishment, while 
actions that are in accordance with the law are likely to be rewarded.   
More specifically, the law under certain conditions clearly establishes that the 
aggressive use of force is inappropriate and the right of self-defense is appropriate. In 
this way, the clarity and authority of international law is directional in nature in that it 
authorizes one type of force (self-defense) and prohibits another type (armed attack). 
International law, therefore, stands out as a unique source of standards that informs 




The historical record indicates that the international community recognizes 
international law on the use of force as an authoritative source of standards in world 
politics.  Legal scholar Christine Gray (2004) argues the history of the use of force 
since 1945, and the response from the international community, indicates that states 
almost always agree on the law and it is only a few controversial cases that there is 
dissension on the legal principles. Disagreements in the international system typically 
involve the facts of the incident or application of the law to the relevant facts, but not 
the law itself.  States and other international leaders have also reaffirmed the 
Charter’s prohibition several times since 1945 (Gray 2008). At the 2005 World 
Summit, for instance, the international community overwhelming reaffirmed the law 
of the Charter. Likewise, as the authors of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change of the United Nations put it, “we believe that the Charter of 
the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task [of 
regulating the use of force].”   
 In sum, I first established that credible sources of information must satisfy the 
diversity and representative conditions. Legal principles can meet these conditions 
when they are enacted through consent-based and fair processes.  The historical 
development of international law on the use of force indicates that it meets these 
requirements. The legal principles on the use of force therefore can serve as a 
legitimate source of information in word politics.  Second, I showed that the 
credibility of international law identifies when it is appropriate to use force in world 




aggressive use of force. In the next section, I put forward my argument for how the 
law as a source of credible information can alter the dynamics of crisis bargaining. 
 
Crisis Bargaining and Reciprocity  
In this section, I present my theoretical framework on how the law can constrain 
leaders in international crises. As noted, this is a two-stage process: first, I argue that 
the law influences the behavior of international actors, and second, I posit that third 
parties impact the behavior of leaders in international crises. Taken together, 
international law on the use of force helps leaders deter aggressive actions from 
taking place by helping them commit to the use of force in response to an armed 
attack.  
 
Third Party Incentives 
In this section, I put forward my argument for exactly how international law 
influences the support of third parties, and ultimately the dynamics of crisis 
bargaining.   In particular, when international law permits the right to self-defense, 
third party leaders can feel more confident that they are using their own limited 
resources in a worthwhile and justifiable effort. In addition, the legal right to use 
force can provide political cover at home should the third party leader determine that 
he wants to support the crisis actor. In contrast, when international law prohibits the 
use of force, domestic actors will be uncertain about the merits of supporting crisis 




it is consistent with international law and oppose the use or force when crisis actors 
violate the law.  
To start, states and intergovernmental (IGOs) make up the international actors 
that can influence the behavior of crisis actors. Third party states include friends and 
allies in the international community, but also neutral and even adversary states. IGOs 
include both regional and international organizations. The latter include, but are not 
limited to NATO, ASEAN, OAS, the Arab League, and the OAU. The recent NATO-
led operations in both Libya and Kosovo are good examples of the actions of regional 
organizations. The pool of third party actors is thus open; if the actor can influence 
the costs of using force in the ways discussed below, then crisis actors must 
incorporate their expected behavior into their decision-making.
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The existing literature offers some insights on the incentives of third party 
leaders. Most of the theoretical arguments on the behavior of third party states in 
international conflict can be found in the alliance literature, and especially the 
alliance reliability literature that seeks to understand when allies honor their 
commitments to war combatants. The literature typically offers two explanations to 
explain variation in alliance support – major power/military capabilities and regime-
type – in which the focus of both mechanisms is on how they affect the costs for 
upholding commitments.  
Regarding the role of power, scholars argue that powerful states are less likely 
to be reliable allies because they can afford the reputational costs that come with 
violating alliance commitments. The empirical literature, however, offers 
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 As I discuss below, third parties can provide military, economic, and diplomatic support. In 
this way, my argument on third parties is not limited to overt military support, such as 




contradictory findings.  Some scholars have found that major powers are less likely to 
support allies (Krause and Singer 1997; Leeds 2003), while others have no found no 
effect for this relationship (Sabrosky 1980). On the other hand, Gartzke and Gleditsch 
(2004) find that powerful states are actually more likely to intervene to protect allies 
in war.  
Second, several scholars have argued that democratic leaders are more likely 
to uphold their alliance commitments than leaders from nondemocratic states (Fearon 
1994; Gaubatz 1996; McGillivray and Smith 2002). Because democratic leaders can 
be punished at home for violating international agreements and damaging the 
reputation of the state, they are unlikely to violate their alliances.
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  More recently, in 
an offshoot of this argument, some scholars argue that more democratic states are 
more likely to support other democracies because of an affinity towards fellow liberal 
states.  
There are also some important works on third party behavior beyond the 
alliance reliability literature. Huth (1998) tests the determinants of major powers 
interventions in a sample of international crises. Consistent with much of the alliance 
literature, he mostly focuses on military capabilities and regime-type variables, 
although he develops more sophisticated arguments on the role of domestic politics 
on the decision to intervene by going beyond hypotheses based solely on broad 
categories of regime type. Finally, Butler (2003) in an important study that goes 
beyond military capabilities and regime type assesses how concepts related to Just 
War Theory influenced interventions by the US during the Cold War.  He finds that 
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several factors can affect US behavior, although his results are to be interpreted with 
caution given that he only considers interventions by the United States.  
While these insights are certainly important, they are limited with respect to 
explaining when third party actors in general decide to support crisis actors.  First and 
most importantly, while allies may be more likely to fight together than other states 
(e.g., Werner and Lemke 1997; Huth 1998), nonallies can still support crisis actors. 
The problem is that the logic of alliance reliability may not apply to nonallies. Most 
of the alliances arguments are based on the reputational costs for violating an 
international agreement, which is a consideration that is absent for nonallies.  Second, 
inasmuch as military power and the regime type may be important determinants of 
alliance reliability, there are likely to be more than two determinants for why states 
intervene in a conflict. That is, it is unlikely that only military power and democracy 
explain all of the variation in patterns of third party support.  Finally, the literature 
only considers overt military interventions, which overlooks the other avenues that 
third parties can influence conflict outcomes, such as IGO support, 
diplomatic/political support, and other forms of material support (e.g., training, 
equipment, intelligence). 
Nonetheless, the existing literature shares one commonality which is that third 
parties seek to minimize both international and domestic costs when they decide to 
intervene to support allies and friends in the international community. Drawing on 
these insights, but offering an alternative to the existing literature that relies almost 




on the use of force can help third parties minimize both domestic and international 
costs.  
International law can help third party leaders make decisions about whether to 
support the crisis actor or decline his request. This is for two primary reasons. First, 
the legal principles related to the use of force provide third party actors with 
information about the motivations of the crisis actors and about the general merits of 
using force.  Second, international law provides domestic cover to third party leaders 
who decide to assist crisis actors.  
 
Limited Resources 
Third party leaders must be selective about when to support crisis actors with their 
own limited resources and security concerns. Their primary concern is whether they 
believe that expending resources in support of the crisis actor is worth it, since they 
are likely to have their own crises or requests from other states in the future.  They 
therefore must be cautious with their resources and avoid expending them in 
questionable cases. Leaders are therefore only likely to support crisis actors when it 
entails relatively limited costs to them and it is consistent with their preferences.  
The problem, however, is that thirty party leaders suffer from asymmetric 
information. There are two sources of this uncertainty. First, while these leaders have 
some information about the merits of using force, they are still at an information 
disadvantage relative to crisis actors. Second, they lack information about the 
motivations of crisis leaders.  That is, there is likely to be some uncertainty about why 




make a decision about whether they should support the crisis actor. International law 
can provide them with this much needed information.  
 Using force that is consistent with international law on the use of force 
provides information to the third party that the leader is not employing aggressive 
actions.  In other words, because the overriding legal principle is self-defense, third 
parties know that lawful behavior is defensive in nature. Even the legal principles that 
expand upon the Charter’s restrictions on the use of force are also opposed to the 
aggressive use of force. For instance, necessity and proportionality – the cornerstones 
of international law that are based on customary international law – ensure that the 
use of force is a last resort. Likewise, the use of force in the protection of nationals 
which is also based on customary international law only permits the right to use force 
after peaceful means have been exhausted.  The same logic applies across the many 
legal principles related to the use of force.  
 There are three primary reasons why leaders benefit for complying with the 
legal principles related to the use of force in international crises. First, when crisis 
actors act consistently with international law, they are signaling their benign intent to 
the international community (Thompson 2006, 2009).  Third party leaders know they 
are using force only as a last resort. They know that they will be unlikely to 
unnecessarily expend resources when the use of force is consistent with international 
law, since wars of choice and other aggressive actions are illegal. This informs third 
parties that the leaders’ intentions are not hostile in nature. On the other hand there is 
likely to be greater uncertainty about the motives of states when they use force that 




when they question their motives.  Middle East scholar Shibley Telhami (2003) made 
this point regarding third party reaction to the US use of force in Iraq, “Most are… 
concerned that the war in Iraq was merely the opening move in a larger strategy; they 
ask themselves which country will be next.” 
Second, states that support leaders that are acting in self-defense can be more 
confident that they will be less likely to face a greater number of adversaries. As 
members of the international community know that the state is acting in self-defense, 
fewer third parties will support the adversary and state that violated international law. 
The third party is thus less likely to have to engage other third parties in the conflict.   
The opposite is also true.  When a third party supports a state that has violated 
international law, it is more likely to be opposed by a larger coalition in war. The 
result is that third parties can expect to pay higher costs in the conflict for supporting 
states that violate international law, and lower costs for supporting states that comply 
with it.   
Third, international audience costs in the form of reputation costs will be 
lower given that they are coming to the aid of a state, rather than supporting a 
belligerent state that is responsible for initiating a conflict. In other words, they do not 
have to worry about any international consequences for supporting the legal use of 
force, since states that support aggressive nations may themselves suffer international 
audience costs. It appears that the United Kingdom’s reputation, for instance, was 
likely harmed by supporting the United States in the 2003 Iraq War, while France’s 
international standing seemed to improve after refusing to support the US in the 




international ramifications for supporting the lawful of force.  Few states suffered 
reputational costs, for instance, for supporting the US in both the first Gulf War and 
in the US-led war against Afghanistan following the attacks of 9/11.  
 
Domestic Cover  
Leaders of third parties have to ensure domestic political support before supporting 
crisis actors, even if they want to help them. Since these leaders are also accountable 
at home, they have to make sure that they will not be punished at home for using 
force to help another state. In other words, leaders have to justify the use of force to 
domestic actors. International law is also helpful here because it provides domestic 
cover to third party leaders.  
Third party domestic publics, like all domestic actors, have problems of 
asymmetric information when it comes to foreign policy. They are unsure about the 
merits of using force, especially when it comes to the use of force for other states. 
Because of this, they often look to elite actors or cues to provide them with 
information about international relations.   
International law can provide this information to domestic actors for two 
primary reasons.  First, the public’s preference is largely consistent with behavior that 
is in accordance with international law. Research indicates that domestic actors are 
more pacific than leaders when it comes to using force (e.g., Eichenberg 2000; Kull 
and Destler 1999; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and 




force for other states.  Given this, public support for war is typically greatest for 
military operations that could be considered largely defensive in nature.  
The preference of defensive action is consistent with international law on the 
use of force. Third party publics therefore can use international law a source of 
information to assess the merits of using force.  When behavior if consistent with 
international law, they know that the use of force is broadly consistent with their 
preferences. On the other hand, when the use of force is contrary to established legal 
principles, third party publics have reason to doubt whether they should support the 
crisis actor.  Given this information, citizens will be more inclined to support the use 
of force that is in accordance with international law on the use of force.  
Second, the behavior of other international actors can influence the support of 
third party domestic actors. As domestic actors look to international actors as a type 
of elite cues, the policy stances of international actors can inform domestic actors 
about the merits of using force. As international actors are more likely to support 
behavior that is consistent with international law, domestic actors are subsequently 
more likely to do the same. In contrast, international opposition to the use of force is 
also likely to trickle down to third party domestic publics.  
Given these two reasons, the authority of international law provides domestic 
cover to leaders who want to support crisis actors with the use force or provide other 
forms of assistance. As such, when leaders support actions that are consistent with 
international law, domestic elites will be less likely to criticize the leader for using 
force unnecessarily. Leaders who feel more secure at home will be more confident 




domestic actors of the state in question, but also the domestic public of potential allies 
and other states in the international community. 
 
Potential Objections  
Despite the above argument, some scholars, especially skeptics of international law, 
may argue that strategic considerations trump international law, especially for the 
decision to support other states with military support. While this was true to some 
extent during the Cold War with respect to at least active military support, the 
evidence also suggests that the law also influences states.
32
 In a study of the United 
Nations General Assembly, Franck (1984) found that states were largely unbiased in 
their support of other states. Even during the Cold War the decision to support or 
condemn other states was largely consistent with international law on the use of force. 
Additionally, Schachter (1991) argues that although there is some bias, ''votes show 
that the reactions to the use of force are not always dictated by political affinities in 
disregard of facts and law. States that are friendly to or even closely allied with an 
accused state have not hesitated to cast their votes against that state when the issues 
were clear''.  
Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates there are several examples when the 
international community acted in a manner consistent with the law instead of 
supporting questionable actions by allies and other friends in the international 
community (Gray 2008, ch. 2). For example, the support of self-determination 
movements related to decolonization including the condemnation of many Western 
states, the widespread support for the US following 9/11,  the Embassy bombings in 
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Kenya and Tanzania, and the mostly muted reaction of the international community's 
to Israel's use of anticipatory self-defense in the Six Day War were all consistent with 
international law. Likewise, when a state violates the Charter, the international 
community often acts in concert to criticize that state, such as repeated 
condemnations against Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia for illegal ''hot pursuit'' 
raids into neighboring countries, the US’s criticism of France, the UK, and Israel in 
the 1956 Suez Crisis, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.    
Finally, even though the UN Security Council has authorized the use of force 
only on a handful of occasions, support from the institution is only likely when the 
proposed use of force is consistent with international law. In other words, the UN is 
unlikely to authorize an illegal action, as evidenced by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003.
33
 Regional organizations behave in similar ways. For instance, in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Organization of American States approved a naval blockade, but 
was unlikely to support US air strikes on Cuba which would have been illegal 
(Chayes 1974).    
In sum, third party leaders who have limited resources and their own strategic 
interests must prioritize their own welfare and exposure when they are thinking about 
supporting crisis actors. They therefore are only likely to assist crisis leaders under 
limited conditions. International law on the use of force can help them decide when it 
in their interests to intervene. The law can help leaders identify courses of action that 
will both minimize the costs of using force and ensure political support at home.  We 
can therefore safely conclude that when crisis actors act in accordance with 
international law, third party leaders will be more likely to support them. In contrast, 
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when leaders act contrary to international law, third parties will be less likely to 
support them.  
 
Leader Incentives 
In this section, I establish that third parties can alter the payoffs for crisis actors, with 
more support leading to higher payoffs and lower support leading to lower payoffs.  
International actors can inflict two types of costs on crisis actors: direct costs and 
what I refer to as indirect costs. First, they can directly influence the payoffs from 
conflict by altering the material and nonmaterial resources at the disposal of crisis 
actors. Second, international actors can also inflict indirect costs on leaders by 
altering the support of domestic actors, who look to international actors for 
information on the merits of using force.   
 
Direct Effects 
International actors can directly influence war outcomes in two primary ways; third 
parties can provide both material and nonmaterial support to crisis actors. Regarding 
the former, it can be thought of largely as burden-sharing that can directly alter the 
costs of using force. Material support can furthermore be divided into active and 
latent support. With respect to active support, third parties can provide troops, 
equipment, and access to air, land, and maritime areas. Turkey, for instance, refused 
to allow the US to enter Iraq from its territory in the 2003 Iraq War. UN peacekeepers 
while made up of soldiers from individual countries operate under and require 




intelligence, and monies for using force.    In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, US 
equipment was vital to Israel’s ability to turn the course of the war in their favor 
(Oren 2003).  Both forms of material support can influence the payoffs for using 
force as they both can have a meaningful impact on the expected course of the 
conflict.   
First, when a crisis leader acts in accordance with international law, he can 
expect to receive higher levels of military support from third parties. Burden-sharing 
can have a powerful effect on the calculus of leaders (Byman and Waxman 2002; 
Chapman 2007; Voeten 2005).
34
  It can serve to both increase the aggregate military 
power of the leader in question and offset the costs of using force. Research has 
established, for instance, that more powerful coalitions are more likely to win wars 
(Reiter and Stam 2002; Choi 2004). Similarly, we also know that leaders who fight 
with larger coalitions suffer lower numbers of military and civilian fatalities 
(Valentino et al. 2010).   
More specifically, there are several advantages for waging multilateral 
conflicts. First, the combined military power is obviously greater then it is for the 
unilateral use of force. This is especially relevant for smaller states that may be 
unable to use force without external support. Second, individual states with their own 
strengths can employ their resources to their area of specialty. In other words, the 
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that this can reduce the benefits of multilateral efforts, but I believe that states still, on 
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war rather than the more uncertain benefits of victory. Second, leaders who value public 
goods are especially likely to benefit from third party support and the lower costs of warfare. 
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expected. Finally, allies who provide resources other than troops are less likely to expect a 




multilateral use of force provides states with a certain degree of flexibility that they 
may otherwise lack for the unilateral use of force. Third, multi-front wars require that 
the targeted state divide its resources across the different fronts, which makes it 
weaker in any given front. Finally, multilateralism gives states greater access to 
strategic or otherwise valuable territory, while denying it to their common adversary.  
International law therefore can serve as an important constraint because of 
how it influences support from members of the international community. 
Multilateralism can provide leaders with major advantages in wars, and thus their 
payoffs from war should be higher. In contrast, the unilateral use of force carries 
heavier costs for leaders, which may be prohibitive for many crisis actors. Crisis 
leader should thus have a preference for complying with international law in order to 
secure the support of allies and other friends in the international community.  
The crisis between the US and Libya provides a nice illustration of how much 
crisis actors value the support of international actors. In 1986, two Americans died 
and several hundred more were injured in a terrorist attack at a nightclub in Germany.  
The US blamed Libya for the attack and responded with heavy air strikes against 
Libya. President Reagan claimed that the US has the right to use force against Libya, 
because Washington had evidence that Libya was responsible for the attack and that 
Libya planned to engage in future attacks.  Importantly, President Regan used 
information obtained from an intelligence asset at the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin 
to make his case about the culpability of Libya.  According to one CIA official, 
however, President Reagan used this information to the “consternation” of the CIA, 




it was so important for President Regan to justify his decision to use force, he 
believed it was worth the price of the intelligence asset.   
Second, nonmaterial support can also help leaders in crisis bargaining. When 
a leader receives political support from the international community, he will feel 
justified in using force and perhaps more acceptant of the costs involved. For 
instance, Schachter (1991, 1620) argues that ''[leaders] are mindful of the political 
costs of adverse opinion even though they may persist in the questionable use of 
force… states accused of illegality take pains to show their conduct to be legitimate 
self-defense.'' Likewise, the increased support can help the crisis actors coerce or 
otherwise persuade his opponent to capitulate. One way to think about this is that 
diplomatic and political support can increase the resolve of the crisis actors. Thus, if 
the international community is able to put enough pressure on the state, the leader in 
question can avoid the costs of using force by forcing his opponent to accept a deal.
35
 
Regime-change in Haiti provides an illustrative case of the logic of the former 
case. Within six months of the United Nations Security Council passing Resolution 
940 authorizing member-states ''to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure 
from Haiti of the military leadership'', President Clinton was able to reach an 
agreement with the military junta to step down and allow former President Aristide to 
return to power. Of course, while other factors contributed to the military junta's 
decision to capitulate, the power of an united international community supporting the 
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international law on the use of force may find that international actors become increasingly 
intolerant of them. In other words, an accumulation of violations may have important 




US's preference for regime-change, as evidenced by UN Resolution 940, played a 
role in the bloodless coup.  
 
Indirect Effects 
The indirect effects of international actors influence the behavior of leaders by 
informing domestic actors about the merits of using force. This argument is based on 
the idea that leaders are accountable to domestic actors and they must maintain their 
support to stay in power.  
Domestic actors, however, lack information about foreign policy and are unable to 
judge the behavior of the leaders. Given this, they look to international actors for 
information about the merits of using force.  Thus international law influences 
domestic actors by first informing the behavior of international ones.   
While there are different arguments on the specific causal mechanisms at play, 
the interest here is on how international actors serve as elite cues to domestic actors 
and provide them with the necessary information.   International actors can serve in 
this role because they meet the conditions that are necessary for domestic actors to 
turn to for credible information.  Specifically, citizens value their support for two 
primary reasons; first, they may share common interests with the third parties (i.e., 
trusted cues) , or second, the diverse set of opinions provides an external check for 
domestic actors on the merits of using force even for those who may doubt the value 
of the institution (Grieco et al. 2011).   
Specifically, international actors can provide both formal and informal actions 




use of force. The UN Security Council, for instance, can authorize the use of force or 
even issue condemnations. Likewise, the UN General Assembly, while not legally 
binding, can pass resolutions signaling the support of the international community or 
at least a certain segment of the international system. The UN Secretary-General who 
has a certain degree of authority as the leader of the UN can similarly issue formal 
statements about the use of force.    
Regional organization can also authorize actions, as the OAS approving the 
blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis. These organizations can also issue public 
denunciations of the certain courses of action. Finally, third party leaders can voice 
their support or not for the use of force. As French President Jacques Chirac said in 
the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war that, “Nothing, nothing justifies this.”
36
 On the other 
hand, third party leaders can publicly declare support for other nations, as the US 
often does for Israel. 
The effect of international law on third parties therefore has important 
consequences domestically. Domestic actors can update their beliefs about the 
behavior of leaders once they receive this additional information. Put differently, this 
information creates an opportunity for citizens to know whether they should punish 
leaders for using force inappropriately, and thus it can serve as the mechanism for 
how international law can constrain states.  Given this, they will punish them if the 
new information indicates that they acted in a manner different from what they 
wanted them to do. In contrast, if this new information confirms that they acted 
appropriately, then citizens have no reason to sanction them. 







 There are three primary ways that international actors can influence domestic 
ones.  First, burden-sharing can serve as an important signal to domestic actors about 
the merits of using force.  Since domestic actors prefer to minimize the costs of using 
force, burden-sharing can be an especially attractive option for leaders. The ability of 
leaders to minimize the costs of using force by sharing the costs of force can provide 
especially valuable information to domestic actors.  In particular, when other nations 
are willing to share the burden for the use of force, this indicates to domestic actors 
that the use of force is worthwhile. In this way, the contributions of allies can serve as 
a costly signal to domestic actors about the merits of using force. The lack of support, 
however, can raise doubts among the domestic public about the necessity of using 
force.  
The available evidence is consistent with the importance of third parties. In a 
comprehensive review of US public opinion on 12 instances of the use of force 
between 1979-2003, Eichenberg (2005) finds strong support for the public's 
preference for multilateral actions compared to unilateral actions. He finds, for 
instance, that in five cases (i.e. Lebanon Peacekeeping, North Korea nuclear 
confrontation, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia), the public's support for using force was 
at least 10 percentage points higher when either the UN or NATO was mentioned in 
the survey.
37
 He points out that the differences are significant in that in a majority of 
the cases in his study, the majority of the public only supports using force when it is 
multilateral in nature. 
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Similarly, when a leader uses force without international support, it may lead 
citizens to doubt the legitimacy of the mission.  Recent work in the public opinion 
literature suggests that while citizens are sensitive to casualties in war, they are more 
sensitive when they doubt the legitimacy of the mission (e.g., Gelpi et al. 2009).  
International actors can inform the domestic public about the merits of using force. If 
a leader uses force without the support of domestic actors and the expected costs of 
the war become relatively high, the leader is more likely to face a domestic backlash 
compared to a conflict when the decision to use force was justified with the support 
of international actors.  
Second, there are reputational consequences for using force against the wishes 
of the international community. Scholars working in a variety of literatures have 
found that citizens value the reputation of the state (McGillivray and Smith 2008; 
Tomz 2007). Reputation can be especially important for compliance with 
international law (Guzman 2008). When leaders use force multilaterally, they will be 
seen as reliable partners who make more credible promises. This makes future gains 
from cooperation both easier and less costly. Since citizens value the future benefits 
of cooperation, leaders have incentives to develop and maintain a cooperative 
reputation.  As a result, if a leader violates international law and receives little 
international support, domestic actors can criticize the leader on grounds that he is 
undermining the future gains from international cooperation. 
Third, the behavior of third parties can also influence the support of the 
domestic opposition. The opposition elite (or other members of the elite in non-




leaders accountable by potentially removing them from office or by impeding their 
preferred policies, especially if they are in the legislature or serve as a veto player in 
another institution (e.g., military leader). The opposition also has incentives to 
undermine the leader. To bolster their own political fortunes, they would like to call 
the leader incompetent and argue that his policies threaten the security and interests 
of the state. 
The opposition elite, however, must be selective about when to criticize the 
leader. If the opposition challenges the leader under adverse conditions, it risks 
undermining its domestic support or it may face counter-attacks by the leader, which 
may be especially costly in non-democratic regimes. Consequently, the opposition is 
more likely to condemn the leader when they are more likely to receive support from 
other domestic actors or if the leader's coalition is already weak or divided.  In 
contrast, when the public already supports the leader, the opposition will be unlikely 
to opposed the public and weaken their own domestic standing. Put differently, it 
would not be in the opposition's interest to challenge the leader when he already has 
the support of the people.    
Thus if a leader is considering the use of force that is consistent with 
international law, he can expect to silence the opposition. In this case, opposition 
elites have few incentives to condemn the policies of the leader. If the domestic 
opposition challenges the legal use of force, the opposition risks being seen as putting 
politics ahead of national security. Similarly, as Schultz (2003b) argues, the 
opposition risks being blamed at home if they failed to initially support the use of 




incentives to challenge the illegal use of force, but few reasons to condemn the lawful 
use of force.   
The US invasion of Iraq once again helps illustrate the importance of 
international actors, especially the United Nations. According to a USA 
TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll conducted shortly before the invasion, 60% of the US 
public supported the war. However, support for the war dropped to 54% without UN 
authorization and to less than 47% if President Bush were to fail to even seek the 
approval of the Security Council.   It is also important to realize is that while the UN 
help shaped the support of domestic actors, UN support was actually endogenous to 
international law. That is, many states refused to support the US invasion of Iraq 
because it violated international law on the use of force.  
 
Theoretical Expectations 
The above discussion leads directly to some theoretical expectations regarding how 
international law can promote the peaceful resolution of international crises.  
Reciprocal interactions help explain the decision of crisis actors to escalate 
international crises with the large-scale use of force. International law on the use of 
force facilitates the reciprocal use of force and minimizes aggression actions by 
helping leaders credibly commit to the use of force in self-defense. International law 
alters the costs and benefits of using force in international crises by influencing the 
support of international and domestic actors. Third parties are more likely to support 
states that comply with international law and withhold support from states that violate 




international law, while they can minimize the costs by abiding by the legal principles 
related to the use of force. As such, leaders with the support of third parties can 
engage in successful deterrence in international crises since the payoffs for the 
reciprocal use of force are greater than they are for initiating the use force.  Therefore, 
we should expect that leaders will be more likely to comply with international law on 
the use of force in order to avoid the costs of engaging in the aggressive use force.   
My primary hypothesis is:  
H1: Leaders are less likely to employ the large-scale use of force in 
international crises when international law prohibits the use of force 




In this chapter, I presented my theoretical framework for understanding how 
international law can effectively constrain leaders in international crises. In so doing, 
I put forward my theory of institutional reciprocity.  By serving as a credible source 
of information, international law can effectively constrain leaders because violating it 
increases the costs of using force, while complying with it reduces these costs. Third 
parties make up the key mechanism here. Third parties are more likely to support 
actions that are in accordance with international law and oppose behavior that is not 
consistent with it. Leaders value the support of third parties because they alter the 
dynamics of reciprocity. Leaders with the support of third parties can credibly 
commit to the reciprocal use of force and deter actors from pursuing aggressive 




likely to escalate international crises when international law prohibits the use of force 











In the previous two chapters, I introduced the most important principles on 
international law on the use of force, and I presented my theoretical framework, 
institutional reciprocity. I argued that international law on the use of force can be an 
effective constraint on the behavior of leaders in international crises. I posited that 
international law facilitates the reciprocal use of force and helps crisis actors deter 
their adversaries from initiating the aggressive use of force against them. The law 
influences the dynamics of reciprocity by altering the support of international and 
domestic actors.  Because the credibility of international law establishes appropriate 
standards of behavior in world politics, I suggested that domestic and international 
actors are more likely to support actions that are in accordance with international law 
on the use of force and oppose actions that violate the relevant legal principles. As 
such, I concluded that leaders are more likely to comply with international law to 
lower the costs of using force.   
 In this chapter, I empirically assess my theoretical framework and present the 
results of my statistical analyses. Using an original dataset on international law on the 
use force in international crises since 1945, I find that this body of law is an effective 
constraint on leaders in international crises. Specifically, my findings suggest that 
leaders are at least 45% less likely to escalate militarily in a crisis when international 




 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I introduce my universe 
of cases and discuss the original dataset on the legality of using force that I created 
for this dissertation. In this section, I also include an example of how I coded the 
international law on the use of force variable.  I then discuss the statistical 
complications that are common to empirical analyses such as mine. Third, I present 
the statistical and substantive results. Fourth, I present an alternative and innovative 
research design to account for any potential spurious effects in my statistical results 
on the effectiveness of international law. Fifth, I consider the role of international law 
within several sub-populations of my analysis, such as powerful states, major powers, 
democratic leaders, and so forth.  Finally, I conclude with the implications of my 
empirical analyses.  
 
Research Design 
I use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset from 1946-2005 to test my 
theoretical expectations on the effectiveness of international law on the use of force. 
As defined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), an incident must meet three conditions 
to be considered an ICB crisis: a state perceives a threat to one or more basic values, a 
heightened perception of involvement in military hostilities, and an awareness of a 
finite time horizon for decision-making.   
While I understand that most studies conflict initiation and escalation use the 
Militarized Interstate Disputes data (MIDs) (Maoz 2005) to assess arguments on 
crisis escalation, ICB is an appropriate universe of cases for my purposes for three 




relatively higher levels of severity compared to the MIDs data. In a comparison 
between MIDs and a new dyadic-based ICB dataset, Hewitt (2003) finds that ICB 
crises, across several different criteria, are more severe than MIDs.
38
 The higher level 
of severity helps ensure that the results are not spurious. As many MIDs occur at 
relatively minor levels of hostilities, leaders may have little interest in escalating them 
to a higher-level, irrespective of the law. It is unlikely, for instance, that leaders will 
routinely escalate minor border incidents that are common in the MIDs data. Thus, 
there is likely to be a strong positive correlation between the prohibition on the use 
force and the decision to refrain from escalating the dispute. The correlation, 
however, will have little to do with international law, and more to do with the fact 
that a leader has little incentive to escalate a relatively minor incident. In contrast, in 
the ICB data, there is a greater likelihood that each dispute will escalate to high-levels 
of force.  The effect of law on the peaceful resolution of international crises using the 
ICB data is less likely to be spurious and more associated with the effectiveness of 
international law. 
Second, the MIDs data is problematic since there is no description of many of 
the actual events in the MIDs data.  Due to this limitation, it would be difficult to 
code the legality of using force for most MIDs, as information on the facts of the case 
that contribute to the legality of using force are missing. Finally, other scholars have 
used ICB to test many theories of conflict, most notably the work on audience costs 
(Gelpi and Griesdorf 2002), the democratic peace (Rousseau et al. 1996), and major 
power interventions (Huth 1998). In sum, the strengths of the ICB data and the 
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limitations of the MIDs data make the ICB data an appropriate universe of cases to 
empirically assess my theoretical argument. 
It is also important to discuss how I built the data used in the analysis, since I 
had to reorganize the standard ICB data and collect additional information to test my 
hypotheses on the behavior of crisis-actors.
39
 To that end, I researched the ICB 
summaries (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000), the recently released ICB dyads data 
(Hewitt 2003), standard conflict sources (e.g., Clodfelter 2002; Sarkees 2010), and 
other studies that have used ICB (Gelpi and Griesdorf 2002; Gelpi 1997; Rousseau et 
al 1996).  
 First, the unit of analysis in my data is the crisis-actor. I also distinguish 
between challenger and target states in my analysis: a state is coded as the challenger 
if it was the first state to express dissatisfaction with the status quo, while the 
defender of this initial action (i.e. the trigger in ICB language) is the target.
 40
 There 
are 455 challengers and 455 targets across the 303 crises in my data.  
 I distinguish between challengers and targets because the relevant legal 
principles permitting the right to use of force vary in large part for challengers and 
targets.  The strict right of self-defense to an armed attack mostly applies to target 
states. When targets have the right to use force, for example, they are usually 
responding to an attack from another state, such as Iraq's armed attack against Kuwait 
in 1990 that triggered Kuwait’s right of self-defense.  
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 ICB has recently created a dyadic data set.  Nonetheless, I rely on my own dataset for 
several reasons. First, the dyadic data does not contain information at the dyadic level for 
many of the variables used in this analysis. Second, the dyadic data does not distinguish 
between challengers and targets. 
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 This coding rule is consistent with other empirical work that uses the ICB data (e.g., Gelpi 




In contrast, the legal principles are typically different and more varied for 
challengers; the majority of these cases include: 1) response to non-state actors 
including terrorists and rebel groups, 2) the right to protect nationals in foreign states, 
3) intervention in other states, 3) anticipatory self-defense, and 5) self-determination 
efforts during decolonization. As a result, challengers are not responding to an armed 
attack by another state, but rather they are responding to some action by either a non-
state actor, the interaction between a non-state actor and another state as in a civil 
conflict, or the occupation of a state by a colonial power.  Given the systematic 
variation in the legal principles for challengers and targets, it is important to account 
for this in my empirical analyses, as I do by distinguishing between challengers and 
targets.  
Second, similar to the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data, I 
disaggregate ICB crises with multiple actors into several challenger-target 
observations. Given this, several crises have more than one challenger and target.  
There are, for instance, two observations in the 2001 Afghanistan War: in the first the 
United States is the challenger and Afghanistan is the target and in the second 
observation, the United Kingdom is the challenger and Afghanistan is the target.  
Third, it is possible for a state to be both the challenger and target in a given crisis. 
For example, in the crisis leading to the Gulf War, Iraq is the challenger against 
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Fourth, crisis actors must be states or in a select few cases colonies that were 
on the verge of receiving statehood.
42
 I, however, exclude non-state actors from my 
analysis. Even though non-state actors indirectly caused many international crises, 
they do not serve as crisis-actors in my data.
43
 On the other hand, I include colonies 
as crisis actors. I differentiate between non-state actors and colonies because many of 
the latter had already developed the institutions and sense of statehood by 1946, 
whereas many of the non-state actors lack these institutional features.
44
 Finally, I drop 
all inter-war crises from my analysis because they are less relevant for analyses on the 
decision to initiate the use of force.   
 
Response Variable: Crisis Escalation 
Crisis escalation is the primary response variable in my analysis. ICB codes four 
different levels of crisis escalation: 1) no clashes, 2) minor clashes, 3) severe clashes, 
and 4) war. In my analysis, I collapse the four category variable into two categories, 
in which the variable receives a one if the leader in question engaged in severe 
clashes or war, and zero otherwise.
45
 Escalation values are based off of the highest 
level of violence for each actor in the crisis-dyad.  
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 Once again, this coding rule is consistent with previous studies that have used ICB (Gelpi 
and Griesdorf 2002; Huth 1998; Rousseau et al. 1996). 
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For instance, while Al-Qaeda obviously attacked the US first on 9/11, I code the US as the 
challenger and Afghanistan as the target, in which the US had the right to use force against 
Afghanistan because Al-Qaeda was considered a de facto organ of Afghanistan. This is 
consistent with the coding rules in the ICB dataset.  
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In other words, I view non-state actors, such as the Cuban exiles invading the Dominican 
Republic as something that is categorically different from Indonesia fighting the Dutch for 
independence. 
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 As a robustness check, I estimated my models using the entire four category scale. The 
results remained the same. I also estimated my equations on a response variable that was 




In Figure 1, I display the distribution of my response variable. As Figure 1 
indicates, there are 466 challengers and 466 targets.
46
 Challengers escalated to the 
large-scale use of force in 188 out of the 466 crisis-dyads (40%), while targets 
escalated 160 times (35%). Finally, both states escalated 150 times amounting to 32% 
of all crisis dyads.  The results indicate that crisis escalation occurs at relatively high 
rates in ICB crises.  
 
 
Theoretical Variable of Interest - International Law on the Use of Force 
I utilize a two-step process to code this variable. First, I collected data on the facts of 
each crisis, and second, I applied international law to the facts. I researched several 
legal works to identify the relevant legal issues (e.g., Alexadrov 1996; Arend 1993; 
Crawford 2003; Dinstein 2005; Franck 2002; Gray 2008; O’Connell 2001; Ruys 
2010) and other sources to code the facts of the crises (e.g., Brecher and Wilkenfeld 
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2000; Clodfelter 2008; Sarkees et al. 2010).  I use the legal principles below to code 
the right to self-defense category.
47
  
1) A state only has the right to self-defense if it suffered casualties and/or 
property damage. Frontier incidents or other minor violations of the use of force do 
not allow for the right to self-defense. 
 
2) The use of force in self-defense must also be necessary. Three conditions are 
required to meet this condition: a) alternative, non-violent means are not available, b) 
states can only respond if a limited attack was part of a series of attacks; in contrast, 
an isolated attack does not permit the right to self-defense, and c) the response must 
be defensive in nature and aimed at preventing future attacks from taking place. 
Punitive actions are not allowed.  
 
3) Attacks on foreign emanations, such as embassies are an armed attack and 
allow for the right to self-defense. 
 
4) The use of force to protect nationals in foreign states is only allowed under the 
following conditions: a) nationals must face an imminent threat or be in grave danger, 
b) the host state must be unwilling or unable to protect the nationals, and c) the use of 
force may only be used to protect the nationals and not for any other reason.  
 
5) Anticipatory or interceptive self-defense is allowed if there is clear and 
compelling evidence that an attack is imminent.  
 
6) Interventions are lawful if they are consistent with the credible non-
intervention rule or the proportionate counter-intervention rule. The former holds that 
interventions are legal when a government invites another state to intervene and 
domestic conflict is at or below the threshold of civil war. Interventions are illegal 
when the state is engaged in a civil war. It is also illegal to intervene on behalf of the 
opposition or rebel groups. The proportionate counter-intervention rule is relevant 
when a state is involved in a mixed or internationalized civil war (other states have 
already intervened). Under these conditions, a state can counter-intervene on behalf 
of the government, but not the opposition. Also, the intervention must be limited to 
the territory of the state in civil war, unless the prior intervention reaches the 
threshold of an armed attack. In this case, the counter-intervenor can use force against 
the initial attacker on its territory. Finally, humanitarian interventions, pro-democratic 
interventions, and other types of regime-change are illegal.  
 
7) States are allowed to respond in self-defense against terrorist groups, rebels, 
and other non-state actors as long as four conditions hold: 1) the attack must be large-
scale and greater than the threshold for armed attack by another state, 2) attack must 
be part of consistent pattern of attacks and not an isolated incident, 3) the host state 
must be unwilling or unable to stop the group, 4 ) it must be clear that other 
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alternatives, such as law enforcement will not work, and 5) self-defense must be 
defensive in nature; punishment is not permitted.  
 
8) States can use self-defense against a state supporter of a non-state actor if the 
host state has effective control of the non-state actor, or the group is considered a de 
facto organ of the state.  In other words, the state must be directly responsible for the 
attack by the non-state actor. All other types of support, such as training, logistical, 
intelligence, weapons, or any other type of aid do not constitute an armed attack by 
the state supporting the non-state actor. 
 
9) A state is allowed to defend another state that is a victim of an armed attack. 
The victim must also request help. Lower levels or other legal principles, such as 
protection of nationals, anticipatory self-defense, and extra-territorial self-defense do 
not allow for the right to collective self-defense. 
 
10) The United Nations Security Council can authorize the use of force.  
 
Israel-Lebanon Coding Example 
I also believe that it would be useful to review an example of how I coded this 
variable since many readers may be unfamiliar with the legal principles related to the 
use of force.  As such, I describe below how I coded this variable for the international 
crisis that lead to the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War.  
In the first stage, I identify the factual circumstances that led to the outbreak 
of the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006. In the second stage, I apply the legal principles to 
the facts to determine if Israel had the legal right to use force against Lebanon. Also, 
it is important to note that Hezbollah is not included as a crisis actor in my data. 
While Hezbolalh’s actions and their relationship to the Lebanese government are 
important legal considerations for Israel’s right to self-defense against Lebanon, non-
state actors are, as noted above, excluded from my analysis.  
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah terrorists inside Lebanese territory fired a 




approximately the same time, another group of Hezbollah fighters crossed into Israeli 
territory, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed three other members of the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF). Immediately following the attack, Israeli troops attempted, but 
failed to rescue the kidnapped soldiers. Five additional members of the Israeli Army 
were killed during this operation to save the abducted soldiers.  Shortly thereafter, 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared that the use of force by Hezbolalh was 
an act of war and that it was attributable to Lebanon. Prime Minister Olmert claimed 
that Israel had a right to self-defense against Lebanon, which he argued was justified 
because the attacks emanated from Lebanese territory and Hezbollah ministers were 
part of the Lebanese cabinet.  The Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora denied 
responsibility and knowledge of Hezobllah’s actions, claiming that Israel had no right 
to self-defense against the Lebanese state (e.g., UN doc SG/SM/10563; UN doc 
S/2006/515: Zimmerman 2009).  
There are two central legal questions relevant to the use of force in this crisis: 
1) did Hezbollah’s actions constitute an armed attack and 2) whether Hezbollah’s 
actions were attributable to Lebanon.   
Regarding the first principle, the Hezbollah attack can only be considered an 
armed attack if it meets three primary conditions. First, it must result in the loss of life 
and/or significant property damage.
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 Second, Israel only has the right to use force if 
the attack was part of a series of attacks, rather than an isolated incident.  Third, the 
Israeli use of force must be considered necessary.  
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First, by both killing several Israeli soldiers and causing serious property 
damage, Hezbollah’s use of force met the threshold of an armed attack. Second, the 
attack on Israel was not an isolated incident as Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel were part 
of a consistent campaign of attacks against Israel going back several years. Third, 
given that Israel had a right to respond to an attack in progress and that there was a 
relatively high expectation of future attacks by Hezbollah, Israel actions can also be 
judged as necessary (Zimmerman 2007). As legal scholar Zimmerman (2007) argues, 
“… there seems to be no doubt that these acts involving both relatively large-scale 
and protracted cross-border shelling and incursions into the territory of another state, 
did amount to an armed attack…” In sum, Hezbollah’s actions clearly reached the 
threshold of an armed attack.   
The second relevant legal principle concerns Lebanon’s responsibility for the 
attacks. Lebanon can only be held accountable for the actions of Hezbollah if the 
relationship between the two met at least one of three conditions 1) Hezbollah is a de 
jure or de facto organ of Lebanon, 2) Hezbollah performs governmental functions on 
behalf of Lebanon, or 3) if Hezbollah is de facto directed by official authorities of 
Lebanon.  
First, Hezbollah cannot be considered a de facto organ of the state (Gray 
2008; Redsell 2007; Ronen 2006; Zimmerman 2009).  According to the International 
Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, a non-state actor is only part of the 
government if the group or persons responsible for the attack is formally incorporated 
into the institutions of the state in question (ILC Commentary, article 4 ). Put 




government. This is important for this crisis since Hezbollah had two ministers in the 
Lebanese Parliament at the time of the attack.  Nonetheless, Hezbollah cannot be 
considered part of the government because even though the political wing of 
Hezbollah was part of the political apparatus, the military forces responsible for the 
attack on Israel were not.  Given the separation between the military wing of 
Hezbollah that engaged in the armed attack and the political wing that was part of the 
government, Lebanon cannot be held responsible for the actions of Hezbollah based 
on this criteria.  
Second, the relationship between Hezbollah and Lebanon also failed to meet 
the second condition (Gray 2008; Redsell 2007; Ronen 2006; Ruys 2010; 
Zimmerman 2009).  The available evidence indicates that Hezbollah was not acting 
on behalf of the government of Lebanon when it attacked Israel. Hezbollah therefore 
had no legal or political authority from the Lebanese government to strike Israel.  
Third, Hezbollah cannot be considered a de facto organ of the state, even 
though they had two ministers in the government. Based on the Nicaragua case 
discussed in Chapter 2, the actions of a non-state actor can only be attributed to a 
state if it sent troops or otherwise ordered troops to attack Israel on its behalf. The 
Nicaragua decision demands that the specific attack be traced to the government, as 
opposed to a general level of control.  First, the two ministers in government failed to 
meet this criteria since, as noted above, they were not involved in the attack. Second, 
to my knowledge, there is also no evidence that indicates that the Lebanese 
government sent troops or otherwise ordered the attack (Redsell 2007; Ronen 2006; 




In sum, while the magnitude of Hezbollah’s attacks reached the threshold of 
an armed attack, the group’s use of force cannot be attributed to the sovereign state of 
Lebanon. Israel therefore had no right to use force against Lebanon, even though 
Prime Minister Olmert put forward a legal argument to justify his use of force against 
Lebanon, and even notified the United Nations that Israel was acting in self-defense.  
Therefore, in my dataset, I code Israel a “1”, or that international law prohibits 
the use of force.  On the other hand, since Israel had no right to use force against 
Lebanon, but employed the large-scale use of force against its neighbor and it reached 
the threshold of an armed attack, I code Lebanon a “0” or that international law 
allowed Lebanon the right to self-defense.  
 
Summary Statistics  
In Figure 2 and 3 (below), I display the basic summary statistics for this variable. 
First, as you can see from Figure 2, the challenger has the right to self-defense only 
46 times, in which he escalates 34 times (74%) and refrains from escalating 12 times 
(26%). In contrast, in the 420 crisis-dyads in which international law prohibits the use 
of force, the challenger does not escalate 269 times or in 64% of these cases, but does 








Figure 3 presents the results for the target. The target is allowed to use force 
98 times and escalates 62 times or in 63% of the cases and does not escalate in 36 
crises or 37% of the time. On the other hand, in the 368 crisis-dyads that the target is 
prohibited from using force, he chooses not to escalate 280 times or in 75% of the 
cases, and only escalates 88 times (23%).  
The distributions of my key variables reveal some interesting patterns. First, 
as expected, when international law prohibits the use of force, both challengers and 




respectively at 64% and 75%.  The figures also indicate that targets are also more 
likely to have the right to use force compared to challengers. This is to be expected 
since most of the cases of the right to self-defense belong to targets. On the other 
hand, legal principles are more varied for challengers, and occur less frequently in the 
data. Overall, the raw data suggests that international law can be an effective 
constraint on leaders in international crisis. Of course, it is necessary to confirm this 
finding by controlling for other possible explanations of crisis escalation and using 
more formal empirical tests.  
Finally, the coding rules for the control variables can be found in Appendix A.   
 
Estimation Procedures  
I use logistic regression with robust standard errors to estimate both the challenger 
and target equations.  I also rely on 95% confidence intervals to display the statistical 
significance for each coefficient estimate. When the confidence intervals do not cross 
zero, the variable is statistically significant at the .05 level using a two-tailed test.  
I use Clarify (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001) to estimate the quantities of 
substantive interest.  Specifically, I present the predicted probabilities, first 
differences, and the percentage change for all of my international law variables.
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  In 
my empirical analyses, the predicted probability is the probability that a crisis-actor 
escalates the crisis for a given explanatory variable.  I compute the first differences 
(or change in probability) by subtracting the predicted probability that the leader 
escalates when international law prohibits the use from the predicted probability that 
the leader escalates when he has the right to self-defense.  The percentage change is 
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calculated by dividing the first difference by the baseline predicted probability that 
leader escalates when international law allows it.  
 
Estimation Issues  
Similar to most statistical analyses, I recognize that there are some potential 
complications in my empirical analysis, including; 1) the interrelated decision of 
crisis actors to escalate with force, 2) selection effects regarding my universe of 
cases, and 3) the endogenous nature of my international law variable. I address each 
in turn below. 
First, it is likely that the decision to escalate for both challengers and targets is 
interrelated. As a result, the error terms across the two equations may be correlated, 
potentially biasing my results. As a robustness check, I estimated a bivariate probit 
model to account for the bias. My results are similar using this estimator, although 
they are a bit weaker for the challenger. I also estimated a bivariate ordered probit 
model for my four category response variable. Once again, the results were consistent 
with the main findings presented in this chapter. I present the logit results to keep the 
presentation of my analysis as straightforward as possible.  
Second, my analysis may suffer from selection bias in that the decision to 
escalate the crisis is related to the decision to initiate the crisis in the first place. As a 
result, my findings on international law may be biased.   
There are two potential sources of the type of bias associated with selection 
effects. First, it is possible that leaders select into crises when they have a right to use 




Given this, the crises in my sample may consist of leaders who are more likely to 
comply with international law. Second, and in contrast to the first reason, leaders that 
initiate crises may be especially resolved and have already incorporated international 
law into their decision-making. By selecting into crises in the first place they may 
have already accounted for and perhaps discounted the constraints of international 
law. Such leaders therefore are less likely to comply with international law on the use 
of force.  
The two selection effects stories, while obviously different from one another, 
still suggest that international law on the use of force is most effective in the pre-
crisis stage. Although I am sympathetic to the logic of selection effects and the 
potential bias it can cause, neither argument has pernicious effects on my findings for 
at least three reasons. 
I begin with the second selection story from above. In this case, the bias 
favors the null hypothesis in that international law does not constrain leaders; 
importantly, this makes it more difficult to find a statistically significant result that is 
consistent with my hypothesis. Given that my sample of crises is made up of leaders 
who have already discounted international law at least according to this selection 
story, we should not expect to find that law influences leaders in international crises. 
However, since I find a statistically significant result for my international law 
variable despite this potential bias, we can be confident that international law does in 
fact constrain the behavior of leaders.  
Second, the first selection effects story suggests that the bias may favor a 




While this could potentially be problematic, the available data suggest otherwise. In 
particular, the small number of challengers with the right to use force (11% of the 
observations) suggests that this logic is not motivating the behavior of leaders who 
initiate international crises. That is, if challengers selected into crises with the right to 
use force, we would expect to see a much larger percentage of challengers with the 
right to self-defense than the 11% that is currently in the data. Admittedly, the one 
limitation of this argument is that I do not have data on the entire universe of potential 
challengers to compare how often potential challengers with the right to use force 
initiate crises compared to potential challengers without the right to use force initiate 
crises.
50
 Nonetheless, the small number of challengers with the law on their side 
suggests that challengers are not selecting into crises when they have a legal 
advantage.  
There are also two conceptual reasons to discount the bias associated with this 
type of selection effect. First, challengers often initiate crises by responding to some 
trigger that is not a direct threat from another state, such as the development of 
nuclear weapons or support for non-state actors. In such situations, a leader may have 
to initiate a crisis to address the security threat, regardless of the legality of using 
force.
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 The implication of this is that it reduces the universe of cases in which 
challengers can select themselves into crises with favorable legal claims.  Thus, while 
challengers can select into crises with the legal right to use force at times, there are 
many crises where challengers are put in the position of responding to some event, 
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 As I discuss below, the nature of my international law variable limits the usefulness of 
using a statistical estimator to account for this type of selection bias.  
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 To be clear, while a leader is responding to some event, he is the challenger since it is his 




minimizing problems of selection effects in the analysis. Second, states may initiate 
crises before they actually make a decision about whether to use force. It is only 
during the crisis that challengers learn about the issue in question, the relevant legal 
principles, and the resolve of the state in question, all of which can affect the utility 
and ultimately their decision to resort to the use of force.  Selection bias therefore 
does not exist since states are unable to select into crises with the legal right to use 
force when they are undecided about whether to use force when they initiated the 
crisis.  
In sum, while I acknowledge that selection bias is important and a relevant 
consideration for crisis behavior, I believe that for all of the reasons discussed above 
that selection effects do not have a pernicious effect on my statistical results.  
While the bias should not raise any concern about the credibility of my 
findings, a Heckman model or similar variant could nonetheless be used to account 
for any selection effects. Unfortunately, my analysis does not lend itself to selection 
models, at least in a manner consistent with existing empirical analyses in the 
literature. In order for a Heckman model to reduce the bias, I would have to first 
estimate a selection equation, in which international law is the independent variable 
and the onset of crisis is the dependent variable, and then an outcome equation similar 
to the analysis in this chapter. Scholars interested in the interrelated nature of onset 
and escalation typically use dyad-years, politically relevant dyads or something 
similar as the sample for the selection equation. The problem, however, is that 
international law on the use of force is not a meaningful variable in the selection 




to be relevant. In other words, there would be little to no variation on the legal right to 
use force variable in the research design typically used by scholars. I am therefore 
unable to use a sample-selection estimator to account for selection bias; nonetheless, 




Finally, the third complication involves the potentially endogenous nature of 
my international law variable. There are three potential sources of bias in this case.
 
 
First, both the challenger and target variables are, to some extent, conditional on the 
behavior of the other.  In other words, the key independent variable is endogenous to 
the behavior of the actors in the crisis. Second, similar to other areas of law, it is 
possible that leaders that abide by this body of law are only selecting into low-levels 
of compliance. Third, some readers may believe that international law is, in general, 
endogenous to the interests of the most powerful states. I start with the third point.  
First, while some scholars have argued that international law reflects the 
interests of the most powerful states (e.g., Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Mearsheimer 
1994), there are several reasons why international law can serve a meaningful role in 
world politics independent of the states that established it (e.g., Abbott and Snidal 
1998; Chayes and Chayes 1995; Franck 1990; Henkin 1979; Keohane and Martin 
1995). In this way, international law while endogenous at the creation becomes an 
exogenous influence on state behavior. This is true for at least three reasons. 
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I am, however, working on creating a universe of cases for a selection equation that would 
include some minimum level of conflict, such as MIDs at a lower level of hostilities, civil 
conflicts, rebel delegation, nuclear proliferation, and kidnapping or other attacks on foreign 




First, both the US and the USSR - two leading powers in 1945 - were not 
alone in crafting the Charter. Scholars have long recognized that it was a political 
bargain between the great powers and weaker states (e.g., Ikenberry 2000).  Second, 
as discussed earlier, many of the most important legal principles on the use of force 
emerged long before the international crises addressed here. Thus, even though a 
powerful state may have supported a specific principle years ago, there is no 
guarantee that the same guidelines will serve its interests today. The Caroline incident 
is a useful example of this of this logic. In 1837, the US as the weaker party called for 
restrictions on the preemptive use of force by a major power against non-state actors 
residing in its territory. It is likely, however, that today the US would prefer fewer 
restrictions on the right to use force against non-state actors. Nonetheless, Webster’s 
formula stands as a cornerstone of international law, despite the US’s rise to power 
since the Caroline Affair.    
Finally, developing nations and other minor powers have also influenced the 
development of customary international law and even many UN General Assembly 
Resolutions. While the latter are not legally binding, UNGA resolutions have proven 
critical in interpreting the Charter; for example, the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case relied 
on the UNGA’s Definition of Aggression in its decision that favored Nicaragua over 
the United States (e.g., Gray 2008).  
Second, some readers may be concerned that leaders select into compliance 
with the Charter by ratifying a treaty or another source of international law. In short, 
selection problems are largely absent from this body of law. All states are obligated to 






  In other words, the variation in the international law variable 
used here is not found in who signs or ratifies the treaty which may be endogenous, 
but rather how the legal right to use force varies across crises. Thus, we can have 
greater confidence that the results presented here are about cooperation instead of 
states selecting into compliance.   
Third, my variable of theoretical interest may be endogenous in that a leader 
only has a right to self-defense if he is the victim of an armed attack. In such cases, 
his legal claims are largely a function of the level of force used by other states and 
vice-versa.  Given this, the international law variable is endogenous and the results 
may be biased.  Fortunately, the bias resulting from this form of endogeneity favors 
the null hypothesis in my empirical analyses, making it more difficult to find a 
statistical significant effect for the peaceful effect of international law.  
To see this, consider the behavior of a challenger state. A challenger is more 
likely to engage in an armed attack (and provide the target with the legal right to use 
force) when it expects that the target will be unlikely to respond with force.
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 That is, 
challengers are likely to use force when they expect favorable outcomes, so they will 
select relatively weaker targets that will be less likely to respond with force even 
though they have the legal right to do so.
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 Thus, the direction of the bias suggests 
that the target in this example should be less likely to respond with the large-scale use 
of force when it has the right to self-defense. As the logic of my argument implies 
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 In addition, the decisions of international courts apply to all states.  
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 The logic of my argument here is premised on the notion that states want to minimize the 
costs of using force.  
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My argument is based on the average situation. There are likely to be scenarios where states 
will be willing to accept the costs of the illegal use of force. Powerful states or major powers 
may be capable of absorbing the costs violating international law, for example. I take up this 




that states with the right to self-defense should be more likely to respond with force, 
the bias favors the null hypothesis, thereby making it more difficult to find support 
for my hypothesized relationship.  
A similar logic explains how the bias influences cases when international law 
prohibits the use of force. A challenger state will be more likely to avoid using force 
if it expects that the target will respond with force to an armed attack. The challenger 
behaves this way to avoid the costs of using force against an adversary who he thinks 
will be likely to use force in return. Thus we should expect on average that targets 
that lack the legal right to use force are actually more likely to use force, since they 
are more powerful and can expect a greater outcome in war. Once again, the bias here 
favors the null hypothesis making it more difficult to find statistical significance for 
my theoretical argument.   
The above explanation makes it clear that endogeneity does not bias my 
results; however, it is possible to use instrumental variables and/or matching methods 
to account for any residual endogeneity concerns. The instrumental variable approach 
is problematic for analyses on international law on the use of force. To estimate a 
simultaneous equation or any other estimator that uses instrumental variables, it is 
necessary to find an instrument or another variable that is related (i.e. correlated) to 
my key independent variable, but is unrelated to crisis escalation, my response 
variable. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that there is a variable that is related to the 
prohibition on the right to use force, but that is unrelated to the decision to escalate 
with force. As a valid instrument likely does not exist, this method is inappropriate 




Matching methods provides another way to account for the endogenous nature 
of my international law on the use of force variable.  In brief, the motivation for 
matching is to make sure that the distribution of the control variables is more evenly 
matched for observations that include the prohibition on force and for observations 
that allow the legal right to use force. More technically, as Iacus et al. (2011) argue, 
the empirical distributions of pre-treatment control variables are roughly equivalent. 
The idea is to create a dataset in which the control variables in the treatment 
(observations with prohibition on the use of force) and control groups (observations 
without the legal prohibition) are more similar in order to more accurately assess the 
causal impact of the treatment effect (i.e. international law on the use of force).  
While several matching procedures have been developed in recent years,  I 
use the coarsened exact matching (CEM) technique to assess the effect of 
international law (Iacus et al. 2011). The results after matching were nearly identical 
to the ones presented in this chapter.
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 As such, I present the unmatched results 
below, but include the matched results along with a description of how CEM works in 
Appendix B.  I now turn to my empirical results.   
Empirical Results 
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For both the challenger and target equations, I matched on regime type for the combatant 






The empirical results suggest that international law on the use of force can effectively 
constrain leaders in international crisis. Across all of my equations, international 
law’s prohibition on the use of force is associated with a decreased likelihood of 
escalation. Specifically, in Figures 4 and 5, we see, consistent with my argument, that 
the coefficient estimate on the international law variable for both challengers and 
targets is negative and statistically significant as the confidence intervals do not come 
close to crossing zero. The negative coefficient estimates indicate that the prohibition 
on the use of force is associated with a smaller likelihood of crisis escalation by both 





 Several diagnostic tests confirm the statistical significance of my results. 
Likelihood Ratio, Wald, and Legrange multiplier tests are all statistically significant 
and thus provide evidence that the model specification with the legal prohibition 
performs better than a model of escalation without it. Thus, we can safely conclude 
that models of escalation that include my variable of theoretical interest are a better 
specification than models that fail to account for international law.  
 Second, model fit statistics suggest that the both the challenger and target 
equations perform well; that is, they accurately predict cases of escalation and no 
escalation in the data. Regarding the challenger, the area under the ROC Curve is 
72% and the number of cases correctly classified is 65%.  The tests for the target 
provide even stronger evidence. The area under the ROC Curve is 82% and the 
number of cases correctly classified is 77%.   
In sum, the diagnostic tests and model fit statistics provide strong evidence 
that the equations are both well specified and strong predictors of crisis escalation. 
Thus, we can have greater confidence in the robustness of the statistical results; 
leaders are clearly less likely to escalate international crises when international law 
prohibits the use of force compared to when they have the right to self-defense. 
Beyond the statistical significance, the post-estimation results provide 
evidence that the prohibition on the use of force has a meaningful impact on the 
behavior of leaders. I display the substantive effects in Figures 6-8. The probability 
that challengers with a right to use force escalate is .65, but this drops to .34 when 






 Thus, challengers are 48% less likely to use force when they do not have 
the right to self-defense (Figure 7).  
International law has an even stronger effect on the behavior of targets. When 
the leader of a target state has the right to use force the probability he escalates is .56. 
In contrast, when he does not have the right to respond in self-defense, the probability 
he escalates is only .16. This results in a first difference of -.4 (Figure 6) indicating 
that the target is 71% less likely to employ the large-scale use of force in crises 
(Figure 8). Once again, the results indicate that when international law prohibits the 
use of force, leaders are less likely to escalate militarily in international crises.  
 
 
Overall, I find mixed results across my control variables for both challengers and 
targets (Figures 4 and 5). Regarding the realist variables, I find that the gravity of the 
crisis is a strong predictor of crisis escalation, although the variable is only borderline 
significant for the challenger. As expected, when the crisis is over more serious 
issues, crisis actors are more likely to escalate. In contrast, military power is not a 
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consistent with many studies of crisis behavior and theoretical arguments that 
suggests that power is likely to have its strongest effect before the onset of a crisis or 
militarized dispute (e.g., Schultz 2003a, Weeks 2008). I find no support for the major-
power variables,  which is consistent with the findings for the military power 
variable.  
On the other hand, I find strong support for the alliance variable. When the 
crisis actors are involved in an alliance, both challengers and targets are less likely to 
escalate the dispute.  Non-contiguous challengers and targets are as expected more 
likely to escalate the crisis. Finally, as the distance between adversaries increases, 
both challenger and targets states are less likely to escalate the crisis, although this 
variable is only borderline significant for target states.   
In addition to the realist variables, I also control for regime-type and the issue 
at stake in the crisis. I find the democratic states are less likely to escalate crises 
militarily. I also include the adversary regime-type variable and find that it is negative 
and significant for the challenger, and negative, but not significant for the target. The 
results provide support for the argument that democracies are generally more pacific 
than nondemocratic states. Finally, I find, as expected, that crises over territorial 
disputes are more likely to escalate compared to crises over policy and other issues. 
Moreover, I also find that crises involving internal issues are more likely to escalate 
compared to territorial ones. This is consistent with the growing evidence that much 
of conflict today can be traced to domestic sources. 
It is also instructive to compare the substantive results for the control variables 




changes for all the statistically significant variables to conduct this assessment. I 
begin with challenger states.  
As noted above, challengers are 48% less likely to escalate militarily when 
international law prohibits the use of force compared to when it allows for the right of 
self-defense.  Importantly, this number is larger compared to the percentage changes 
for all of the control variables. For instance, democratic challengers and targets are 
only 17% and 28% less likely to escalate the crisis, respectively, a relatively high 
number but still less than international law.  The alliance variable has the second 
largest percentage change at -36%, meaning that challengers who share an alliance 
with targets are 36% less likely to escalate the crisis. Once again, however, this 
number is still smaller than it is for the international law variable. Grave crises and 
ones over territorial and internal issues are only 10%, 22%, and 22% more likely to 
escalate militarily, respectively; all three are less than the percentage change for the 
effect of international law. Non-contiguous states and states that are relatively distant 
from another geographically are also less likely to escalate, but the percentage change 
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 Figure 8 displays the percentage changes for the variables that are statistically 
significant for the target.  As noted, targets are 71% less likely to escalate when 
international law prohibits the use of force compared to when it allows for the right to 
self-defense. Similar to the challenger results, this percentage change is larger than it 
is for all of the other variables in the model. When targets are involved in grave 
crises, they are 57% more likely to escalate military, a very strong substantive result, 
but still smaller than the international law variable.  Targets are 32% and 18% less 
likely to escalate when they or the challenger are democratic, both smaller than 71%. 
In disputes fought over territorial and internal issues, targets are 27% and 45% are 
more likely to escalate, respectively. On the other hand, targets are 23% less likely to 
escalate when they have an alliance with challengers. Likewise, targets are less likely 
to escalate as the distance increases between them and the challenger and when they 
and the challenger are not contiguous.  In short, we see that international law has a 
stronger substantive impact on patterns of escalation in international crises than the 





The preceding section established that the prohibition on the use of force is associated 
both statistically and substantively with the lower likelihood of escalation in 
international crises. The results hold for both challengers and targets, even controlling 
for several factors that have been shown to influence crisis escalation. The 
substantive results for international law are larger than they are for all of the control 
variables, providing further evidence in favor of the role of international law in 
international crises. Consistent with my theoretical expectations, we can therefore 
conclude with confidence that there is a strong general relationship for the use of 
force and the propensity of leaders to escalate international crises. Simply, challenger 
and target states are less likely to escalate crises with the large-scale use of force 
when international law prohibits the right to self-defense than when it allows for the 
right to use force.  
 
Robustness Check: Coincidence of Interest 
In the previous section, I established the legal prohibition on the use of force is 
associated statistically and substantively with lower levels of escalation in 
international crises. The results are consistent with my theoretical expectations 
regarding the role of international law on the use of force in world politics. I 
recognize, however, that some readers may believe that my statistical results on 
international law are spurious in that the legality of using force is correlated with the 
initial (or imminent) attack suffered by the state in question. In other words, leaders 




when they are not attacked. In this way, it is not the law that leaders are reacting to, 
but rather the use of force in general.  
 In this section, I address this concern by presenting an alternative research 
design that seeks to isolate the effects of international law. To that end, I follow 
recent work by Schultz (1999) on the democratic peace, who sought to distinguish 
between the information and institutions explanations for democratic peace by 
developing a research design with opposite predictions for each theoretical argument. 
Specifically, using a research design that focused on the behavior of target states, he 
argued that the information argument predicts that targets should be more likely to 
back down against democratic challengers, while the institutional argument predicts 
that targets should be more likely to escalate against democratic challengers. In a 
series of statistical tests, Schultz found that targets of democratic states were more 
likely to back down, providing support for the information argument. Schultz’s work 
has led in part to the information argument being accepted as the leading explanation 
of the democratic peace. 
 In this section, I present the results from an empirical analyses that attempts to 
do something similar to Schultz’s work on the democratic peace. While I am unable 
to emulate exactly what he did, the below research design comes close and should 
address any concerns that readers may have about the relationship between the 
effectiveness of international law on the use of force and patterns of escalation in 
international crises. In particular, I create a research design that distinguishes between 
standard conflict expectations regarding the use of force and legal expectations about 




 Specifically, I create a polychotomous variable with three categories to 
measure the legal prohibition on the use of force.  The three categories produce three 
mutually exclusive binary variables. The first variable, “Right to Self-Defense” 
measures the legal right of self-defense and equals 1 if the state has the right to use 
force and zero otherwise. The second variable, “No Right to Self-Defense 
(Attacked)” equals 1 if the state was the victim of an attack by a state or non-state 
actor but the attack did not reach the level of activating the right of self-defense, and 
zero otherwise.
57
 The third variable, “No Right to Self-Defense (Not Attacked)” 
equals 1 if the state was not attacked and has no right to self-defense and zero 
otherwise.  
The purpose of this variable is to clarify whether the law or the use of force is 
driving state behavior or if states are just responding to the use of force.   The legal 
argument indicates that there should be a statistically significant difference between 
the Right of Self-Defense and No Right to Self-Defense (Not Attacked) as well as the 
Right to Self-Defense compared No Right to Self-Defense (Attacked). However, 
there should be no difference in patterns of escalation between the No Right to Self-
Defense (Not Attacked) and No Right to Self-Defense (Attacked) variables.  
In contrast, standard conflict explanations predict a different set of results. 
According to the conventional wisdom, states are expected to use force when they are 
attacked and refrain from using force when they are not attacked. Thus, there should 
be a statistically significant difference between the Right of Self-Defense and No 
Right to Self-Defense (Not Attacked) and a difference between No Right to Self-
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As discussed in Chapter 2, there are several reasons why a state may have been attacked, 




Defense (Not Attacked) and No Right to Self-Defense (Attacked). There should, 
however, be no difference between No Right to Self-Defense (Attacked) and Right to 
Self-Defense. Standard conflict explanations predict no difference between these 
categories because in both cases force was used against the state in question. While 
the magnitude of the attack may be smaller or a single, isolated incident, there are 
several reasons why levels of escalation should be relatively the same for both 
categories.
58
 States that have been attacked even if it is relatively small are likely to 
account for both domestic political pressures and their reputations for resolve in their 
decision-making. In other words, there are good reasons to believe that states that 
have been attacked have the necessary incentives (i.e. accommodate domestic actors 
and develop or maintain reputation for resolve) to respond with force, even if the 
attack was relatively small or by a non-state actor, etc. Thus, we can expect states to 
respond with force to any level of attack.
59
 In sum, this variable and research design 
should help establish whether a legal or conflict threshold is driving the results 
presented in this dissertation.  
 The summary statistics for the international law on the use of force variable 
reveal some interesting patterns. Among the 422 observations in the data, the 
challenger has the right to self-defense in 44 cases (10%), no right to self-defense 
(force) in 153 observations, and no right to self-defense (no force) 225 times (53%). 
Likewise, the target has the right to self-defense 80 times (19%), no right to self-
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 In addition, IR scholars rarely distinguish between different levels of force used by 
challengers in studies of conflict escalation.  
59
Nonetheless, I recognize that some readers may still be concerned about this final 
comparison. To alleviate any remaining skepticism, the response variable I use in this 





defense (force) in 135 cases (32%), and no right to self-defense (no force) in 207 
observations (49%). First, although the right to self-defense is fairly rare, challengers 
and targets have a right to self-defense in 10% and 19% of the time, respectively. The 
figures also indicate that targets are also more likely to have the right to use force 
compared to challengers. This is to be expected once again since most of the cases of 
the explicit right to self-defense belong to targets. On the other hand, legal principles 
are more varied for challengers, and occur less frequently in the data.  
 Finally and most importantly, when force is used, it is almost always at a level 
below the right of self-defense. For example, among the 197 observations where force 
was used against challengers, they did not have the legal right to use force in 78% of 
observations. Likewise, in the 215 observations in which force was used against 
targets, they did not have the right to self-defense 63% of the time. The patterns in the 
data suggest that states are aware of the threshold that activates the right to self-
defense, and therefore limit their use of force to a level before this line in order to 
avoid giving their adversaries the legal right to respond with force and the benefits 
that come along with it 
 Crisis escalation is the primary response variable in my analysis. I create a 
three category variable to account for different levels of escalation that can occur in a 
crisis.
 60
  Escalation values are based off of the highest level of violence that the 
respective actor engages in during the crisis.  The variable equals 0 when the crisis 
actors did not engage in any level of escalation, 1 when the crisis employed the minor 
or limited use of force, and 2 when the crisis actor engaged in severe or clashes or 
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As a robustness check, I estimated my models using the entire four category scale. The 
results remained the same. I also estimated my equations on a response variable that was 




war with the adversary. Regarding the distribution of this data, the challenger 
escalated to the large-scale use of force in 58 observations (13%), employed limited 
force in 201 cases (48%), and refrained from using force in 163 crises (39%).  The 
target used the large scale use of force in 73 observations (17%), employed limited 
force in 145 crises (34%), and did not use force in 204 cases (48%).  
 
Estimation Results  
I use a bivariate ordered probit estimator (Sajaia 2009) to test my hypothesis on crisis 
escalation. I use this estimator to account for the fact that the challenger and target 
decisions to escalate are separate, but interrelated decisions.
61
 I also rely on 95% 
confidence intervals to display the statistical significance of each coefficient estimate. 
When the confidence intervals do not cross zero, the variable is statistically 
significant at the .05 level using a two-tailed test.
62
 
The empirical results indicate that international law on the use of force can 
effectively constrain leaders in international crisis. In Figure 9A, I present the 
coefficient estimates for the categorical international law variable for the challenger, 
in which the Right to Self-Defense is the comparison category. I expect that both 
variables in the equation – No Right to Self-defense (Not Attacked) and No Right to 
Self-Defense (Attacked) to be negatively associated with the decision of challenger 
states to escalate militarily. The results reported in Figure 9A confirm my theoretical 
expectations and the statistical results from earlier in this chapter. When international 
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 Specifically, the bivariate ordered probit allows us to estimate separate equations for both 
the challenger and target and still incorporate the correlation between the disturbances of the 
two equations. 
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law prohibits the use of force challenger states are less likely to escalate with the 
large-scale use of force, regardless of whether force was used against them or not.   
 
In Figure 9B, I report the results with No Right to Self-Defense (Attacked) as 
the comparison category. As a reminder, the purpose of this test is to ensure that the 
prohibition on the use of force and not general patterns of conflict are driving my 
results. The coefficient estimate comparing No Right to Self-Defense (Not Attacked) 
and No Right to Self-Defense (Force) is not statistically significant. The coefficient 
estimate is near zero with the confidence intervals clearly crossing zero, meaning that 
when international law prohibits the use of force, there is no difference in the decision 
to escalate for challenger leaders who have been the victim of an attack or not. The 
final coefficient estimate in Figure 9B confirms that states are more likely to escalate 
when they have the Right to Self-Defense compared to when they lack the Right to 
Self-Defense (Attacked).  The results for the challenger, therefore, clearly align with 
the legal expectation, rather than the standard conflict explanations. States are less 
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The statistical results for the target produce similar findings (Figure 10). 
Target leaders are less likely to escalate when international law prohibits the use of 
force than when they have a right to self-defense (Figure 10A). When international 
law prohibits the use of force, there is no statistical difference in patterns of escalation 
when force has been used against targets compared to crises when force has not been 
used against them.  
 
The results provide support for my theoretical argument on international law 
on the use of force. First, when international law prohibits the use of force, both 
challengers and targets are less likely to escalate compared to when they have the 
right to self-defense.  Second, when international law prohibits the use of force, 
leaders escalate at similar levels, regardless of whether force was used against them 
or not. The empirical results indicate that the legal prohibition on the use of force and 
not the use of force in general makes up the line of demarcation for leaders in 
international crises. Put differently, it is not a coincidence of interest, but rather the 
UN Charter and related legal principles that explain state behavior in international 
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I present the post-estimation results to demonstrate the substantive effects for 
the legal prohibition on the use of force categorical variable. In Figure 11, I present 
the first differences for the statistically significant comparisons for the decision to 
escalate with the large-scale use of force.  As Figure 11A  indicates, the predicted 
probability that challengers escalate militarily decreases by 13% and 14% when they 
have No Right to Self-Defense (Not Attacked) and when they have No Right to Self-
Defense (Attacked), respectively, compared to when they have a Right to Use Force.  
The results are similar for target states (Figure 11B). The probability that targets 
escalate drops by 12% and 8% when targets go from having the Right to Self-Defense 
compared to when they have No Right to Self-Defense (Not Attacked) and when they 
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Figure 11A: Challenger First Difference for Decision to Escalate
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First Difference 95% CIs
Figure 11B: Target First Difference for Decision to Escalate
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In Figure 12, I present the percentage changes for the international law and 
statistically significant control variables.  Challengers are 58% and 62% less likely to 
escalate when they have No Right to Self Defense (Not Attacked and Attacked, 
respectively) compared to when they have the Right to Use Force.  The percentage 
change performs well compared to the control variables. It is, for instance, larger than 
all of the control variables that are associated with less escalation (democracy and 
distance-related variables).    
 
The results are also strong for target leaders (Figure 13). When targets have 
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they have a Right to Use Force. Likewise, when they have No Right to Self-Defense 
(Force), they are 49% less likely to use force compared to when they have a right to 
self-defense. Once again, the size of the percentage changes suggests strong support 
for my argument.  In addition, while the percentages changes are only larger than the 
alliance variable, they are roughly the same size as the other variables that predict less 
escalation (democratic and distance-related variables).   
In sum, the statistically significant results and the meaningful percentage 
changes indicate that the constraints imposed by international law have a 
substantively meaningful impact on challengers and targets.  Both types of states are 
far less likely to escalate military in international crises when international law 
prohibits the use of force compared to when international law permits the right to 
self-defense.  The statistical results clearly indicate that it is a legal threshold that 
explains leader behavior in times of crises, which hopefully alleviates any concerns 
about the spuriousness of international law.  
 
Robustness Check: Conditional Relationships 
While the results provide strong evidence in favor of my argument, it is also useful to 
further investigate the relationship between international law on the use of force and 
crisis escalation. One way to do this is to examine the effect of international law 
within different populations in the data. The purpose of this extension is to determine 
whether the peaceful effect of international law is robust across different types of 
states and crises. Specifically, I assess the role of international law in several different 




states, 3) powerful states, 4) weak/parity states, 5) grave crises, 6) major powers, 7) 
internal issues, 8) territorial issues, 9) Cold War and 10) post-Cold War.   
Within each group, I estimate the effects of international law using the same 
estimator, control variables and response variable that I used above. I also present the 
substantive effects by computing the percentage changes for the effect of 
international law in each group. 
 
 The results for challenger states are presented in Figure 14. The coefficient 
estimates for both democratic and non-democratic states are both negative and 
statistically significant indicating that the effect of international law is consistent 
across regime-type. This is an important finding since some scholars working in what 
is known as the democratic legalism literature have argued that democratic states may 
be more inclined to comply with international law.
63
 The basic argument advanced is 
that democratic states with strong rule of institutions domestically learn to operate 
within legal constraints and consequently transfer this behavior to the international 
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 I, of course, recognize that these results do not speak to a comparison between democratic 
and nondemocratic regimes. Nonetheless, it is still interesting that the law is effective among 
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arena (e.g., Simmons 1999; Slaughter 1995).  On the other hand, leaders from 
nondemocratic states who lack these institutions are more inclined to pursue their 
interests, regardless of the constraints imposed by international law. The results here 
indicate, however, that leaders from both democratic and nondemocratic states act in 
accordance with international law, reinforcing the strong general results from earlier 
in this chapter.   
  The results for several sub-populations that are associated with realist 
explanations, such as military power, gravity of the crisis, and the behavior of major 
powers are also presented in Figure 14.   The findings suggest that strategic 
considerations may attenuate the effectiveness of international law.  When the 
challenger is a powerful state (i.e. possesses more than 60% of the dyadic military 
capabilities), the coefficient estimate for international law is negative, but it misses 
statistical significance at the .05, but makes it at the .10 level. International law 
produces similar results for the other two realist variables; both the gravity of the 
crises and major powers are negative, but miss statistical significance at the .05, but 
again make it the .10 level. The results suggest that realist variables have a 
dampening impact on the pacifying effect of international law. 
 While proponents of international law may find these results troubling, they 
are consistent with my theoretical argument. Because the prohibition on the use of 
force adds a cost for using force illegally, some states especially powerful ones may 
be able to absorb these costs and use force illegally despite the lower payoffs.  This 




escalate militarily when international law prohibits it. Simply, they are unable to 
overcome the costs that are associated with doing so.   
The same logic holds for grave crises; leaders may believe that the costs of the 
unlawful use of force are not enough to prevent them from employing the large scale 
use of force when the stakes are high in that such crises produce other considerations 
which may trump the costs of violating international law.   The weaker results (still 
statistically significant at less restrictive levels) for the strategic calculations, while 
perhaps disappointing from a legalistic perspective, nonetheless are consistent with 
my argument and standard patterns of crisis escalation in the extant literature.  
 Finally, the results for the other sub-groups, such territorial concerns, internal 
issues, Cold War, and post-Cold War are consistent with the general findings from 
above. The one partial exception is that international law just misses statistical 
significance at the .05 level for the post-Cold War level. Nonetheless, since it is 
borderline significant, I include it here as a significant predictor of lower levels of 
military escalation. The result for the territorial concerns variable is consistent with 
the territorial integrity norm argument in that wars over territory are increasingly rare 
(Zacher 2001).  The result when the crisis is over internal issues provides further 
evidence for the general pacific effect of international law. Finally, while some 
readers may be surprised that the effect of international law exists even during the 
Cold War, it is consistent with my argument and some of the empirical findings in 





 The conditional relationships for target states provide even stronger evidence 
in favor of international law on the use of force (Figure 15). Similar to the challenger, 
international law is associated with lower levels of escalation for both democratic and 
nondemocratic states. Once again, this illustrates that the constraining effects of 
international law on the use of force extend beyond regimes with strong domestic rule 
of law institutions.   
 The realist variables (i.e. military power, grave crises, major powers) produce 
the strongest difference between challengers and targets. While the strategic 
calculations dampen the constraints of international law for challengers, it has no 
such effect for targets. That is, targets are less likely to escalate militarily when 
international law prohibits the use of force than when it allows it, even when target 
state are much stronger than their adversaries, are major powers, or are engaged in 
grave crises.  
The difference between challengers and targets can in all likelihood be 
explained by the selection effect that exists for challengers, but is absent for targets.  
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in violation of international law have already incorporated the costs of doing so into 
their decision to use force. In other words, by the very nature of being challengers, 
they initiate crises with the knowledge that they can accept the costs of using force.  
Second, weaker challengers are unlikely to initiate the use of force against 
stronger targets and provide them with the right to self-defense since they would be 
unable to absorb the costs of doing so. Thus, the deterrent effects of relatively strong 
targets reduce the likelihood that weak challengers will violate international law and 
provide targets with justification to respond with force. In this way, the expectation of 
how international law will affect the behavior of targets alters the behavior of 
challengers when they are considering using force against targets.  
 Cold War, territorial issues, and internal issues all produce similar results as 
challengers in that international law still reduces the likelihood of military escalation 
even within these sub-populations. The effect of international law just misses 
statistical significance at the .05 level during the post Cold War Era. Nonetheless, the 
result is borderline significant and generally consistent with the pacifying effect of 
international law on crisis-actors. 
Thus, with the exception of the realist conditions for challenger states that can 
be explained within my framework, the statistical results for the sub-populations 
indicate that the legal prohibition on the use of force is associated with less escalation 
in international crises for both challengers and targets.  The findings provide strong 
support for the effectiveness of the legal prohibition on the use of force.  
In Figures 16 and 17, I present the substantive results in the form of 




consideration.  Regarding challengers (Figure 16), the findings indicate that there is a 
large range for the percentage changes with a low of -5% (internal issues) and high of 
-32% (Cold War). Two realist variables – powerful states and major powers – 
produce, as expected, relatively small percentage changes at -11% and -13, 
respectively. It is also interesting that non-democratic variable  (-27%) has a larger 
substantive impact than the democratic variable (-15%); nonetheless, both indicate a 
meaningful substantive impact for regime-type. The strong substantive impact during 
the Cold War (-32%) is consistent with the statistical findings from above. Finally, 
the two groups with the lowest percentage changes are crises over internal issues (-
5%) and post-Cold War ones (-8%). The results, while interesting are actually 
consistent with one another. Many crises since the end of the Cold War involve 
internal issues, in which there is greater uncertainty over the law in this area and 
states may be more inclined to violate the law due to this uncertainty.  
 
 
The percentage changes for target states are presented in Figure 17.  There are 
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highest percentage change at -77% (Territorial Issues and Weak States) and the 
lowest at -10% (Powerful States). Second, the percentage changes are on average 
larger for target states compared to challenger states. This is consistent with the 
statistical and substantive results from earlier in this chapter, which indicate the 
international law is a stronger constraint on targets than it is for challengers.  
 
More specifically, the three realist variables – Powerful States, Grave Crises, 
and Major Powers produce the smallest effects at -10%, -11%, and -18%, 
respectively.  While these three variables are all statistically significant, it is 
interesting that they provide the lowest substantive impact. As explained earlier, this 
is largely consistent with how strategic influences can attenuate the constraints of 
international law. The Cold War, Territorial Issues, Weaker States, and Non-
Democratic states all produce the highest percentage changes. For the most part, the 
findings are consistent with both the substantive effects for challengers and the 
statistical results. Finally, the Post Cold War, Internal Issues, and Democratic States 
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In this chapter, I empirically assessed my theoretical argument on the effectiveness of 
international law in international crises. I find strong support for my expectations:  
both challenger and target leaders are less likely to escalate militarily when 
international law prohibits the use of force compared to when they have a right to 
self-defense. The results are statistically and substantively consistent across a range of 
empirical analyses, including several sophisticated robustness checks and alternative 
research designs. We can therefore be confident that the prohibition on the use of 







Chapter 5: International Law and Third Parties 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I used statistical analysis to assess my primary hypothesis on 
the influence of international law on the use of force and crisis escalation.  I found 
strong support for my theoretical argument on the pacifying role of international law. 
Crisis actors are less likely to escalate militarily when international law prohibits the 
use of force compared to when they have a right to use force. The result holds for 
both challenger and target states. My findings are also robust to multiple 
specifications, estimators, and different samples. In short, we can safely conclude that 
the prohibition on the use of force is associated statistically and substantively with 
less escalation in international crises 
 Notwithstanding the strong results, I recognize that I did not explicitly assess 
the behavior of third parties in the previous chapter, the underlying causal mechanism 
in my argument.   In this chapter, I overcome this potential limitation and test whether 
the law alters the behavior of third parties. To that end, I first consider whether 
international and regional multilateral security organizations - as representatives of 
third parties - are more likely to support states that act in accordance with 
international law and condemn states that act contrary to it.  Second, I asses how the 





 Regarding the quantitative tests, I use the ICB dataset created for the previous 
chapter to empirically assess the support of third parties. I use two different variables 
to test this relationship. First, I consider whether international and regional 
multilateral security organizations (IGOs) are less likely to support states that lack the 
legal right to use force in self-defense and are consequently more likely to support 
states that have the right to use force in self-defense. Second, I consider whether 
IGOs are less likely to support states that have violated international law by 
committing aggression and thus are more likely to support states that have refrained 
from engaging in aggression.
64
 As expected, the statistical results indicate strong 
support for my theoretical argument on the behavior of third parties. Third parties in 
the form of IGOs are more likely to support states that have the right to use force in 
self-defense and less likely to support states that have committed aggression.  
 Second, I briefly review how the international community reacted to the 1991 
and 2003 wars against Iraq. While traditional security concerns played a role, I also 
find that international law influenced the behavior of third parties, who were more 
likely to support the legal use of force against Iraq in 1991, but largely withheld their 
support for the unlawful invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I explain why I 
use IGOs to empirically assess the behavior of third parties. Second, I briefly review 
research design and measurement issues, including how I coded the new IGO support 
variable created for the empirical analyses in this chapter. Third, I present the results 
in the form of coefficient estimates and the quantities of substantive interest for both 
tests. Fourth, I present the qualitative evidence from the Iraq Wars. Finally, I 
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conclude with implications of my findings for my theoretical argument and the role of 
law in general.   
 
Third Parties and IGOs 
In this section, I explain why I use international and regional multilateral security 
organizations to test my theoretical expectations on the behavior of third parties. 
There are two primary and interrelated reasons that I use IGOs to measure the 
behavior of third parties: 1) they reflect the preferences of individual states and 2) 
practical considerations.  First, IGOs, especially multilateral security organizations 
reflect the policy preferences of states in the international system. By design, IGOs 
provide a means to vote, authorize, or otherwise implement the various policies of 
governments. As such, IGOs are endogenous to the behavior of states, as scholars 
have long recognized.
65
 Indeed, scholars have increasingly turned to IGOs to measure 
the preferences of states (e.g., Gartzke 1998; Reed et al. 2008; Voeten 2000, 2004). 
As Reed et al. (2008, 1207-1208) argue, “states use UN votes to express their 
preferences on issues related to positions taken by blocs of states, and on issues 
related to ongoing dyadic disagreements.” IGOs, therefore, constitute a reasonable 
way to measure the preferences of states in the international system.
66
 
Second, it would be practically impossible to research the policy positions of 
all governments for every single crisis. Whether in formal press statements, informal 
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 While at first endogenous, IGOs can become an exogenous constraint on states (Keohane 
1984; Martin and Simmons 1998, 2003).   
66
 This is especially true because I collect data on both the United Nations (including the UN 
General Assembly) and regional organizations. Thus, even if the UNSC fails to pass a 





comments, debates in the United Nations, and so forth, leaders express a variety of 
opinions about international events in multiple ways and outlets.  It would require a 
considerable amount of time to collect all of this information, which is beyond the 
resources of this dissertation. In contrast to this approach, using IGOs as a proxy for 
third party behavior allows for a practical and efficient way to identify and collect 
information on the preferences of international actors.
67
  I turn to this below.  
 
Research Design 
Similar to the previous chapter, I use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data 
from 1946-2005 to test my hypotheses on the role of IGOs.  Once again, three 
conditions are required for an incident to be included in the ICB data:
 
a state 
perceives a threat to one or more basic values, a heightened perception of 
involvement in military hostilities, and an awareness of a finite time horizon for 
decision-making (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).  
There are several different types of crises in my data. For example, the United 
States and North Korea experienced three crises over the latter’s illicit nuclear 
weapons program in 1993, 2002, and 2006.   Libya and Malta also experienced a 
crisis about off-shore oil deposits in 1980, while Guyana and Venezuela were in a 
crisis over the construction of a hydroelectric project in disputed territory in 1983. 
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 I recognize that collecting information on the behavior of major powers makes up an 
alternative way to measure third parties. While ICB has information on the response of the 
US, USSR/Russia, France, and the UK, it lacks any information on the foreign policy 
behavior of China. Without this information, it would be difficult to assess the behavior of 
third parties. Efforts are currently underway to collect this information for future research on 




Finally, several crises ended in interstate wars such as the ones between Chad and 
Libya and the multiple Arab-Israeli crises.  
Similar to Chapter 4, the crisis-actor is the unit of analysis here; I again 
distinguish between challengers and targets in my analysis because the legal 
principles vary systematically across the two sets of actors. I also disaggregate ICB 
crises with multiple actors into several dyadic observations (Maoz 2005).
68
 Third, I 
also drop all inter-war crises from the analysis. Given these coding rules, there are 
344 crises and 910 crisis actors in my data during this time span (455 challengers and 
455 targets).  
 
Response Variable  
The response variable in this chapter is IGO support, both for challengers and targets. 
The primary source of this variable is the ICB data; however, I also consulted several 
other sources to code this variable due to incomplete information in ICB.  Some of 
the most important ones include, the United Nations Yearbook, British Yearbook of 
International Law, Keesings, and IGO websites including regional organizations.  
Consistent with the ICB data, I collected data on both international and major 
regional and/or security organizations.
69
 The latter institutions include the Arab 
League, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization of American States, 
Organization of African Unity, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Central Treaty 
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 Several crises have more than one challenger and target.    
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 I limited my focus to major regional organizations for two reasons. First, since I am 
interested in how IGOs in part affect domestic actors, it is likely that only salient or 
well-recognized IGOs can serve in this role. In other words, major regional security 
organizations are the relevant type of IGO for my study. Second, data limitations 




Organization, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Regarding the latter, I used data 
from both the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General 
Assembly.
70
   
 To code the variable used in my analysis, I considered an IGO to support the 
challenger (target) if it either support the challenger (target) or condemn the target 
(challenger).  The result is that my variable captures both support for the state in 
question and/or disapproval of the adversary. Support includes authorization to use 
force (including emergency military forces and peacekeepers) or resolutions favoring 
the initiator even if it does not include explicit approval for the use of force.
71
 
Condemnation includes sanctions leveled against the defender, as well as public 
statements and resolutions criticizing it.  All other actions including no action, 
mediation/good offices, discussion without resolution, and mutual call for action (i.e. 
cease-fire) do not count as IGO support in the analyses conducted in this chapter.  
It is also important to recognize that I include cases of IGO support that are 
beyond the explicit authorization to use force. Nonetheless, I believe that this is 
justified for three primary reasons.
72
 First, crisis actors still face international political 
costs when IGOs condemn or otherwise disapprove of their actions, even if it falls 
short of the use of force. Thompson (2007, 2009) argues, for instance, that states try 
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 When the actions of the regional organization and international organization 
conflict with one another, I code the variable based on the actions of the United 
Nations. The lone exception is that I followed the actions of the regional organization 
if the UN refrained from supporting/condemning the relevant actors.  
71
 In crises that include multiple resolutions or attempts at resolutions, I base my 
coding on the final resolution or attempted one.  As a robustness check, I coded cases 
based on the highest level of support/condemnation instead of the final action and the 
results remained the same.   
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 In a similar vein, Chapman (2009) considers how IGO actions short of the 




to avoid international condemnation, with the implication being that international 
political costs are an important consideration for leaders in international crises.  
Second, IGOs can still send a signal to domestic actors about the merits of the 
proposed policy even when they fail to authorize the use of force. As such, IGOs can 
still have an indirect influence on leaders by informing the opinions of domestic 
actors.  
 Third, as is well known, IGOs have only formally authorized the use of force 
on a very small number of occasions. The small number of observations limits the 
inferences that can be made with such a small number of cases. Because of this and 
along with my theoretical justifications as expressed above, I believe that focusing on 
formal support/condemnation from IGOs is an appropriate test of my argument. 
 Regarding the distribution of this variable, challengers have received IGO 
support in 69 observations (15%), while targets have received support in 89 
observations or 20% of the time. The data indicates that IGO support is relatively 
infrequent and targets receive greater IGO support than challengers.  
 Several examples can help illustrate the behavior of IGOs in international 
crises.  Regarding challengers, the United Nations Security Council, the United 
Nations General Assembly, and several regional organizations supported the United 
States and the United Kingdom following 9/11.  Likewise, the United Nations 
authorized the use of force against Iraq in 1990 and the Organization of American 
States supported the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Arab League 
has supported Arab states on numerous occasions in several crises against Israel and 




 Regarding targets, the United Nations condemned Iraq and supported Kuwait 
on several occasions, beginning with Iraq’s invasion in 1990.  The United Nations 
Security Council condemned South Africa and Rhodesia numerous times for their 
raids into neighboring states in pursuit of rebel groups.  Finally, the United Nations 
Security Council and the Arab League both condemned Israel in 1982 following its 
raid on the Beirut International Airport in December.  
 
Theoretical Variables of Interest 
Legal Right to Self-Defense 
In this section, I describe the coding rules for my two variables of theoretical interest 
in this chapter. The first variable is based on the legal right to use force measure that I 
created for the statistical analysis in Chapter 5; however, I make one minor, but 
important change to the variable.  Because my response variable in this chapter is 
IGO support, I recoded the cases where UN authorization made the use of force legal 
(i.e. Korean War) to no legal right to use force.
 73
  This is to ensure that my response 
and explanatory variables are not measuring the same concept. The final variable then 
is a binary dummy variable that is coded a 1 if the state is prohibited from using 
force, and it is coded a zero when the actor has the right to individual self-defense.  I 
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 As a robustness check, I also drop all these cases from the analysis and the results remained 
the same.  
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 In Figure 1, I present the summary statistics for the relationship between this 
variable and IGO support. First, when the challenger has the right to use force, he 
receives IGO support 38% of the time, while in the absence of the right to use force, 
he only receives IGO support 13% of the time.  We see similar results for the target 
(Figure 2). When the target has the right to use force, he receives IGO support 33% of 
the time, but only receives it 18% of the time when he does not have the right to use 
force. At first glance, the patterns in the data are consistent with my theoretical 
expectations: third parties are more likely to support states that have the right to self-

























































The second variable in this chapter captures whether the actor in question violated 
international law on the use force by committing aggression. The variable is a dummy 
variable that equals if the actor committed aggression but failed to reach the threshold 
of an armed attack and zero otherwise.
75
  I expect this variable to be negative, as 
IGOs should be less likely to support states that violate international law.  
This variable, while similar in many ways to the first one used, is nonetheless 
different in important ways. Most importantly, as, discussed in Chapter 2, it is 
possible for a state to commit aggression that is below the level of an armed attack. 
This is the well-known gap between the two concepts in which a state may be the 
victim of a force, but it does not have the legal right to respond in self-defense (e.g., 
Dinstein 2008; Gray 2010; Ruys 2010).
76
   Several examples are included below to 
help clarify the difference between aggression and an armed attack.  
First, it is possible that the initial use of force fails to reach the threshold of an 
armed attack. As established in Chapter 2, the use of force must result in the loss of 
life and/or significant property damage.  All other uses of force, while illegal, do not 
permit for a legal right to use force in self-defense.  For instance, minor 
border/frontier incidents often fit in this category of law.  Second, it is also possible 
that there is some uncertainty about what state was responsible for the initial attack 
and what state is the defender.  In such cases, it is impossible to identify who 
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 See Appendix C for coding rules on aggression.  
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 In addition, there is a third category of force known as de minimis use of force that does 
not constitute a violation of international law. Such uses of force are considered to be very 




committed the armed attack and who has the right to self-defense. Finally, attacks by 
non-state actors often fail to reach this threshold, especially before the accumulation 
of events threshold is reached.  Likewise, the relationship between a non-state actor 
and its state supporter can fail to meet the effective control standard. In such cases, 
the support for the non-state is aggression, but it is not an armed attack.  
In short, this second measure while similar to the first, still constitutes an 
alternative legal concept. It therefore provides a distinct way to assess how IGOs 
respond to violations of the legal principles related to the use of force by crisis actors.  
In addition to the theoretical justification, it provides for a useful robustness check on 
the first variable. Thus, we can conclude that it is appropriate to include both 
measures in this chapter.  
 
In Figures 3 and 4, I present the summary statistics for this variable. When a 
challenger commits aggression, he only receives IGO support 9% of the time, while 
he receives IGO support 22% of the time when he does not violate the law.
77
 We find 
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 Some readers may be surprised that IGOs support crisis actors who have violated 
international law. Almost of these cases are made up of regional IGOs supporting violators 
who been the victim of an attack by non-state actors.  For instance, NATO supported the 




































even stronger patterns for target states. When a target violates international law in the 
form of aggression, he receives IGO support in only 9% of the cases, while he 
receives IGO support in 28% of the cases when he did not violate international law.  
 
Overall, the basic patterns in the data provide strong support for my 
theoretical expectations on the behavior of third parties. Both challengers and targets 
are more likely to receive IGO support when they do not violate international law. 
Likewise, they are more likely to be condemned by IGOs when they commit 
aggression. Of course, while these findings are useful, it is important to assess my 




I use logistic regression with robust standard errors to estimate my theoretical 
expectations on the behavior of third party support.  I also rely on 95% confidence 
intervals to display the statistical significance of each coefficient estimate. When the 
                                                                                                                                           
routinely supports Arab states that support non-state actors that use force against Israel even 




































confidence intervals do not cross zero, the variable is statistically significant at the .05 
level using a two-tailed test.  
I use Clarify (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001) to estimate the quantities of 
substantive interest.  I present the predicted probabilities, first differences, and the 
percentage change for all of my international law variables.
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  In my empirical 
analyses, the predicted probability is the probability that an IGO supports the crisis 
for a given explanatory variable.  I compute the first differences (or change in 
probability) by subtracting the predicted probability for IGO support when the actor 
has the right to use force (or does not violate international law) from the predicted 
probability for IGO when the actor does not have the right to use force (or violates 
international law).  The percentage change is calculated by dividing the first 
difference by the baseline predicted probability. 
 In Figure 5, I present the coefficient estimates for the challenger for the model 
specification with the legal right to use force variable. As expected, the variable of 
interest is negative and statistically significant, meaning that challengers are less 
likely to receive IGO support when they do not have the legal right to use force, 
compared to when they have the right of self-defense. This implies that challengers 
with the legal right to use force variable are more likely to receive IGO support. The 
finding indicates strong statistical support for my argument on the behavior of third 
parties. IGOs are less likely to support states that lack the legal right to use force than 
states with the right to use force.  
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The control variables behave mostly as expected. First, it is interesting that 
several control variables are significant; for instance, democratic challengers are more 
likely to receive IGO support than non-democratic challengers. Likewise, challengers 
that are major-minor power dyads are more likely to receive support from IGOs than 
major-major and minor-minor dyads. As expected, IGOs are more active in the post-
Cold War period compared to the Cold War Era, and crises over territory are less 
likely to receive IGO support. Relatively strong challengers are less likely to receive 
IGO compared to weaker challengers. While this may seem surprising at first, it 
makes sense when this result is understood in combination with the finding on the 
major-minor variable in that once major powers are accounted for, stronger 
challengers are less likely to receive IGO support.  Finally, it may be surprising that 
the target gravity is positive and significant, but the challenger gravity variable is not 
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 In Figure 6, I present the first difference for all of my variables of theoretical 
interest. When the challenger has the right to use force, the probability he receives 
IGO support is .41, while it drops to .21 when the challenger does not have the right 
to use force. The resulting first difference is .20 and the percentage change is -51% 
(Figure 7). Thus, IGOs are 51% less likely to support challengers who lack the legal 
right to use force compared to challengers with the right to use force in self-defense.  
 
In Figure 7, I present the percentage change for the international law on the 
use of force variable and all of the statistically significant control variables. The 
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The substantive effect is larger than three other statistically significant variables and 
is within the same general range as all the other significant variables with the 
exception of the Post- Cold War variable. The magnitude of this variable is expected, 
given that IGOs have been much more active following the end of the Cold War 
compared to during the Cold War.  
The results are similar for target states. As you can see in Figure 8, the right to 
use force is negative and statistically significant suggesting that IGOs are less likely 
to support targets that lack the right to self-defense compared to targets with the right 
to self-defense. Once again, this is consistent with my theoretical argument on the 
behavior of third parties, and in particular IGOs.  
 
The control variables, however, are relatively weaker in the target equation. 
First, a target is less likely to receive IGO support when it is major power and they 
are a minor power.  In contrast, a target is more likely receive IGO support when it is 
a major power and the challenger is a minor power. Targets are also more likely to 
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stronger targets are also less likely to receive support. This again makes sense when it 
is considered in combination with the findings on the major power variables.  
 In Figure 6 above, I present the first differences for the target. The predicted 
probability for targets with the right to use force is .31, but it declines to .17 when 
targets lack the right to use force. This leads to a first difference of -.14 and a 
percentage change of -45% (Figure 9).  Targets are therefore 45% less likely to 
receive IGO support when they lack the right to use force compared to when they 
have the right to use force.  
 The percentage change for all of the statistically significant variables can be 
found in Figure 9.  The substantive effects for the target are not as strong as they are 
for the challengers. While the target produces a meaningful percentage change at -
45%, it is weaker than the other significant control variables, although it is relatively 
similar in size to the effect of challengers that are major powers. Both the military 
balance and the gravity variable are about twice as strong as the prohibition on the 
use of force variable, while the percentage change for the target major power is much 
larger at 116%. Nonetheless, the target percentage change -45% should still be 





 The results clearly provide strong statistical and substantive support for the 
relationship between the legality of using force and the support of third parties.  IGOs 
are less likely to support both challengers and targets that lack the legal right to use 
force compared to challengers and targets with the legal right to use force in self-
defense.   
 In this section, I assess how IGOs respond to crisis actors that commit 
aggression. In so doing, I use the same response variable as above - IGO support, but 
use aggression as the key independent variable. As described above, this variable is 
useful because it provides an alternative way to conceptualize international law and it 
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The results for the challenger are presented in Figure 10.  As expected the 
variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that challengers who 
commit aggression are less likely to receive IGO support compared to challengers 
that refrained from doing so.  The substantive results also provide strong support for 
my argument. When challengers have not committed aggression, the probability they 
receive IGO support is .24, but it drops to .11 when they have committed aggression. 
This produces a first difference of -.13 (Figure 6) and a percentage change of -.54% 
(Figure 11). Thus, IGOs are 54% less likely to support challengers that violate 
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I present the percentage changes for all of the statistically significant variables 
in Figure 11.  Because the results for the control variables are similar to the first set of 
equations, I limit my discussion here to a comparison of the controls and my variable 
of interest. Similar to above, the aggression variable performs well relative to the 
control variables. The substantive effect (-54%) is larger than the size of the military 
balance variable, gravity, and about the same size as the territory and democracy 
variables. The major power variable and the post-Cold War variable, however, are 
both substantially larger than the magnitude of the aggression variable. Despite this, 
the relationship between IGOs and international law on the use of force is both 
statistically and substantively meaningful.  
 
The results for the target produce similar results (Figure 12). First, we see that 
the coefficient estimate for targets the aggression variable is negative and statistically 
significant. Thus, IGOs are less likely to support states that commit aggression 
compared to states that do not.   Regarding the substantive effects, the predicted 
probability for targets who receive IGO support is .21, but this drops to .07 when 
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the percentage change is -67% (Figure 13). Targets are therefore 67% less likely to 
receive IGO support when they violate international law compared to when they do 
not violate international law.  The substantive effects for the target are strong, even 
relative to the other control variables (Figure 13). The magnitude is larger than the 
military balance variable, the gravity variable, and the challenger major power 
variable, while only the target major power variable is greater than the international 
law variable.  
 
Overall, we see strong and consistent statistical and substantive results for the 
behavior of third parties, measured in this chapter as IGOs. IGOs are more likely to 
support crisis actors when they have a right to use force compared to when they do 
not have a right to use force, and they are less likely to support actors who commit 
aggression than states that do not violate the law in this manner. We can therefore be 
confident that the underlying mechanism in my theoretical framework is true, 
providing further support for my primary argument in this dissertation on the 
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international law in order to minimize the material and nonmaterial costs that 
international actors can impose on them.  
 
Case Evidence 
In the previous section, I established using statistical methods that third parties 
conceptualized as IGOs are more likely to support states that have the right to use 
force and less likely to support states that commit aggression. In this section, I briefly 
use evidence from Gulf War I and II to reinforce the statistical findings, and to further 
trace how third parties respond to the legality of using force.   My purpose in 
presenting evidence from the Gulf Wars is to highlight the role of international law 
and how it contributed to the decision of third parties to support the United States.  In 
so doing, I am not claiming that the law is more important than the standard 
explanations of third party behavior (strategic interests, economic relations, domestic 
politics, etc.); rather, I am simply suggesting that law in addition to these arguments 
contributed to the decision-making of third parties during the Iraq Wars.  The 
contribution, therefore, is to identify a new mechanism that scholars interested in 
conflict and crisis bargaining have mostly overlooked.  
 In particular, I am interested in the relationship between the legality of using 
force and the ability of the US and the UK to obtain international support, including 
UN authorization for the use of force in 1991 and 2003.
79
 The case evidence  supports 
my theoretical expectations: the US, UK, and coalition partners received greater 
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 A point of clarification is needed here. I of course recognize that the UN can legally 
authorize the use of force; my interest is on the other legal principles that provide states with 
the right to individual self-defense. In other words, I show below that UN authorization is in 




support from third parties during the first Gulf War than during the 2003 War, 
including authorization from the UN to use force in 1991, but the failure to obtain one 
in 2003. The historical record also indicates that the legal principles related to the use 
force explain in part the different levels of support from the international community.   
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, I briefly review 
the events surrounding the two crises that led to these two wars. I then discuss the 
legality of using force for each war. Third, I review how international law influenced 
the behavior of the international community. I conclude with the implications from 
the statistical and qualitative evidence presented in this chapter.   
 
1991 Iraq War 
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, defeated the Kuwaiti military in a decisive 
victory, and occupied the Arab state all within six hours. International reaction was 
immediate: the US, the United Nations Security Council, and even the Arab League 
all condemned Iraq and demanded that Saddam Hussein completely and immediately 
withdrawal his forces from Kuwait. Iraq steadfastly refused to comply with the 
demands of the international community.  After several months of stalemate between 
Saddam and the international community, the US led a coalition of forces backed by 
UN Resolution 678 to liberate Kuwait from Iraq leading to the outbreak of the first 
Gulf War (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
 During the months leading up to Operation Desert Storm, the US prioritized 
international support and largely received it. Indeed, the sense of unity displayed by 




provided troops and over 20 states contributed military supplies and hardware. 
Financial assistance was even greater. US allies and friends contributed $54 billion, 
which helped to offset the $60 billion costs for the war. Even states such as Jordan 
that opposed the war effort still avoided condemning the US outright in the months 
preceding the war.  Finally, the widespread support for the US position culminated in 
United Nations Resolution 678 passed on November 2, 1990 authorizing states to use 
“all means necessary” against Iraq if Saddam Hussein failed to withdrawal his troops 
from Kuwait (e.g., Baker 1995; Clodfelter 2008; Freedman and Karsh 1993; Powell 
1995; Woodward 1991).  
The evidence clearly indicates that the legality of using force to repel Iraq 
from Kuwait was one of the most important factors in the almost universal consensus 
of the international community to authorize the use of force against Iraq. There are 
two questions that are pertinent to the lawful behavior of the United States and the 
international community as it relates to the lawful use of force against Iraq. First, did 
Iraq’s attack on Kuwait constitute an armed attack, providing Kuwait with the right to 
self-defense? Second, did the international community have the right of collective 
self-defense on behalf of Kuwait, even if Iraq committed an armed attack against 
Kuwait?   
First, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent occupation and annexation 
clearly reached the threshold of an armed attack.  Second, Kuwait requested help 
from the international community, activating the collective self-defense doctrine and 
providing the international community with the legal right to repel Iraq from Kuwait. 




In the Exercise of its inherent right to of individual and collective self-defense 
and pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, Kuwait should 
like to notify you that it has requested some nations to take such military 
actions or other steps as are necessary to ensure the effective and prompt 




  The historical record indicates that international law in part motivated 
international opinion on this matter.  The UN Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 660 stating that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a breach of international 
peace and security.  Many officials in the Bush Administration also believed that the 
US based on the Charter had the legal right to use force against Iraq without receiving 
additional authority from the UN (Baker and 1995; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 144).   
France also believed that the Western states had the legal right to use force, although 
again they preferred to obtain a UN authorization for using force. The UK Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher also believed that the use of force against Iraq was legal 
even without UN authorization (Thompson 2009).
81
  
Finally, many of the neutral and non-aligned states largely supported the US 
and the other major powers in the United Nations General Assembly by first 
supporting economic sanctions and then supporting the use of force against Iraq. For 
example, the GA stated its concern with Iraq with the statement, “Iraqi aggression 
and the continued occupation of Kuwait in flagrant violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations” (UNGA A/45/250).  
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 Letter to the Security Council, S/21498 13 August 1990 
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 To be sure, Thompson makes that point that even though many Western officials believed 
they had the legal right to use force, they also preferred to go to the UN for the additional 
legitimacy and legality that the UN could give them domestically.  As noted above, I agree 
with Thompson and others (Chapman 2007, 2009; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Fang 2005; 
Thompson 2006, 2009) about the importance of the UN; my specific argument is only that 




In conclusion, the first Gulf War largely confirms both my theoretical 
argument on the role of third parties and my statistical findings. The international 
community largely supported the efforts of the US, UK, and others because it was 
legal to use force against Iraq. Iraq had committed an armed attack against Kuwait 
and based on Article 51 of the Charter, Kuwait had the right to individual and 
collective self-defense.  The high levels of support led to Resolution 678 that 
contributed to the coalition of forces that forced Iraq from Kuwait.  
 
2003 Iraq War 
In the previous section, I established that it was legal to use force against Iraq in 1991 
and the international community largely responded in kind by showing nearly 
universal support for using force against Iraq. In this section, I demonstrate that it was 
illegal to use force against Iraq in 2003 and this led to widespread disagreement 
among members of the international community, including outright hostility towards 
the United States even by friends and allies.  
  In the lead-up to the Iraq War, the US put forward two different legal 
rationales for the use of force: the preemptive use of force and what is known as the 
revival argument.    The US argued that it had a legal right to use the preemptive use 
of force due to the changed nature of the threat – weapons of mass destruction, rogue 
states, and terrorism.  In this way, the US tried to shift the imminent threat standard 
for the right of the anticipatory use of force to a gathering threat standard.
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, interceptive self-defense is only allowed when there is clear and 




 The US legal justification, however, was widely rejected among legal 
commentators and states including friends and allies. The UK legal adviser Michael 
Wood argued, “If state practice were to develop in the direction of preemption or if 
regime change became accepted as a proper objective, it would be open season for all 
States to attack whom they perceive as threatening them” (Wood 2002).  Likewise, 
even the UN Secretary General declared that the preemptive use of force was 
unlawful in a statement released shortly before the Iraq War  (Annan 2003). Shortly 
after the war, the ICJ, the UN High Level Panel on Threats, among other sources all 
rejected the expanded right of preemption put forward by the Bush Administration 
(Weller 2010).  In short, as legal scholar Weller (2010, 143) argues, “the thesis of 
preventive or preemptive war therefore was widely rejected.” 
Due to the rejection of the preemption argument even by the UK, the US, the 
UK, Australia and other allies moved towards the revival argument as the primary 
legal justification for using force against Iraq. This argument holds that the force was 
permitted based on Iraq’s refusal to comply with previous UN Resolutions, including 
SCR 678 of 1990, SCR 687, and SCR 1441. In other words, a new UN resolution 
explicitly authorizing the use of force was unnecessary to establish the legality of 
using force.   
Legal authorities and other states once again largely rejected this argument.   
Regarding UN resolution 1441, Weller makes three key points: 1) the UN resolution 
did not grant fresh authority to use force, 2) the resolution provided for a finding of 
non-compliance by the UN arms inspectors, as opposed to individual states, in order 




determine the consequences of such violations, including the possibility of using 
force. In other words, the revival argument did not allow for the US and others to 
legally wage war on Iraq.    
Likewise, the UN Secretary General warned that, “if the US and others were 
to go outside of the Council and take military action, it would not be in conformity 
with the Charter” (Annan 2003). The implication of this statement is that the US had 
no legal right to use force without the Security Council approving it. This is in 
contrast to the first Gulf War, in which the US had the legal right to use force because 
of the principle of collective self-defense in response to the Iraqi armed attack.  
 The illegality of the war in Iraq had important consequences for the US’s 
ability to mobilize international support. Unlike in the first Gulf War where the US 
received the support of most states in the international community, the US received 
very little support this time.  The widespread opposition to the war can be seen in 
three different ways: international opinion was opposed to the use of force in the lead-
up to the war, the small amount of contributions made by friends and allies, and 
finally, statements made in the United Nations immediately after the US, UK, and 
others commenced  hostilities against Iraq.  
First, from the very beginning, France, Germany, and Russia opposed the use 
of force, and instead called for diplomatic options and other non-violent coercive 
measures.  Their positions hardened as the US moved closer towards war. On 
February 10, French President Jacques Chirac along with the leaders of Germany, and 
Russia declared, “Nothing today justifies this war.”
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  Later, both France and Russia 







said that they would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force.
84
 Both France 
and Russia believed that the use of force was unlawful and they thus refused to 
provide it with legality by passing a resolution in the Council.
85
   
Foreign publics also largely criticized the war effort. According to a report in 
the BBC, “between six and 10 million people are thought have marched in up to 60 
countries over the weekend.”
86
  In short, as Daadler argues, “The administration is 
trying too hard to prove something that isn’t. By insisting that the coalition of the 
willing is larger, deeper, and wider than is in fact the case, the administration only 




Second, it is also useful to directly compare the levels of political, economic, 
and military support from the international community for the two wars against Iraq. 
Coalition combat troops numbered 160,000 in 1990, but only 47,200 (45,000 British 
troops, 2,000 Australians, and 20 Polish troops) in 2003. In 1990, only a handful of 
states opposed the war and even fewer were overtly hostile to the US; in contrast the 
US received widespread condemnation in 2003, including from many friends and 
allies as noted above. In 1990, the international community provided billions of 
dollars to the war effort, yet in 2003, the US did not receive a single monetary 
contribution from other states.  In 1991, over 30 countries contributed combat troops, 
but in 2003 only three did so.  Finally, the United Nations authorized the use of force 
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Finally, following the initiation of hostilities, several states condemned the US 
and its few coalition partners for violating international law in the invasion of Iraq.  
Russia declared at the UN, “An unprovoked military has been undertaken, in 
violation of international law and in circumvention of the Charter.  The military 
action… cannot be justified in any way. It is clear to everyone that the use of force 
against Iraq in an effort to change the political regime of a sovereign State runs totally 
counter to the fundamental principles contained in the Charter.”
89
 China similarly 
declared that, “Such an action constitutes a violation of the basic principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations of international law” (UN Doc. S/PV.4726).  The Arab 
League likewise said, “the aggression a violation of the Charter and the United 
Nations and the principles of international law” (UN Doc. S/PV.4726).  The Non-
Aligned Moment claimed that use of force against Iraq was a, “violation of the 
principles of international law and the Charter.”
90
 France and Germany both criticized 
the US and the UK for taking military actions without authorization from the United 
Nations (UN Doc. S/PV.4726).   In short, as the UN Secretary General later said, “I 
have stated clearly that it was not in conformity… with the UN Charter” (Annan 
2004). 
In sum, the historical record clearly supports my theoretical expectations on 
international law and the role of third parties. The large-scale use of force against Iraq 
in 1990 was legal (even before UN authorization) and the international community 
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responded in kind with its nearly unanimous support for the US and other leading 
nations. In contrast, it was illegal to use force against Iraq in 2003 and few states 
supported the US and the UK, with many nations showing outright hostility towards 
the United States and Great Britain.   
 
Potential Objection 
Despite the lack of international support, the United States and its coalition partners 
of course still used force against Iraq. Does the recent Iraq War suggest that the 
argument advanced in this dissertation about the constraints imposed by third parties 
is wrong?  No; in fact, it is the “exception” that proves the rule. As I have argued 
throughout this dissertation, international law on the use force alters the costs and 
benefits for using force by affecting the support of third parties. States face added 
costs for violating international law and increased benefits for acting in accordance 
with it. The additional costs/benefits for violating international law, however, may be 
insufficient to offset the expected payoffs for war. That is, if a leader believes that he 
can prevail in war even after incorporating the costs for violating international law, 
then he will choose to use force. The Bush Administration in 2003 behaved this way 
in that they believed that they could absorb the international backlash for illegally 
using force in Iraq. This perceived limitation of international law should not be 
exaggerated, however. As the most powerful country in the world, the US has a 
unique capacity to absorb the costs of employing the unlawful use of force. Most 
other states, however, lack the military, political, and economic prowess to flaunt 





In this chapter, I sought to demonstrate that third party behavior is consistent with my 
theoretical expectations. To that end, I assessed how IGOs respond to leaders that 
violate international law on the use of force, a useful proxy to test the behavior of 
third parties. Consistent with my theoretical expectations, I found that IGOs are both 
more likely to support leaders that have the right to self-defense and less likely to 
support leaders that violate the law. I also traced the behavior of the international 
community during the 1991 and 2003 wars in Iraq.  As expected, I found that 
international law largely explains why third party states supported the effort in 1991 
and opposed the war in 2002. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter provides 
strong support for the underlying causal mechanism in my argument that states 
comply with the legal principles related to the use of force because of international 






Chapter 6: The Cuban Missile Crisis 
 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I used quantitative methods to assess my theoretical 
expectations on international law on the use of force and crisis escalation. In Chapter 
4, I used cross-national research to assess how international law influenced the 
decision of leaders to escalate international crises. As expected, I found that leaders 
are less likely to escalate militarily when international law prohibited the use of force 
than when it allowed for the right to self-defense.  In Chapter 5, I more directly 
assessed the causal mechanisms in my argument by looking at how third parties react 
to international law on the use force and aggression. Consistent with my argument I 
found that international and regional institutions are more likely to support leaders 
who act in accordance with international law than those that violate it. Together, the 
quantitative evidence provides strong support for my theoretical expectations on the 
pacifying role of international law on the use of force in international crises.  
In this chapter, I expand upon the quantitative evidence and present a case 
study on how international law on the use of force influenced the decision-making of 
President Kennedy and his advisers during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The case study 
is a useful method to study how international law affects foreign policy decision-
making.  Most importantly, it allows me to directly assess the causal mechanisms and 
causal pathway that I put forward in my theoretical framework. Using historical 




believed international actors would respond to the legality of using force, and, in turn, 
how US leaders incorporated the expected support of third parties into their decision-
making during this crisis.  Thus, my purpose, similar to the previous chapter, is 
simply to highlight the role of international law in this crisis, and to show that the law 
operates in a manner consistent with my theoretical argument. The case study is not 
intended to be a comprehensive account of all the factors that led to the various 
decisions that took place during this crisis. Rather and once again, the purpose of the 
case study is solely to isolate the impact of international law.  
As I describe in great detail below, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides strong 
support for my theory of institutional reciprocity. The evidence indicates that 
international law influenced President Kennedy because of how it impacted the 
behavior of third parties. Specifically, US officials expected to receive lower support 
for violating international law by engaging in the preemptive use of force against 
Cuba, and greater support for acting in accordance with international law by 
implementing the OAS-blockade. The greater support for the blockade contributed in 
part to President Kennedy’s decision to implement it, instead of employing air strikes 
against Cuba.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I present a short 
summary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second, I review the relevant legal principles 
and discuss what US leaders knew about international law during the period under 
investigation. Next, I present evidence showing that US officials believed that 
international law would affect the behavior of friends and allies in the international 




policy options, and how this then contributed to the decision to implement the 
blockade. I then discuss how members of the international community behaved as 
Washington expected following President Kennedy’s decision to implement the 
blockade.  Finally, I address the role that nuclear weapons played in the outcome of 
this crisis, and conclude with the implications of this study. 
 
Background 
On September 4 1962, President Kenney issued a press statement warning the Soviet 
Union that the US would act if they put offensive missiles in Cuba. A little over a 
month later, on October 14, a U-2 spy plane flying over the western part of Cuba took 
pictures of what appeared to be Soviet missile bases under construction at a military 
installation in San Cristobal.  Within twenty-four hours, experts at the CIA’s National 
Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) confirmed that the photos were medium 
range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).  The next morning McGeorge Bundy, the National 
Security Adviser, informed President Kennedy about the nature of the photos and the 
emplacement of the MRBMs in Cuba (e.g., Abel 1966; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; 
Allison 1971; Chayes 1974)  
On October 16 at around 6:30, President Kennedy convened several of his top 
advisers and other officials in his administration in a group that what later be called, 
the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm). The mission 
of ExComm was to aid the President in choosing a course of action in response to the 
placement of the USSR missiles in Cuba.  Among the many possible options floated 




major policy options to counter the Soviet missiles in Cuba: surprise air strikes versus 
blockade. The former consisted of the preemptive use of force in the form of air 
strikes against the missiles sites, while the latter was made up of a naval blockade to 
stem the flow of any futures shipments of military goods, accompanied by an 
ultimatum to remove the missiles (e.g., Abel 1966; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; 
Allison 1971; Chayes 1974).   
ExComm was largely divided between those who favored immediate air 
strikes along with a possible invasion, and other members that preferred a more 
diplomatic approach, such as the blockade. Indeed, throughout the crisis, President 
Kennedy and the other members of ExComm struggled to reach a consensus on 
whether to choose the air strikes or the blockade.  Several officials including General 
Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and John McCone preferred the use of force over the 
blockade; even President Kennedy appeared to favor this option at first. As the US 
President argued at the end of the first meeting, “I don’t think we’ve got much time 
on these missiles. We may just have to take them out… We’re gonna take out these 
missiles” (May and Zelikow 1997: 50).  
Many of these same officials were skeptical of the blockade, primarily 
because they thought that it would be unable to remove the missile threat. As 
President Kennedy argued, “The only thing that I am saying is that we’re not going to 
get them out with the quarantine. I’m not saying we should lift the blockade or what 
we should do about the quarantine. But we have to all now realize that we’re not 




favored the air strikes to the blockade because they thought it gave the US the best 
chance to remove the missiles from Cuba. 
On the other hand, other officials including Dean Rusk, Leonard Meeker, 
George Ball and eventually Robert Kennedy all favored the blockade. While the 
advocates of the option recognized that it may not force the USSR to remove the 
missiles, they supported it largely because the loss of international support for using 
force would be consequential. In particular, policymakers were concerned with how 
the USSR, as well as friends and allies in the international community would respond 
to the use of force compared to the blockade. As McNamara argued, “I don’t know 
quite what kind of a world we live in after we have struck Cuba, and we’ve started it. 
He continued, “… we ought to work on the consequences of any one of these courses 
of actions, consequences which I don’t believe are entirely clear to any of us” (May 
and Zelikow 1997: 65).  Other officials including Dean Rusk, Marshall Carter, and 
George Ball shared these concerns on the costs of employing the preemptive use of 
force.  
After four days of deliberations and intense debate, President Kennedy made 
his decision on the afternoon of October 20 when he decided to implement the naval 
blockade.  At the same time, the US President tasked the military with preparing 
plans for air strikes and a possible invasion of Cuba, in case the blockade failed to 
force the Soviet Union to remove the missiles as many suspected that it would. Over 
the next two days, the President and his advisers met with Congressional leaders and 
spoke with several foreign leaders to brief them and to obtain their support for the 




American people to inform the public about his plans to implement the blockade (or 
“quarantine”) to counter the Soviet missiles in Cuba. On October 24, the US military 
began to put the naval blockade into effect, about 500 miles from Cuba.  
After two days without incident, tensions flared on October 26 when several 
hostile interactions took place that threatened to escalate the already precarious 
situation.  First, Khrushchev withdrew an earlier offer to remove the missiles in 
exchange for a US pledge not to invade Cuba, and instead said that the USSR would 
only remove the missiles in Cuba if the US withdrew missiles from both Italy and 
Turkey.  Second, a U-2 pilot was killed when its plane was shot down flying over 
Cuba, and third US and USSR fighter jets were launched after an incident near Soviet 
airspace (e.g., Abel 1966; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Allison 1971; Chayes 1974).   
  Given the increased potential for nuclear war, various US and USSR officials 
met over the course of October 26 and 27 to try to find an agreement to end the crisis 
short of full-scale war.  At the end of the day on October 27, the two adversaries 
appeared to reach an agreement to end the crisis when President Kennedy agreed to 
Khrushchev’s second offer to remove the missiles from Italy and Turkey in exchange 
for the USSR withdrawing its missiles from Cuba, as long as the deal would initially 
remain private.  On the morning of October 28, Khrushchev confirmed his 
commitment to the peaceful resolution of the crisis and made a public statement 
declaring that the USSR would dismantle the weapons sites in Cuba. Kennedy 
immediately followed and applauded Khrushchev’s contribution to peace and said 




The public statements made by both sides signaled the end of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  
 
International Law and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
In the remainder of this chapter, I show how international law influenced the 
decision-making of President Kennedy and his team of advisers. To that end, I first 
establish in this section that US officials were familiar with relevant legal principles 
on the two major policy options available to them. Specifically, US policymakers 
were exposed to international law through two major sources of information: 1) legal 
memos provided by lawyers from the US State, Defense, and Justice Departments 
that were produced in the months preceding the crisis and 2) a discussion of the 
relevant legal principles by ExComm on October 19.  
 
Legal Memos  
About two months before the Cuban Missile Crisis, officials in the Kennedy 
Administration requested that lawyers from the Defense, State, and Justice 
Departments prepare memos on the lawfulness of potential US actions in Cuba. The 
purpose of the memos was to provide information about the different policies 
available to the US should a crisis develop with the USSR and its communist protégé 
(Chayes 1974: Chapter 2).  As Robert Kennedy argued, “we ought to do a serious 
study of whether the United States could as a matter of international law, take action 
to prevent long-range missiles from being installed in Cuba, and perhaps of what 




intelligence reports about the increase in Soviet shipments to Cuba, US officials 
wanted to be prepared and knowledgeable about the different policy options available 
to them and the relevant legal issues for using force in Cuba. I begin with the Justice 
Department memo.  
Norbert Schlei, the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, was 
the primary author on the report from the Justice Department. Schlei made three 
important points on the legality of using force in Cuba.  First, he argued that a limited 
right of preemptive self-defense exists since neither the UN Charter nor the OAS 
prohibits the taking of unilateral action in self-defense prior to the occurrence of an 
armed attack.  Quoting the well-known Caroline Case that was discussed in Chapter 
2, he argued, that “preventive action in self-defense is warranted only where the need 
for it is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation” (Chayes 1974: 109). Nonetheless, he also pointed out that this was a 
limited right and the preventive use of force was not permitted in this case. Thus, he 
concluded, it is clear that “preventive action would not ordinarily be lawful to prevent 
the maintenance of missile bases or other armaments in the absence of evidence that 
their actual use for aggressive attack was imminent” (Chayes 1974: 109).   
Second, he also claimed that the UN Charter and the Rio Pact could both 
authorize various options and provide justification for actions that would otherwise be 
criticized if undertaken unilaterally.  Based on Article 39 of the UN Charter, for 
instance, he argued that the Security Council could authorize the use of force for a 
“threat to peace” or “breach of the peace” along with an “act of aggression.” 




of the Rio Treaty, common defense is permitted in response to an armed attack, but 
also if the “territory or sovereignty or political independence of any American State” 
is affected by an “aggression which is not an armed attack” or by “any other fact or 
situation might endanger the peace of America” (Chayes 1974: 110-111). Schlei 
therefore argued that both the UNSC and the OAS could authorize the use of force 
when the right of individual self-defense does not exist.  
Third, Schlei also highlighted US obligations to the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the United Nations. He claimed that even though unilateral action is 
permitted under the aforementioned conditions, either of these institutions 
“undoubtedly carries with it a commitment to have recourse to the organizations 
procedures if at all possible before acting unilaterally” (Chayes 1974: 111).  Schlei 
therefore emphasized the importance of working through international organizations.  
Finally, the report also included a section on what the Schlei termed, special 
hemispheric law. The thrust of his argument was that the Monroe Doctrine allowed 
for special regional circumstances that allowed for the right to self-defense beyond 
what is permitted under Charter law.
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 Applied to the crisis at hand, Schlei raised that 
the US could use force under “less restrictive conditions” thereby allowing the US to 
use force in response to the placement of the missiles in Cuba (Chayes 1974: 112-
115).  
The Defense Department memo makes up the second key report. Benjamin 
Forman, the Assistant General Counsel for International Affairs was the lead author 
on this report.  Dated September 14, he concludes:  
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the use of such a measure would not be permissible under the United 
Nations Charter unless:   1) the Security Council had found the 
existence of a threat to the peace and had recommended measures, 
including a naval blockade, in accordance with Articles 39, 41, and 42 
of the Charter, 2) such action were, pursuant to Article 51, taken on the 
basis of individual or collective self-defense because of an armed 
attack, or 3) such action were taken as a result of a decision by the 
OAS (Chayes 1974: 22). 
Forman raised two additional points in his memo. First, he indicated the 
United States was “bound” to submit all disputes to the OAS and the UN for 
consideration.  He made clear that the US was obligated to at least seek out guidance 
from the relevant IGOs. Second, he suggested that either institution could recommend 
a blockade to deal with a threat to peace, such as the placement of missiles in Cuba 
(Chayes 1974: 22).  
Abram Chayes, the State Department’s legal adviser, produced the third legal 
memo of import here. This motivation for this memo was slightly different than the 
previous two reports.  Following the Kennedy’ Administration’s decision to suspend 
U-2 flights over Cuba in September 1962, Rusk asked Chayes to provide an analysis 
of whether the OAS could legally authorize the flights under its auspices.  Rusk 
wanted to know about the legality of OAS approval in order to know whether the 
OAS could legitimize the flights, and provide political cover for the United States in 
case a U-2 was shot down. The report is relevant here because it involved the legality 
of military options in Cuba, and it helped inform ExComm about the lawfulness of 
potential policy options during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chayes 1974: 135-140).  
In the report, Chayes made several recommendations about the lawfulness of 
the use of force in Cuba. First, he concluded that the OAS could address the situation 




to the Americas. In particular, he argued that the OAS could take it up under Article 6 
of the Rio Treaty, but not Article 3 since the latter concerns issues of an armed attack, 
which had not taken place. The report also concluded that based on Articles 2(4) and 
53 of the UN Charter, the flights would not constitute an armed attack and thus Cuba 
would not have the legal right to use force in self-defense (Chayes 1974: 135-140).   
In sum, all three memos were in broad agreement regarding the legality of US 
actions in Cuba. All three indicated that the placement of missiles in Cuba did not 
constitute an armed attack, and therefore did not allow for a right to self-defense 
under the UN Charter. In addition, all three reports were in agreement that the OAS 
could approve a response under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty even without an armed 
attack or the authorization from the UNSC. Likewise, all the authors suggested that 
the US faced an obligation to consult the OAS and even the UN before taking any 
unilateral action. 
There was, however, an important exception to the near uniformity across the 
memos. The section on special hemispheric law - the Monroe Doctrine allowed the 
US to expand upon the Charter’s restrictions on the right to use force - only appeared 
in the memo produced by the Justice Department. This interpretation of international 
law failed to make to into the other reports, largely due to the fact that the argument 
was based on questionable legal principles (Chayes 1974).  Schlei later admitted that 
even President Kennedy rejected the argument. According to Schlei, “… The 
President was critical of our draft [statement] because it mentioned the Monroe 
Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, he snapped at me, “What the hell is that?” I 




was or meant he didn’t want to mention it in his statement” (Chayes 1974: 23). 
Indeed, Chayes argued that President “buried” the Monroe Doctrine as any sort of 
legal basis for US actions (Chayes 1974: 23).  
Finally, it is important to recognize that the legal analyses in the memos were 
shared with leading policymakers. Regarding the Justice Department memo, Schlei 
discussed his memo with several administration officials, including Robert Kennedy 
and Dean Rusk. Schlei himself suggested that the memo was sent to President 
Kennedy, John McNamara, Dillon, and maybe even Bundy and McCone.  Robert 
Kennedy would also claim that he set up a meeting to discuss the memo and the 
problem with Katzenbach, Schlei, and Rusk on September 3. Schlei also later claimed 
that the memo was a source of the President Kennedy’s press statement in early 
September.  The State and Defense Department memos were also shared with other 
policymakers. Forman at the very least sent his report to Chayes at State. Chayes also 
claimed that he showed both memos to Rusk, who later discussed it with other 
administration officials.  In sum, we can conclude, as Chayes notes, “that there is no 
reason to doubt that most of the members of the Executive Committee were generally 
familiar with the legal background and issues” (Chayes 1974: 24).
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under Article 53 of the Charter, it would require authorization of the Security Council.  He 
then claimed that the US would be able to make a good argument to the contrary and that 




October 19 Meeting  
The October 19 meeting in Ball’s office produced the second major source of 
information on the relevant legal principles.
93
  While the legal questions were raised 
throughout the first days of the crisis, October 19 is a key point in the discussion on 
international law as it was at the center of the meeting. It is also important to note that 
while President Kennedy was leaning towards the blockade on October 19, he by no 
means had made a final decision on what to do in Cuba. Thus, the legal principles 
discussed on October 19 still influenced the thinking of the President and ExComm.  
At the beginning of the meeting, Rusk called for an “exposition” of the legal 
framework for the different polices, including the use of force against Cuba. He 
claimed that a surprise air strike had no support in the law or morality and thus must 
be ruled out.  The Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, however, argued 
that the US could justify the use of force based on the principle of self-defense. 
Among the legal experts, Katzenbach was alone in declaring such a broad 
interpretation of international law (US Department of State 1997:26–50). 
Leonard Meeker concurred with Rusk’s assessment of the legality of using 
force. Specifically, Meeker argued that any action must be considered in relation to 
the UN Charter. As the legal expert at the meetings, he reminded his audience that the 
Charter contained a general prohibition against the use of force, except in limited 
circumstances, including the right to self-defense following an armed attack. He also 
made it clear that the situation in Cuba did not constitute an armed attack, and thus 
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the US had no legal recourse to use force based at least on this justification. He then 
mentioned that the second exception to the prohibition on the use was that the United 
Nations Security Council could authorize collective self-defense under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. He also noted that this seemed unlikely given that the Soviet Union 
could veto any such action (US Department of State 1997:26–50).  
Meeker then suggested a third legal avenue. He said that the Charter also had 
provisions for regional actions under Chapter VIII. In particular, Article 52 allowed 
for regional actions when “such matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for region regional action.” He therefore 
declared that a legal argument could be made under the Charter for the use of force if 
it were sanctioned under the Rio Treaty. Specifically, based on Articles 6 and 8 of the 
Rio Treaty, he argued that the use of force could legally be authorized if the Americas 
were under threat.  Meeker also mentioned that it was necessary to obtain a two-thirds 
vote in the Council to obtain authorization for this (US Department of State 1997:26–
50).  
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Edward Martin then 
commented about the possibility of obtaining the necessary 2/3 vote. He said that the 
US could immediately secure the necessary 14 votes for the blockade and that they 
could increase the number of votes to 18 or 19 within the next 24 hours. Robert 
Kennedy made the point that it was necessary to know in advance about OAS 
support. He argued that it would put the President in an impossible position if the US 
were to attempt to receive OAS authorization, but then failed to do so (US 




an important factor in support of this option since it provided the necessary legal 
justification.   
In sum, between the legal memorandum and the discussions during the 
ExComm meetings, we can conclude that ExComm was familiar with the legal issues 
related to the missiles in Cuba. We can therefore make two important conclusions 
about what ExComm knew about international law during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
First, they knew it was illegal to use force against Cuba as the US was not the victim 
of an armed attack and an attack was not imminent. In other words, they were aware 
that the US had no right to self-defense in Cuba. Second, the OAS could authorize the 
naval blockade and it would be considered consistent with international law.  
 
International law and the Preemptive Use of Force 
Among the many possible military options that ExComm debated when the crisis first 
started, US officials settled on air strikes against the missile sites only as the best 
course of action for the military track. The advantage of employing the preemptive 
use of force, as noted above, is that the US believed they could take out most of the 
missiles in the Cuba.
94
  The two key disadvantages were that US expected that the 
USSR would respond with force elsewhere, and that the US would lose international 
support. Together, USSR reprisals and the lack of international support greatly 
increased the costs for using force against Cuba.   
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was at the forefront of discussing the 
consequences of illegally using force. He also consistently called for consideration of 
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the legal issues. Rusk argued that while the US had to take action, he also cautioned 
against acting immediately and acting unilaterally since any use of force by the US 
was likely to affect the US’s 42 allies across the world. He similarly suggested that 
“we could find ourselves isolated and the alliances crumbling” for engaging in the 
unlawful use of force (May and Zelikow 1997: 56).  On October 16, for instance, he 
claimed that the preemptive use of force would have important consequences in Latin 
American and among NATO Allies. He argued that pursuing the option would lead to 
a “maximum communist reaction” causing a potential overthrow of friendly regimes 
in the region (May and Zelikow 1997: 56).  
Others in ExComm concurred with Rusk’s assessment of the consequences of 
the preemptive use of force. Both McNamara and Bundy would later comment in 
reference to the use of force, “Russian roulette and a broken alliance” indicating that 
using force was a gamble that would lead to problems with US friends in both Latin 
America and Europe (May and Zelikow 1997: 104). Likewise, George Ball suggested 
that President Kennedy provide a 24 hour window to the USSR because of the “sense 
of affront” that would result from unannounced airstrikes among the international 
community including US allies” (May and Zelikow 1997: 91).  In a memo to 
President Kennedy, Lovett claimed that he “thought that the missile strike, the first 
strike, would be very destructive to our alliances” (May and Zelikow 1997: 172). 
Similarly, Ambassador Bohlen argued on October 16 that if the US were to strike 
unannounced, “allied reaction would be dead against us, especially if the Soviet 
Union retaliated locally (or in Turkey or Italy or in Berlin)” May and Zelikow (1997: 




ground invasion acknowledged that political problems might make it necessary to 
provide the USSR with advance notice of a likely attack by the US (May and Zelikow 
1997).   Finally, in a memo summarizing the meetings of October 17, the President’s 
speechwriter, Theodore Sorensen recalled that two points of discussion during the day 
were: 1) how successful we would be in justifying to world military action against 
Cuba and 2) whether the effect on our allies would be worse if we do strike or if we 
do not (Chang and Kornbluh 1992: 114-115). 
 The evidence clearly indicates that several leading US officials believed that if 
the US engaged in the preemptive use of force against Cuba, they would lose the 
support of friends and allies in the international community.  The historical record 
further indicates that the US believed this would happen because it was unlawful and 
consequently illegitimate to strike first.
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 Several US officials thought that they 
would be isolated on the world stage if they used the preemptive use of force against 
the Soviet Union because it violated appropriate standards of behavior in the 
international system.  
 In particular, US policymakers argued that such a strike on Cuba would 
produce an international response similar to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor.  Indeed, Pearl Harbor became a critical analogy for ExComm as US officials 
cited it throughout their conversations. Robert Kennedy was the leading voice in 
using the Pearl Harbor analogy to warn of the consequences of using force first. In 
fact, it was Pearl Harbor that primarily changed the Attorney General from a 
proponent of using force to an opponent of it. In his first recorded reaction, for 
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example - a scribbled note at the first ExComm meeting – he wrote, “I now know 
how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor” (Kennedy 1971: 9) Later he 
would comment that, “my brother is not going to be the Tojo of the 1960s”. Robert 
Kennedy also claimed that,   
 
“With some trepidation, I argued that whatever the validity the 
military and political arguments were for such an attack in preference 
to a blockade, America’s traditions and history would not permit such 
a course of action. Whatever military reasons he and other could 
marshal, they were nevertheless in the last analysis advocating a 
surprise attack by a very large nation against a small one. This, I said, 
could not be undertaken by the US if we were to maintain our moral 
position at home and around the globe. Our struggle against 
Communism throughout the world was far more than physical survival 
– it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals, and these we must 
not destroy” (Kennedy 1971: 16-17). 
 
Likewise, in a position paper to President Kennedy dated October 18, George 
Ball argued forcefully in opposition to a preemptive strike because of the illegality 
and illegitimacy of it: 
But I think that – far from establishing our moral strength – we would, 
in fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a 
manner wholly contrary to our traditions, by pursuing a course of 
action that would directly thwart everything we have stood for during 
our national history, and condemn us as hypocrites in the opinion of 
the world.  
 
We tried Japanese as war criminal because of the sneak attack on Pearl 
Harbor” We condemned the Soviet action in Hungary. We took a 
strong moral line against the use of force by the French and British at 
Suez when they felt their vital interests were threatened. We have 
taken a strong line in the United Nations and in other world councils 
against the dangers of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons.  
 
It is my strongly held view that we cannot launch a surprise against 
Cuba without destroying our moral position and alienating our friends 
and allies. If we were to do so we would wake up the following 




alliances and arrangements and that our whole post-war effort of trying 
to organize the combined strength of the Free World was in shards and 
tatters (Chang and Kornbluh 1992: 119-120). 
 
In sum, Robert Kennedy, George Ball, and other members of ExComm were 
all concerned that a preemptive strike on Cuba would be considered inappropriate by 
members of the international community, and, consequently, they would fail to 
support the US against the USSR.  These concerns were not on the fringes of the 
debate; Robert Kennedy claimed that “ExComm spent more time on this moral 
question during the first five days than on any other single matter…  We struggled 
and fought with one another and with our consciences, for it was a question that 
deeply troubled us all” (Kennedy 1971: 17). 
96
   
The potential loss of international support following the use of force had two 
important consequences for the United States. First, the US believed with high 
confidence that the USSR would engage in reprisals elsewhere if they were to strike 
Cuba.  If tensions were to escalate to a major war with the Soviet Union, the US 
wanted to be sure of allied support in order to be able to confront the Soviet Union 
with a large amount of international support.  
Second, the US also wanted to maintain solidarity with its allies over the long-
term in order to help it compete against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As US 
officials expected the Cold War to continue unabated for some time, they wanted to 
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than international law per say.  Nonetheless, as Chayes argues, “it is hard to believe 
that men as familiar as these with the law in general and the specific international law 
context of the situation before them could have been unaware or even unmindful of 
the legal overtones of the moral proposition. Legal norm and morals are two 





avoid any course of action that would weaken the commitment of its allies since this 
could help embolden the Soviet Union in future interactions. 
Regarding the importance of international support, Rusk argued “the actions 
also have to be thought of in connection with alliance solidarity. They’re faced with 
conflicting elements. Unless we’re in a situation where it is clear that the alliance is 
with us and understands the problem, then an unannounced, or unconsulted, quick 
action on our part could well lead to a kind of allied disunity that the Soviets could 
capitalize upon very strongly” (May and Zelikow 1997: 79).  Likewise, Adlai 
Stevenson in a letter to President Kennedy on October 17 wrote that it was important 
that the US receive the support of much of the world since it is likely that the Soviet 
Union would engage in reprisals elsewhere if the US used force. Obtaining greater 
support, he argued, would help offset the costs of a conflagration should the Soviet 
Union respond with force as US officials expected (May and Zelikow 1997).  
In sum, members of ExComm recognized the dangers of engaging in the 
preemptive use of force.  Because the US wanted to maximize international support in 
case a conflict erupted with the Soviet Union, the reaction of third parties to the 
preemptive use of force influenced Washington’s thinking on this option. By using 
force illegally, they would lose the support of the international community and hence 








International law and the Blockade 
An OAS-approved blockade made up the second leading option to ExComm. 
Officials believed that the US could maximize international support by obtaining 
OAS approval for a blockade of Cuba.  Beyond implementing the blockade itself, it 
was critical that the US receive OAS approval for it. Obtaining OAS approval and 
legality for the blockade would add to the legitimacy of the blockade in the eyes of 
the international community and thus serve to increase it as a plausible alternative to 
the large scale use of force among ExComm.  Several policymakers therefore 
prioritized obtaining OAS approval for the blockade in order gain international 
support.  
Dean Rusk once again took the lead in pushing for OAS authorization of the 
blockade as he argued it would help the US obtain third party support. He argued that 
the US should consult OAS before taking any action since the OAS provided the 
“strongest legal basis for whatever action we need to take” (May and Zelikow 1997: 
80). He specifically recommended, “First that we stimulate the OAS procedure 
immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere 
considers that the Rio Pact has been violated, and over the next days, under the terms 
of the Rio Pact Treaty” (May and Zelikow 1997: 36). 
John McNamara who at first supported air strikes against Cuba later changed 
his mind to the blockade.  In justifying his decision, he listed four major advantages 
of the blockade: it would cause the US the least trouble with allies, 2), it avoids any 
surprise air attack on Cuba which is contrary to US traditions, 3) it is the only military 




4) it avoids any sudden military move which might provide a response from USSR 
that could lead to general war. As you can see, the first reason McNamara provided is 
directly related to the support of international actors and the second and third reasons 
are associated with the legitimacy of the blockade (May and Zelikow 1997: 128). 
Finally, Meeker also favored the blockade because, as noted above, he argued that it 
was legal and he believed that the consequences of using force were too high.  
An important exchange between Ball, Bundy, and Rusk also illustrates the 
importance of international law and OAS authorization for the blockade.  
Ball: The great difficulty of a blockade without a declaration of war is 
that it is an illegal blockade, that it will be very difficult. 
Bundy: It is an act of aggression against everybody else. 
Ball: Everybody, including our allies. 
Rusk: What? You could have a blockade imposed under Article 8 of 
the Rio Treaty. After that is within the territorial framework of the Rio. 
The conversation nicely illustrates the most important points of my argument. 
First, US officials were concerned with international law, second, they incorporated 
how allies would respond to implementing the blockade, as a violation of 
international law, and finally, the OAS provided legal justification for the blockade 
and thus it provided assurances to allies about the legitimacy of the mission. Indeed 
President Kennedy probably said it best, “If we didn’t get an OAS resolution, it 
would have to be a declaration of war and a declaration of War on Cuba at that point 
would have placed us in an isolated position the whole foreign policy of the US since 
1947 has been to develop and maintain alliances in this hemisphere as well as around 




Once again, international support had important consequences for President 
Kennedy’s decision.  The US believed that a united front among Europe and the 
Western Hemisphere following the implementation of the blockade would help 
increase the likelihood that Kruschev would accept some sort of compromise 
agreement.  The US believed that greater international support would help them 
prevail in negotiations with USSR and possibly deter them from using force. As 
Meeker argued, since OAS approval provided a legal basis for the blockade “it 
changed our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of international law 
into a country in accordance with twenty allies legally protecting their position” 
(Kennedy 1971:121). Along these lines, Thompson argued that, “The Russians have a 
curious faculty… of wanting a legal basis despite all of the outrageous things they’ve 
done.  They attach a lot of importance to this” (May and Zelikow 1997: 155). 
In sum, despite the advantages of using force, especially early in the crisis, the 
costs of using force were greater than the benefits of using force.  The political costs 
associated with violating international law and using force against Cuba contributed 
to the decision of President Kennedy to implement the blockade instead of employing 
airstrikes and/or a ground invasion against Cuba. Specifically, throughout the 
deliberations, several members of ExComm repeatedly and consistently argued that 
violating international law by using force would result in lower international support 
from allies and increased hostilities from the USSR, and hence, greater costs for using 
force.  Likewise, despite doubts about the success of the blockade in terms of forcing 
the USSR to remove the missiles, President Kennedy still expected increased support 




International law and the Post-Blockade Decision 
The previous two sections highlighted how US officials incorporated international 
law into their decision-making processes. The evidence clearly shows that the 
expectation of third party support contributed to the decision-making of President 
Kennedy. In this section, I show that the actual international response was consistent 
with the thinking of ExComm, providing further support for my argument on the role 
of international law and crisis bargaining.  
First, the show of unity between the US and allies influenced the behavior of 
the USSR. Robert Kennedy argued “our position around the world was greatly 
strengthened when the OAS unanimously supported the recommendation for a 
quarantine. Their willingness to follow the leadership of the US was a heavy and 
unexpected blow to Khrushchev. It had a major psychological and practical effect on 
the Russians” (Sorensen 1965: 706).  Likewise, one historian concluded that there is 
reason to think that Moscow was “staggered” by the show of inter-American 
solidarity (Abel 1966: 131).  In an article on November 3, 1962, the NY Times 
concluded that the unanimity of the OAS council together with the support of NATO 
allies for the blockade surprised the Soviet Union and accounted for much of her 
diplomatic confusion during the week.   
Robert Kennedy also claimed that, “the Latin American countries, 
demonstrating an unique sense of unity, unanimously supported the recommendations 
of the United States. In fact, a number of Latin American states contributed men, 
supplies, and ships during the several weeks that followed” (Kennedy 1971: 35).  The 




legality of the OAS-approved blockade and most importantly that this influenced the 
behavior of the USSR. Similarly, months after the end of the crisis, several members 
of ExComm met to discuss “what ifs”, one if which was... “what would have 
happened… if the OAS and other Allies had not supported us” (Chayes 1974: 48).  
Second, it was in large part international law that influenced the behavior of 
allies. As Robert Kennedy claimed, “The diplomatic effort was of great significance. 
We were able to establish a firm legal foundation for our action under the OAS 
Charter and our position around the world was greatly strengthened when the OAS 
unanimously supported the recommendation for the quarantine. Thus the Soviet union 
and Cuba faced the united action of the whole Western Hemisphere” (Kennedy 1971: 
29).   
Likewise, once the decision was made to implement the blockade, US 
officials made a concerted effort to demonstrate the legality of the blockade to friends 
and allies in the international community.  As part of the effort to gain international 
support, Chayes wrote a second memo dated October 23 on the legality of the OAS 
blockade. Regarding the OAS authorization on the blockade, he concluded,  
The recommendation contained in the Resolution for the use of armed 
force if necessary was thus fully authorized by the terms of the Rio 
Treaty and adopted in accordance with its procedures. The quarantine 
being imposed is specifically designed to “ensure that the Government 
of Cuba” cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers the 
offensive weapons which threaten the peace and security of the 
Continent. It represents a minimal use of force to achieve the state 
objectives. The United States action thus falls within the terms of the 
OAS Resolution (Chayes 1974: 143). 
The US sent the memo to many friends and allies in the international 




document was a complete surprise to him. As he noted, “the pleas from our 
diplomatic missions for an exposition of the legal basis for the US action were so 
insistent and continuous that soon after the OAS action… the memorandum was 
transmitted in full to all posts” (Chayes 1974: 47). The demand for the US legal 
argument demonstrated the importance that third party leaders placed on international 
law as a means to justify their support for US actions in Cuba.  
 
The Nuclear Objection 
The evidence presented in this chapter clearly indicates that international law 
influenced the decision-making of President Kennedy and his team of advisers during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nonetheless, the most obvious critique of this argument is 
that nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war and not international law 
contributed to the peaceful resolution of this crisis. While of course it is true that 
nuclear weapons and the balance of military power in general influenced the outcome 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, there are good reasons to believe that law also had a 
meaningful impact on the termination of this crisis. This is true for two primary 
reasons.  
 First, and at the most basic level, multiple factors go into explaining the 
decision-making of leaders. It is unlikely that a single variable can explain all of the 
variation in world politics, especially international crisis. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
for instance, scholars have long argued that the conventional military balance, the 
strategic nuclear balance, along with domestic political considerations, among several 




suggests that international law in addition to the more traditional explanations also 
played an important role in this crisis.  
 Second, and more substantively, it is not clear that the threat of nuclear war 
was the leading determinant of crisis behavior here.  While US officials believed that 
the USSR would respond with force to an American military strike most likely in 
Europe, they also doubted that the USSR would use nuclear weapons.  As Press 
(2005, 132) argues “no one believed that the Soviets would intentionally start a 
nuclear war. Even if some of the missiles survived an air strike, the Soviets would not 
authorize a nuclear attack against the United States.”  Likewise, Trachtenberg (1985, 
143) argues that US policymakers “overtly and deliberately exploited” the risk of 
nuclear war, because ‘‘deterrent threats, by reducing the probability of any direct 
Soviet retaliation, would increase America’s freedom of action in Cuba.” Primary 
source material leads to a similar conclusion. A National Intelligence Estimate from 
October 20 concludes that, “Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war 
or take military measures, which in their case, would run the grave risk of general 
war’’ (Chang and Kornbluh 1992,134–143). Finally, George Ball claimed that 
“‘Khrushchev himself would never risk a major war on a fellow as obviously erratic 
and foolish as Castro” (Chang and Kornbluh 1992,134–143). 
 In sum, while nuclear weapons of course played an important role in the 
peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that the law also influenced the decision-making of US policymakers. 




that it would maximize international support, which he could use to his advantage 
against the USSR in this crisis and throughout the Cold War. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I sought to explain how international law played a role in the 
peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy and his team of 
advisers prioritized international law because of how they expected friends and allies 
in the international community would respond to it.  Specifically, they expected that 
the preemptive use of force as a violation of international law would alienate 
members of the international community, while the legality of an OAS-approved 
blockade would find the US acting in concert with friends and allies. The support had 
important consequences on the resolution of the crisis: US officials believed that less 
support would lead to lower payoffs and greater support would lead to higher payoffs. 
Given these considerations, President Kennedy chose the policy with the higher 
payoffs – the OAS-approved blockade.   
Indeed, as Robert Kennedy argued years later, “the strongest argument against 
the all-out military attack, and one no one could answer to his satisfaction, was that a 
surprise attack would erode if not destroy the moral position of the United States 
throughout the world (Kennedy 1971: 27). Likewise, as Chayes concluded, “The 
factual record is irrefutable, however, that the men responsible for decision did not 
ignore legal considerations. On the contrary, they made a considerable effort to 
integrate legal factors into their deliberations… Law and legal considerations played 




“We may fairly conclude that the rule of Article 2(4) was a significant factor in 
determining the decision against air strike or invasion and for the lesser measure of a 
quarantine” (Chayes 1974: 100, 40).  In short, the evidence from both primary and 
second sources is unambiguous: the legal prohibition on the use of force contributed 






Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
Does international law on the use of force - the body of law that regulates the decision 
to use force between states and increasingly between states and non-state actors - 
influence the behavior of leaders in international crises? If so, how do the United 
Nations Charter and the related legal principles on the use of force actually constrain 
leaders?  
 Scholars have long disagreed on the role of international law including the 
legal principles related to the use of force in world politics. Many scholars simply 
reject the effectiveness of the law, especially in the security realm, given the primitive 
nature of the international legal system (i.e. no centralized enforcement mechanism). 
Morgenthau (1967), for instance, doubted the influence of international law in high-
security disputes because he believed that sanctions or other enforcement mechanisms 
were necessary for international law to constrain leaders. Other influential political 
scientists, such as E.H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Krasner have all argued 
that international law is at most epiphenomenal to state interests (Carr 2001; Krasner 
2001; Waltz 1979).  More recently, prominent legal scholars, Jack Goldsmith and 
Eric Posner have pointed to the limits of international law and have argued that it has 
a minor influence on state behavior (Goldsmith and Posner 2005).  Several scholars 
have also argued that international law on the use of force has little influence on the 
decision of leaders to use force (Arend and Beck 1992; Glennon 2001; Weisburd 
2009). Mearsheimer, for instance, argues that the Charter has failed to “push states 




Despite the critics, numerous scholars maintain that the law can constrain state 
behavior, even in the security arena.  Scholars favoring a more normative approach, 
for instance, argue that governments comply with the law in large part because of the 
legitimacy of it. They argue that leaders feel a sense of legal obligation (“opino 
juris”) or that the law exerts a “pull toward compliance” (Franck 1990), or states feel 
an “obligation of obedience” to the law (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 1998).  On the 
other hand, scholars working in the rationalist tradition agree with the critics that the 
law must be self-enforcing, but they argue that compliance with the law is more 
common than most critics allow for. In so doing, they draw on standard arguments 
from the rationalist international cooperation literature to explain the effectiveness of 
the law (e.g., Huth et al. 2011; Morrow 2007; Simmons 2009).  
 Despite the ongoing debate among both legal scholars and politics, we still 
have very little systematic knowledge on international law on the use of force. This 
omission is not inconsequential. The legal prohibition on the use of force codified in 
part in the United Nations Charter is largely seen as a pivotal moment in the recent 
history of international relations. Indeed, the legal rules on the use of force constitute, 
according to many scholars and policymakers, the primary operating norm of the 
post-World War II era. Nonetheless, both political scientists and legal scholars 
continue to ignore how international law on the use of force can constrain leaders and 
other actors in the international system.  
 In this dissertation I addressed this important gap in the literature by 
undertaking a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of international law on the 




assessing how the law alters patterns of escalation in international crises from 1946-
2005. Using an original dataset on international law on the use of force and case 
studies, I found that law can serve as an effective constraint on leaders during 
international crises.  
 
Theoretical Argument 
In Chapter 3, I put forward my theoretical expectations on international law on the 
use of force. I argued that international law can constrain crisis actors from 
employing the large-scale use of force by facilitating the dynamics of reciprocity in 
crisis-bargaining and consequently helping leaders deter the aggressive use of force. I 
argued that this is a two-part process. First, the law serves as a bright-line that clearly 
establishes that the aggressive use of force is inappropriate and the lawful use of force 
is appropriate.  This body of law, therefore, legalizes and in large part institutionalizes 
the reciprocal use of force in international crises. Second, by serving in this role, the 
law alters the support of international actors, who are more likely to support crisis 
actors with the right of self-defense and withhold support from actors who violate the 
law.  As such, third party support provides leaders with the resources to credibly 
threaten to employ the reciprocal use of force in response to aggressive actions. In 
turn, this can serve to deter attacks from occurring in the first place.  I concluded that 
leaders are less likely to escalate militarily when the law prohibits it, compared to 







In Chapter 4, I tested my theoretical expectations on an original dataset on 
international law on the use of force. In particular, I examined the relationship 
between the prohibition on the use of force and patterns of escalation in international 
crises from 1945-2006.  I found that leaders are at least 45% less likely to escalate 
militarily in a crisis when international law prohibits the use of force than when 
leaders have a right to use force. I also employed a variety of robustness checks to 
ensure that the results are robust to standard statistical and conceptual complications 
in the literature. The strong and consistent findings indicate that the prohibition on the 
use of force is associated both statistically and substantively with lower levels of 
escalation in international crises.  
In Chapter 5, I directly examined the role of international actors, the 
underlying causal mechanism in my theoretical argument. To that end, I relied on 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council, United 
Nations General Assembly, and other major regional multilateral security 
organizations as proxies for international support. In particular, I assessed whether 
third parties are more likely to support actors who have the right of self-defense and 
oppose actors who have violated international law. I found strong support for the 
logic of my argument: international and regional organizations are at least 38% less 
likely to support leaders who violate the law, compared to leaders who are in 
compliance with it.   
In this chapter, I also compared the levels of international support for the 




Consistent with my theoretical expectations, I found first that the international 
community provided much less support in the 2003 Iraq War than the first Gulf War, 
and second it did so in part because the US and her allies violated international law on 
the use of force in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Together, the qualitative and quantitative 
results presented in this chapter provide strong support for my theoretical argument 
on how international law influences the behavior of third parties.   
In Chapter 6, I assessed my argument in a case study of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, in which I found that international law influenced the decision-making of 
President Kennedy and his advisers during this crisis.  US officials expected to 
receive greater international support for the naval blockade and less third party 
support and higher costs for employing the preemptive and illegal use of force against 
the missile sites in Cuba. US officials feared that if they used force without the 
support from the international community, the USSR would be more likely to respond 
with force. In contrast, Washington believed that an OAS-approved blockade would 
deter the USSR from using force to challenge the blockade.  The level of international 
support contributed to the decision to implement the blockade.   
 In sum, the quantitative and empirical evidence presented in this dissertation 
provides strong support for my theoretical argument on the role of international law 
on the use of force in international crises.  Crisis actors who act in accordance with 
international law obtain greater international support, while actors who violate the 
law receive less support. International law therefore promotes the peaceful resolution 




signal their intent to employ the use of force in self-defense and deter their 
adversaries from engaging in the aggressive and illegal use of force.  
 
Implications 
My dissertation has several important implications for the policy and academic 
communities interested in both international law and conflict. First, my dissertation 
can help advance the literature’s understanding of compliance with international law. 
Scholars have long argued that reciprocity can promote cooperation and compliance 
world politics, yet there is a paucity of empirical research on it. To my knowledge, 
Morrow’s (2007) work on the laws of war is the only piece of scholarship that 
explicitly theorizes and empirically assesses how reciprocity can contribute to 
compliance with international law.  My dissertation that finds strong statistical and 
substantive support for how the law can influence reciprocal interactions in 
international crisis provides further support for the role of reciprocity in the 
international law compliance literature. Scholars can therefore have greater 
confidence that reciprocity is in fact associated with compliance and continue to 
pursue the role of reciprocity in both the security and economic realms.  
 Second, I integrate the role of international actors into the traditional 
understanding of reciprocal interactions. While scholars have theorized about how 
domestic actors can influence reciprocity, they have for the most part overlooked how 
international actors can influence strategic interactions in this context.  As my 
theoretical arguments shows, third parties by altering the costs and benefits of using 




more generally. Future work on law compliance should therefore continue to explore 
how third parties can affect international law compliance, both within the context of 
reciprocity and on its own as a distinct mechanism.  
 My dissertation also has important implications for policymakers. Most 
importantly, my results clearly indicate that international law on the use of force 
alters the costs and benefits of using force by influencing third party support in 
international crises.  Leaders can expect to receive greater support and lower costs for 
complying with the law, and lower support and greater costs when they violate it. As 
such, this dissertation can help policymakers know when they can expect to receive 
relatively high levels of international support for using force.  
 Second, the findings in this dissertation also suggest that the law is most 
effective when it is clear and well-established. Uncertainty about the law and the facts 
attenuate the constraining effects of international law.  Policymakers and other actors 
who want to minimize the resort to force in world politics should be motivated to 
clarify the remaining ambiguities in the legal principles related to the use of force to 
further promote the peaceful resolution of international crises. The use of force by 
non-state actors and their state supporters is one area of law that could benefit from 
further clarification on the relevant legal principles. Likewise, states often violate the 
law when there is uncertainty over the underlying facts of the relevant crises. 
Increased monitoring efforts in contentious areas could help lower the likelihood of 
conflict.  
 Finally, this dissertation has important implications for scholars interested in 




that international law on the use of force can effectively constrain leaders in 
international crises. My findings overturn the conventional wisdom in the political 
science literature that either overlooks this body of law or dismisses it.  The legality 
of using force clearly influences the decision of crisis actors to resort to force. As 
such, my dissertation makes clear that some use of force is legal and some is illegal, 




I plan to conduct several more analyses to further examine how international law on 
the use of force operates in world politics. Most importantly, I intend to write several 
more case studies on the specific principle in this body of law, including the 
anticipatory use of force, interventions in civil wars and other forms of non-
international armed conflict, and the extra-territorial use of force against non-state 
actors.   The insights from the case studies will identify specific policy 
recommendations for how to improve the effectiveness of this body of law.    
Second, I will conduct additional tests using the data on the specific legal 
principles that I have already collected. Specifically, I plan to disaggregate the legal 
variable I currently use and assess the effectiveness of the specific legal principles, 
such as the extraterritorial use of force, interventions, anticipatory self-defense, and 
so forth. I also plan to disaggregate the legal variable across the different sources of 
international law (i.e. customary international law, treaty law, court decisions, and the 




will be particularly useful to understand how the effectiveness of this body of law 
varies across both the specific legal principles and the different sources of 
international law.   
Third, I plan to conduct surveys on how citizens respond to international law 
on the use of force. The surveys will allow me to obtain empirical evidence on the 
micro-foundations of my argument. While I have preliminary evidence using cross-
national state-level data that is suggestive of my argument, I am unable to directly test 
my theoretical framework on the indirect effects of international law using 
observational data at the national level. Because this part of my argument is based on 
the behavior of individuals rather than national leaders, I require data that directly 
measures how citizens respond to international law instead of inferring citizen 
support from leader behavior. The results of the survey, therefore, will allow me to 
more precisely gauge how international law can serve as a constraint on leaders.  
Finally, I plan to complement the quantitative and qualitative work by 
interviewing former legal advisers from the State Department and other elite actors on 
the role of international law in the policymaking process. For example, I will consider 
how the law influenced the decision of the US to use force against Afghanistan and 
especially Sudan in 1998 following the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania. Likewise, I am interested in how policymakers handle the ramifications of 
violating the law when they are considering humanitarian interventions (i.e. 
intervention in Kosovo). In short, the elite interviews should be an extremely 
illuminating way to show exactly how this body of law influences leaders in the 






On October 25, 1962, US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson and the USSR 
Ambassador Valerian Zorin engaged in a famous and heated exchange about the 
situation in Cuba. As Stevenson was questioning Zorin about the missiles in Cuba, 
the Soviet Ambassador retorted, I am not in an “American Courtroom.” Stevenson 
immediately countered, “You are in the court of world opinion right now.”   
 Stevenson’s famous line not only makes up the title of my dissertation, but it 
is also the underlying logic of my argument. While the international system lacks 
overt enforcement mechanisms, international audience costs in the context of 
reciprocity can contribute to compliance with the international law on the use of 
force.  States that violate the law can expect to receive lower support from the 
international community and subsequently higher costs for using force, while states 
with the right of self-defense can expect to receive greater support and lowers costs. 
Third parties, therefore, provide leaders with the necessary incentives to comply with 
international law on the use of force.  
 As former State Department Legal Advisor Abram Chayes once said, 
“international law may not be determinative in international affairs, but it is relevant 
and influences foreign policy; first, as a constraint on action; second, as the basis of 
justification or legitimization for action; and third, as providing organizational 
structures, procedures, and forums within which political decisions may be reached” 
(Scharf and Williams 2010, 4). My argument in this dissertation reflects the wisdom 




international relations literature (i.e. balance of power, domestic politics, and 
economic interdependence) explain in large part the decision to use force in 
international crises, I hope this dissertation makes clear that international law on the 

















Appendix A: Control Variables 
Military Capabilities: This is measured as a ratio of military capabilities between 
each state and its adversary. The measure is the average ratio of three separate 
indicators of military capabilities: 1) total military personnel, 2) military 
expenditures, and 3) expenditures per soldier. The primary source for this variable is 
the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 (Singer et al. 
1972, 1987) 
 
Democracy: This variable takes on a value of 1 if a state's net Polity score is equal to 
or greater than 6, and zero otherwise (Marshall and Jaggers 2003). As a robustness 
check, I used 7 as the cut-point. My results remained the same.  
 
Accountable Regimes: This variable is a coded a 1 if the regime type was one of the 
following: 1) democracy, 2) new democracy, 3) mixed nondemocracy, 4) single-party 
states, 5) military 6) regimes, or 7) dynastic monarchies, and zero otherwise. (Geddes 
2003; Weeks 2008) 
 
Contiguity: Coded a 1 if the challenger and target share a land or river border, or are 
separated by less than 400 miles of water, and zero otherwise (Bennett and Stam 
2000). 
 
Distance: This variable is the natural logarithm of the distance (measured in a 
kilometers) between the capitals of the challenger and target (Bennett and Stam 
2000). 
 
Alliance: This variable is coded a 1 if the challenger and target have an offensive or 
defense alliance or have a credibility pact, and zero otherwise (Leeds et al. 2002) 
 
Major-Minor Challenger: Coded a 1 if the challenger is a major power and the target 
is a minor power, and zero otherwise (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
 
Major-Minor Target: Coded a 1 if the target is a major power and the challenger is a 
minor power, and otherwise (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
 
Gravity: Coded a 1 if the crisis was a threat to existence or threat of grave damage to 
the crisis actor, and zero otherwise, and zero otherwise (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 
2000). 
 
Territory: Coded a 1 if the crisis was over territorial issues, and zero otherwise 
(Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). 
 
Internal: Coded a 1 if the crisis involved non-state actors, and zero otherwise 





Appendix B: Matching 
 
The Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) procedure works in five steps.  First, I 
create a new dataset that contains the treatment variable (international law on the use 
of force) and the control variables from the models used in this dissertation. 
Consistent with the purpose of matching, the control variables in this new data are 
associated with the implementation of the treatment. Second, I coarsen or recode each 
control variable to create a variable with a smaller number of categories, in which 
substantively indistinguishable values are grouped together in the new categories. For 
example, a net Polity variable (1-20) could be coarsened into non-democratic, mixed, 
and democratic regimes. This coarsening is either done manually or by an automated 
procedure. 
Third, I create strata or categories that include all possible combinations of the 
values from all of the coarsened variables. For example, a second control variable, 
GDP, could be added and coarsened into low-income, middle-income, and high-
income states. The strata would then include (1) non-democratic, low-income, (2) 
non-democratic, middle-income (3) non-democratic, high-income, (4) mixed, low-
income, and so forth. Observations from the data that fit the combination of values 
are then placed in the appropriate strata. Fourth, strata that include at last one treated 
(right to self-defense prohibited) and one control unit (right to self-defense permitted) 
are retained, while the remaining strata are dropped from the data.   Fifth, the 
coarsened variables from the reduced data set are returned to their original values and 




primarily rely on in this dissertation. Specifically, after running the matching 
procedure, I re-estimated my main equations on a reduced, but more balanced sample 
of 217 challenger observations and 348 targets.  As noted above, the results are nearly 















Appendix C: Aggression 
 
Right to Self-Defense: This variable equals 1 if the state is prohibited from using force 
and zero if the state is prohibited from using force.  See previous chapter for detailed 
coding rules for this variable.  
 
Aggression: This variable equals 1 if a state commits aggression but fails to reach the 
level of activating the right of self-defense, and zero otherwise.   The determination of 
aggression is based on the Definition of Aggression, United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX).  
 
Specifically, the resolution holds that the following acts constitute aggression:  
“ (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or 
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof, 
“(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State 
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
“(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
“(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another State; 
“(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
“(f) The action of a State in allowing its temtory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State; 
“(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity 
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